

# KOREAN WAR

## Organized Crime?



COUNCIL *on*  
FOREIGN  
RELATIONS



By William P. Litynski

# From the Grassy Knoll in Seoul, Korea: Lone Gunman or Patsy?

The Assassinations of Korean Patriots  
Yuh Woon-Hyung (July 19, 1947) and Kim Ku (June 26, 1949)



***Dr. Syngman Rhee has friends in high places:*** Dr. Syngman Rhee (center), President of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), appears with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Allen W. Dulles (2nd left), U.S. Army General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (left), Commander-in-Chief of the Far East and United Nations Command, and U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Walter C. Dowling in Seoul, South Korea in circa 1956. **Allen W. Dulles, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and Walter C. Dowling were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private political organization in New York City.** Walter C. Dowling served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from July 14, 1956 until October 2, 1959.  
(Photo: Allen W. Dulles Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University)





▲ 중국에서 갓 환국한 김구 주석을 미군정 사령관 하지(John R. Hodge)중장에게 소개하는 리승만(1945. 11)

Korean politicians Syngman Rhee (left) and Kim Koo [Kim Ku] (center) meet with U.S. Army Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea, in Seoul, Korea in November 1945.

Korean patriot Kim Ku, who served as President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (1940-1948), was assassinated by a “lone gunman” in Seoul, Republic of Korea on **June 26, 1949**. The Korean War began on **June 25, 1950**.

Korean independence activists Yuh Woon-Hyung and Kim Ku favored immediate unification and the elimination of the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel; **both Yuh Woon-Hyung and Kim Ku were assassinated in Seoul by a “lone gunman”**.

“As if enough did not happen on the last Sunday in June [1949], **just past noon An Tu-hui, a member of the Northwest Youth and an officer in the ROKA [Republic of Korea Army], entered Kim Ku’s home and assassinated him.** Drumwright commented that military police “arrived within minutes of Kim’s death, although there were no military installations nearby.” Both American and British sources thought that Rhee was behind the murder, and the British cited rumors that Kim was plotting a coup against Rhee.”

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 392



Yuh Woon-Hyung delivers a speech in Committee for Preparation of Korean Independence in Seoul, Korea on August 16, 1945. **Yuh Woon-Hyung was assassinated by a "lone gunman" (a 19-year-old man named Han Ji-geun, a member of a Korean secret society) in Seoul, Korea on July 19, 1947.** (Photo: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division\\_of\\_Korea](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_Korea))

"The driver had slowed to negotiate the *Haehwadong* traffic rotary, when the murderer mounted the running board and pumped three bullets from a .45 automatic into Yo Un-hyong's head, killing him instantly. G2 investigators pinpointed the site "within a stone's throw of a police box," but said that police "made no effort to apprehend the assassin." The executioner, nineteen-year old Han Chi-gun, belonged to a small group of right-wing terrorists; like Japanese hotheads in the 1930s, he reckoned that his act would make him a national hero. Upon his capture he told police he had acted at the instigation of a man in P'yongyang named Pak Nam-sok. After plotting to assassinate Kim II Sung, Han had come down from P'yongyang a month before the murder, residing at the home of Han Hyon-u, who was then doing a life sentence for the 1945 murder of Song Chin-u; living in the same house was none other than Kim Tu-hwan, whom CIC agents had caught torturing leftists just a few weeks before. Although Han denied any political affiliation, he and his group "acknowledged adherence" to Kim Ku. General Hodge and other knowledgeable Americans in the Occupation thought that Kim Ku was responsible for the murder; Leonard Bertsch believed that Kim had first cleared the act with Syngman Rhee. But there is evidence for another possibility, one that Hodge and Bertsch would hesitate to assert: that the National Police engineered it. By the summer of 1947 Yo Un-hyong was "the most shot at man in South Korea," according to a U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) historian, who counted nine attempts on his life since liberation. In July 1946 several thugs had tried to lynch him; in October 1946 leftists detained him for two days, after which he entered a hospital suffering from "nervous shock." For months before his death, Yo complained that police followed him everywhere and periodically searched his home; but since these same police would not protect him from attack, he asked Americans for permission to carry a weapon and to arm his bodyguards."

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 206

“Roger Baldwin, for many years the head of the American Civil Liberties Union, toured Korea in May 1947. “The country is literally in the grip of a police regime and a private terror,” he wrote to friends; “you get the general impression of a beaten, discouraged people.” He saw a prison where one thousand people were held for labor and strike organizing. Koreans “want all foreigners to get out and let them build their nation,” but were the Americans to pull out, he thought, a civil war would result. After the American G-2 chief showed him intelligence reports on the countryside, however, Baldwin concluded that “a state of undeclared war” already existed in Korea. He spoke with Yo Un-hyong, 1945 leader of the Korean People's Republic, who told him that the government was “full of Quislings” and “toadies to the Americans”; **it was the American retention of the colonial police, Yo thought, that was the key to the “present chaos.”** On a quiet, sultry afternoon a few weeks later, Yo picked up the editor of the *Independence News*, Ko Kyong-hom, and motored over by the ancient Ch'anggyong'won Palace to meet another American, Edgar Johnson, an Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) official. Johnson later recalled,

I remember how impatiently I waited, with my interpreter, that afternoon of July 19, 1947. I had been told by messenger that Lyuh would come about four o'clock. Four o'clock came, four thirty, and then a furiously driven car swerved into the muddy lane leading up the hill to our house . . . a man jumped out and ran stumbling up the hill. Breathlessly he told me that Lyuh had been assassinated less than half a mile from my house.”

**The driver had slowed to negotiate the *Haehwadong* traffic rotary, when the murderer mounted the running board and pumped three bullets from a .45 automatic into Yo Un-hyong's head, killing him instantly. G-2 investigators pinpointed the site “within a stone's throw of a police box,” but said that police “made no effort to apprehend the assassin.” The executioner, nineteen-year old Han Chi-gun, belonged to a small group of right-wing terrorists; like Japanese hotheads in the 1930s, he reckoned that his act would make him a national hero.** Upon his capture he told police he had acted at the instigation of a man in Pyongyang named Pak Nam-sok. After plotting to assassinate Kim Il Sung, Han had come down from Pyongyang a month before the murder, residing at the home of Han Hyon-u, who was then doing a life sentence for the 1945 murder of Song Chin-u; living in the same house was none other than Kim Tu-hwan, whom CIC agents had caught torturing leftists just a few weeks before. Although Han denied any political affiliation, he and his group “acknowledged adherence” to Kim Ku. General Hodge and other knowledgeable Americans in the Occupation thought that Kim Ku was responsible for the murder; Leonard Bertsch believed that Kim had first cleared the act with Syngman Rhee. But there is evidence for another possibility, one that Hodge and Bertsch would hesitate to assert: that the National Police engineered it. **By the summer of 1947 Yo Un-hyong was “the most shot at man in South Korea,” according to a U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) historian, who counted nine attempts on his life since liberation. In July 1946 several thugs had tried to lynch him; in October 1946 leftists detained him for two days, after which he entered a hospital suffering from “nervous shock.” For months before his death, Yo complained that police followed him everywhere and periodically searched his home; but since these same police would not protect him from attack, he asked Americans for permission to carry a weapon and to arm his bodyguards.** Bertsch visited Yo's country home in March 1947 and found that police had arrested Yo's bodyguards after searching his house and finding weapons; Yo was in hiding, fearing an assassination. The American advisor to the provincial police, a Colonel Stone, defended the arrests and said he would not indulge in “groundless prognostications” about whether Yo was a target for assassination. **Two weeks later Yo's home was wrecked by a bomb. In the same period, American G-2 reports carried many rumors of assassination plots by rightist groups, including one that targeted Maj. Gen. Albert Brown, head of the American team at the Joint Commission. In late May, the G-2 cited the existence within the Korean National Police of a “Black Tiger Gang,” run by the Seoul police director, Chang T'aeksang; this gang was “reliably reported” to have met with leaders of the Northwest Youth on or about May 13, to plot “a terroristic campaign aimed specifically” at Yo Un-hyong, Kim Kyu-sik, and Won Se-hun.** A week before Yo died, American intelligence found “serious unrest” in police ranks over the pro-Japanese, antitraitor bill then before the SKILA; “several ranking members of the police force,” whom the Americans termed “old pro-Japs,” were “attempting to coerce all police into direct action.” **SKILA legislators expressed fear for their own safety, while Yo Un-hyong and Kim Kyu-sik again asked the Americans to supply bodyguards. None were provided. Of those politicians with whom the Americans were willing to deal, Yo Un-hyong was the most vocal critic of the retention of hated Korean police who had done Japanese bidding. He was also, as the CIA later acknowledged, the only noncommunist southern leader capable of challenging Syngman Rhee for power. His daughter, Yo Yon-gu, told me that Chang T'aek-sang ordered the murder. Either the police arranged his assassination, or looked the other way so that it could happen.** It is remarkable, for example, that the murderer could live at the home of Song Chin-u's assailant for a month with Kim Tu-hwan, and not be detected by the police. It is even more remarkable that the American command dealt so cavalierly with Yo's many requests for protection, and so leniently with his police and rightist adversaries. In 1945 Yo Un-hyong was a gifted, fitting leader for liberated Korea. A hardy man and charismatic orator, he reflected the aspirations of the great majority of the Korean people, and in his person embodied the peculiar class structure of Korean society as it emerged from the Japanese grip: at home with the vast peasantry, he also had a bit of the bourgeois gentleman about him. He was an ardent nationalist, a staunch resister during the colonial period who also kept his distance from General Hodge, earning the latter's enmity. Yo also developed a bit of camaraderie with Kim Il Sung, something that still carries a hint about how Korea might have been unified without civil war. But by 1947 the national division had hardened, separate states had arisen, and in retrospect it is difficult to imagine how a man of his magnanimous qualities could have survived the deepening strife. The British epitaph was that Yo “tried to ride all the horses at once in order to be sure of coming home on the winner,” which has an unkind measure of truth in it, were Korea England or America. But in the Manichean world of postwar Korean politics, a man who sought to bridge differences and unite parties was rare indeed. Yo Un-hyong remains about the only politician from the 1940s who is honored both in South and North Korea. That itself is an eloquent epitaph. On the third anniversary of liberation in 1948, the remnant *kon'guk tongmaeng* faction sought to hold a memorial service for Yo: Rhee had ninety-six of them arrested. At the end of 1947 KDP stalwart Chang Tok-su was also assassinated, rather a replay of the murder of Song Chin-u two years earlier. In both cases the



assassins were traced to Kim Ku, the motives were the same, and the Occupation did nothing but put the underlings in jail. One of the assassins, P'ae Hui-bom, said that during World War II Chang had been an advisor to the Headquarters of the Japanese Army in Korea, had mobilized many youths for wartime service, and ran a "reeducation" institute for political prisoners; since 1945 he "had been plotting to establish a separate government in South Korea." All this appears to have been true, but [U.S. Army Gen. John R.] Hodge did not take kindly to the murder of one of his closest advisors; he came to think that Kim and Syngman Rhee were behind the murders of both Chang and Yo. For weeks he pondered the arrest of Kim Ku, and some sort of exile for Rhee, but ultimately Hodge merely got Kim to testify in the case, whereupon Kim predictably denied involvement."


– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 205-208



Korean patriot Yuh Woon-Hyung (Yo Un-hyong) (left) was assassinated in Seoul, Korea on July 19, 1947 by a "lone gunman" – a 19-year-old Korean "patsy" named Han Chi-gun (Han Ji-geun), a member of secret society for White Terror "Baek-ui-sa". Yuh Woon-Hyung lived in Shanghai during the 1920s.

Korean patriot Kim Ku (center), a reunification activist who served as President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea (1940-1948), was assassinated in Seoul, Republic of Korea on June 26, 1949 by a "lone gunman" – a Korean "patsy" named by An Tu-hui (Ahn Doo-hee). An Tu-hui, who served as an informant and an agent for the United States Army Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) in 1949, was assassinated on October 23, 1996, nearly 50 years after the assassination of Kim Ku.

Right photo: Kim Ku met with North Korea's "Dear Leader" Kim Il Sung (left) in Pyongyang in April 1948 to discuss unification, but the meeting ended in disagreement.



### **Chang Taek-sang (1893-1969)**

Foreign Minister of South Korea (August 15, 1948-December 24, 1948),  
Prime Minister of South Korea (May 6, 1952-October 6, 1952),  
and Chief of the Seoul Metropolitan Police (right photo)





A photo of the Korean National Assembly building (the former Imperial Japanese Government-General Building) in downtown Seoul, South Korea in the early 1990s before the building was demolished. The “Grassy Knoll” is on the right. (Photo: [Flickr](#))

“The southern political system issued forth in the first few months after liberation, and did not substantially change until the 1960s. **Under American Occupation auspices, Koreans captured the colonial state and used its extensive and penetrative apparatus to preserve the power and privilege of a traditional landowning elite that had been tainted by its associations with the Japanese. The one reliable and effective agency of this restoration and reaction was the Korean National Police (KNP). The one viable political Party was the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), not because it organized a mass constituency but because it organized the elite, and captured central positions in the state.** The effective opposition to this system was almost wholly on the Left: the Korean People’s Republic and the people’s committees in 1945-1946, the South Korean Worker’s Party (SKWP) and various mass organizations, especially the *Chonp’yong* labor union, in 1947, and most important, a mass popular resistance that from 1945 to 1950 mingled raw peasant protest with organized union activity and, finally, armed resistance in the period 1948-1950. The elemental conflict in the South, then, pitted a ruling class with control of a strong and effective state – one that had been remarkably autonomous of society during the colonial period – against a leftist and communist leadership with less certain control of its main resource, a restive and aggrieved mass that had been severely dislocated by Japanese imperialism and its demise, and that strongly resisted the assertion of conservative power.”

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 185

# Lee Beom-seok: Korean National Socialist Extraordinaire?



Lee Beom-seok [Yi Pom-sok] (1899-1972)

Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea [South Korea] (August 1, 1948-April 21, 1950),  
Defense Minister of the Republic of Korea [South Korea] (1948-1950),  
Korean Ambassador to the Republic of China [Taiwan], and Korean Nationalist

““The Idea,” Juche [主體], seems at first glance to be readily understandable. It is defined as self-reliance and independence in politics, economics, defense, and ideology. On closer inspection, however, the term’s meaning is less accessible...In fact it [Juche] seems to be used much like *kokutai* [国体] in interwar Japan, or *volkische* in [Nazi] Germany, or Mao Zedong Thought in China: a term defining an emotion that puts the nation first, or the leader’s wishes first, in everything. As we have said, Juche shares the same character as *kokutai* (*kukch’e* in Korean); *chu* means something like main or master, so that the liberal translation of Juche would be “main” or “master” principle. Corporatism seems to be a flexible framework within which Left and Right can meet, something many have noted about interwar Europe. Korea is no different. Juche resonates with *kokutai* and other such phrases precisely because of its diffuse and all-purpose meaning; an emotion masquerading as an idea, it appeals to nationalists of all persuasions. Thus it is that Kim Il Sung’s ideology calls up comparisons with perhaps the most extreme right-wing figure in postwar South Korea, Yi Pom Sok [Lee Beom Seok], the founder and leader of the early postwar Korean National Youth (KNY). In the 1930s, Yi had studied European corporatist and Fascist youth groups, and worked with the Kuomintang Blue Shirts and Special Services in China. On his return to Korea in 1946 he organized some 70,000 youths into a classic rightist vehicle of the streets; by 1948 the KNY had over a million members and made Yi second only to Syngman Rhee in power. **His pet slogan, “minjok chisang, kukka chisang” (nation first, state first), expressed his [Nazi] German learning; he was among the first Korean political figures explicitly to exalt not just the nation, but the state. He opposed Korean reliance on foreigners (*sadae chuui* or “flunkeyism,” as the North Koreans translate it), advocated independence, lambasted those politicians who were “un-Korean,” and urged Koreans to adopt a standpoint of *juche*, which in his usage meant complete subjectivity where everything Korean was concerned. He preferred economic autarky to any external international involvements that might subordinate Korean interests. He urged a pan-national Korean solidarity based on racial purity: “the Nation is the race and the race is the nation.”** Talk of “racial essence” and “blood-lines” (*hyolt’ong*) runs throughout his work: this for him was the key characteristic defining Korea, and the essential element in its corporate and organic unity. **As for the mind and spirit, he thought only the strongest national consciousness (*minjok uisik*) could save Korea from predatory great powers. He lived in the era of “the masses,” he said, and therefore leaders must “understand and love” the masses, always be among them and never separate from them. One race, one blood, one nation, one state, and inseparable unity between leaders and led would create “a great family” that would endure. The resonance with Kim Il Sung’s idea is clear. Yi was, however, a romantic and conservative corporatist. He exalted the state, thought leaders should be patriots above politics, railed against the concept of class struggle, and in his bias against capitalism and material pursuits sought not to overcome it in socialism but to return to an earlier era of community.”**  
– *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* by Hagen Koo, Chapter 6 (*The Corporate State in North Korea* by Bruce Cumings), p. 223-224

“South Korea's youth groups are an unstudied phenomenon, but they were a potent form of political organization that belies the factious, politically-impotent stereotype of Korean politics. The raw material came in the greater part from young men who were refugees from the North, although unemployed and marginal elements of southern society, as well as a corps of elite students, also participated. In the cities, youth groups served as police auxiliaries, strikebreakers, or plain clothes thugs who broke up opposition demonstrations (still a common feature of ROK politics today). In the countryside, depending on the social complexion of villages, youth groups might defend prominent clans, or side with marginally richer peasants, or indeed organize whole villages to fight against neighboring leftist villages or to protect against guerrillas and bandits. Nearly every political party of any significance had a "youth" auxiliary, defining youths as roughly between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five. The Left had a mass organization of youths formed in late 1945, named the *Choson ch'ongnyon ch'ong wngmaeng* or General Federation of Korean Youth. On the Right, the most important groupings were the Korean National Youth (KNY), the Northwest or *Sobuk* Youth (NWY), the *Taedong* Youth, the *Kwangbok* Youth, and Rhee's NSRRKI Youth (*Taehan tokch'ok ch'Onghnyon ch'ong yonmaeng*). Most of them were organized in the aftermath of the autumn uprisings; one, the Korean National Youth led by Yi Pom-sok, was an official agency of Military Government (MG), funded by [U.S. Army Lieutenant General John R.] Hodge. **The youth groups were set in motion at the top by the most powerful rightists: Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Cho Pyong-ok, and Chang Taek-sang. The Korean National Police, led by Cho and Chang, was the general patron of rightist youth, relying on the groups time and again as auxiliary strong-arm forces. Youth group offices were often next door to police stations (and sometimes inside). People flowed out of the youth groups into the police and the army, and vice versa. Chang Taek-sang, the head of the Seoul Metropolitan Police, was on the board of directors of at least two youth groups, and as early as November 1946 was said to be encouraging joint police-youth group operations.** Chang's conspicuous role in running the groups occasionally approached black comedy, as in his remarks on September 11, 1947 (deemed "unfortunate" by the G-2): Chang announced a "crackdown" on terrorism regardless of politics, and then remarked, "During the past two months, the police have allowed several young men's groups and parties to perform terroristic activities, explaining to them their unlawful actions, and hoping they would repent their past errors." **American authorities noted that "practically all rightist organizations maintain their headquarters and branch offices in vested property," that is, buildings controlled by the Occupation.**" In November 1947, the G-2 intercepted a memo from the Seoul Metropolitan Police to the provinces, indicating that the police were training two hundred members of the *Taedong* Youth in each of the following cities: Seoul, Taegu, Taejon, and Kwangju. Once the ROK was established, the tie between the police and youth groups no longer needed to be hidden. In December 1948, for example, the Metropolitan police trained six hundred members of the Northwest Youth, then dispatched them to riot-torn areas "equipped with police uniforms and on regular police status." **The Army took much larger numbers of youth group members into its ranks in mid-1948. No one was safe from the terrorism. In September 1947, an assistant district attorney in Pusan, Chong Subak, an employee of the Military Government, sought to prosecute four members of a rightist youth group for terrorism. He was assassinated, and no one was brought to justice for the murder.**"

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 194-195

“Aware of the fact that he had only a weak and disunited group of supporters within the National Assembly, [President Syngman] Rhee recalled Yi Pom-sok, former prime minister and defense minister, who was serving as his ambassador to the Nationalist Chinese Government in Taiwan, and entrusted him with the task of organizing the new party. In order to understand the nature of the newly organized party, it is necessary to examine closely the personal background of Yi Pom-sok, its chief organizer. Before 1945, Yi Pom-sok was famous for his anti-Japanese military activities in Manchuria. In 1920, at the age of twenty-one, he was said to have led a 1,500-man force of the Northern Route Independence Army to a decisive victory over a regular Japanese brigade of some 10,000 men. Upon formation of the Liberation Army of the Korean Provisional Government in 1940, Yi was appointed its chief of staff. In this position he had a close relationship with the military and political leaders of the Nationalist Chinese government, including Chiang Kai-shek. Yi returned to Korea on June 22, 1946, and within a few months he set about organizing the National Youth Corps (*Minjok Ch'ongnyondan*) on the basis of a “nation-first” and “state-first” slogan. **For reasons not clearly understood even today, his National Youth Corps was generously supported by the American authorities with money and material. Furthermore, the police could not obstruct its activities because of the American support it received. The National Youth Corps, often compared to Hitler’s Jugend Brigade, attracted mostly “marginal men” such as former Communists who needed protection in a legitimate organization, rightist youths who resented struggle among the rightist organizations themselves, romanticists who were attracted to the Corps’ ideological appeals, and others who were tired of the chaotic situation in Korean society. Some 20,000 young men initially responded to its call for membership in October 1946. The National Youth Corps was attacked by both leftist and rightist groups, but it expanded rapidly in organization and membership throughout the nation. At one point, Yi Pom-sok claimed that half of all Korean youths had been affected by Corps training. Though this was an exaggerated claim, it indicates the extent of activities of the National Youth Corps. Upon establishment of the Korean government, Yi was appointed prime minister and, simultaneously, minister of defense. He kept the prime ministership until April 1950, two months before the outbreak of the Korean War.”**

– *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea, Volume 35* by Sŭng-jŭ Han, p. 17-18



“The officially-supported Korean National Youth melded Chinese influences with Japanese methods of dealing with political recalcitrants. **Yi Pom-sok was a fierce Korean nationalist, except where the Chinese Nationalists were concerned. Born in 1899 in Kyonggi Province, he went to China during World War I. He fought the Japanese as a guerrilla along the Sino-Korean border in the early 1920s. In 1933 he visited Germany to study military affairs; later he worked with German and Italian advisors to the Nationalists. By 1937, he was in the Office of the Chief of Staff of the KMT 51st Army, and by 1938, was a company commander at the KMT Military Academy in Hangzhou. He was widely known in Korea as a follower and admirer of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. ‘Chiang and his secret police chief, the unsavory Tai Li, organized a youth wing called the “Blue Shirts” in the 1930s, a fascist-style paramilitary force that chose the color blue, it would appear, because brown, black, and green were already spoken for. Yi worked with this group, and wrote in 1947 that the Germans and the Italians were “pioneers” in youth movements, and also cited the Kuomintang’s good experience with youths. He originally termed his own youth group “the Blue Shirts,” and the KNY, as an American delicately noted, had “distinctive blue uniforms.”** American sources in Shanghai reported that Yi had been “working for Tai Li” during the war, and thought he had been involved with a group of young men who “persecuted all Korean residents of Shanghai and other Eastern cities without discrimination.” Tai Li had been a confidant of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) chief in China, Adm. Milton “Mary” Miles. In August 1945 ten OSS agents in Shanghai flew Yi into Seoul briefly, then took him back to Shanghai for reasons that have never been clear. Whatever the OSS may have thought of Yi, by 1950 the CIA termed him “a man of little imagination and mediocre intelligence,” possessing a forceful personality, “great political ambitions, and an intensely nationalist viewpoint.” He thought and acted “like a traditional Chinese war lord,” and remained deeply under the influence of Chiang Kai-shek. The CIA thought his future was limited, in part because he could not speak English. **It was probably Yi’s nationalism that the Americans disliked the most, however, for it meant he could not be trusted. Yi became known for his use of the Chinese slogan, “*minjok chisang, kukka chisang*,” meaning nation first, state first. He got the slogan in China, which probably got it from Germany. In his mind nation and race were synonymous, just as they were in Hitler’s; the difference was that in Korea the distinction between race and nation was minimal, *minjok* (ethnic people) often connoting both.** His 1947 book is interesting for its anachronisms, its “untimely” quality; coming two years after the Holocaust it is a bit much to hear someone prattling on yet again about race, nation, and blood lines. At one point he lauds the Jews for preserving their identity for centuries, at another he remarks that “the exclusion of the Jews was quite efficacious for [German] unity.” **In classic corporatist fashion, he called upon Koreans to forget class conflicts, distinctions between superior and inferior, and to unite as one family. But the book is really a text on what it means to be a Korean, with “being Korean” the essence of citizenship and nationhood. He even uses the term *Juche*, (*chuch’e*), by which he meant something like being ever subjective where things Korean are concerned, always putting Korea first. This is the cornerstone of Korean nationalism, just what one would expect from an ancient, homogeneous people long subject to outside threat.** For the American who has rarely had to think about how to preserve a nation surrounded by predators, such views are bloody-minded, solipsistic, utterly recalcitrant, obnoxious, doing violence to reason at every turn. But these are popular ideas in Korea, and also a realm where Left meets Right. If this is a type of fascism, perhaps no national elite would be more receptive to such appeals than right-wing Koreans; if not that, still far more receptive than to liberal ideas. Fascist doctrine in politics lauds unity, and most Koreans thought disunity had brought on the disaster of colonialism; in economics it posits autarchy, a traditional fact and ideal in Korea; it likes a strong leader, and no people seems to praise and respect a leader more than Koreans (even if much of the flattery may be false); it conflates ethnicity and nation, which coincide almost exactly in Korea but hardly anywhere else. **It was common in Seoul in the 1960s to see *Mein Kampf* in Korean translation displayed in one bookstall after another, and secondary school students would often name Hitler the man they respected most amongst twentieth-century leaders.”**

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 195-196


#### ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

William P. Litynski served in the U.S. Army from September 2001-November 2004, primarily in the First Armored Division in Germany (Apache Troop, 1-1 CAV, Bidingen); he was deployed to Iraq (near Baghdad) from April 2003 until July 2004. He attended Crestview High School in Crestview, Florida from 1996-2000 and graduated in 2000. He lived at Yokota Air Base, Japan (U.S. Air Force base near Tokyo) from 1987-1993. (His mother is from Japan, and his grandfather was drafted twice by the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II.) William P. Litynski has traveled extensively and has visited Tokyo, London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Vienna, Brussels, Luxembourg City, Munich, Frankfurt am Main, New York City, Washington D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Seattle, and Dallas. (E-mail: wpl314@yahoo.com)






The first U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, John J. Muccio, signs over the government to the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Seoul, Korea on September 12, 1948. To Muccio's right is Minister of Foreign Affairs **Chang Taek-sang**; to his left, Prime Minister **Lee Beom-seok**. (Note: The pronunciation of Lee Beom-seok's first name is "bum suck".)  
 (Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)



3. ROK police and Constabulary block a leftist demonstration in downtown Seoul, April 1947


(Photo: *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings)



**Syngman Rhee** (right), President of the Republic of Korea, greets **Chang Taek-sang** (left), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, and **Chang Myon** (center), Korean Ambassador to the United States, on November 5, 1951.  
(Photo: [http://film.ktv.go.kr/page/pop/photo\\_pop.jsp?photo\\_PhotoSrcGBN=BK&photo\\_PhotoID=13&detl\\_PhotoDTL=68](http://film.ktv.go.kr/page/pop/photo_pop.jsp?photo_PhotoSrcGBN=BK&photo_PhotoID=13&detl_PhotoDTL=68) )



# Skull & Bones at Yale University: Secret Society or Criminal Syndicate?



This picture, which hangs in the tomb, is in an 1882 Skull and Bones photograph album. Its engraving translates to “Who was the fool, who the wise man, beggar, or king?”

Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library

The Order of Skull & Bones is a secret society at Yale University. The Order of Skull & Bones is also known as the “Brotherhood of Death.” Skull & Bones initiation rituals allegedly include individuals resting naked in a coffin and revealing their sex life to 14 fellow Bonesmen. (Source: *Secrets of the Tomb: Skull and Bones, the Ivy League, and the Hidden Paths of Power* by Alexandra Robbins)

**“In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way.”  
– Franklin Delano Roosevelt**



The Tomb, official headquarters of The Order of Skull & Bones, is located at Yale University on High Street in New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.A.

## MEMBERS OF SKULL & BONES DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Robert A. Lovett (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – Secretary of Defense (1951-1953); Deputy Secretary of Defense (1949-1951)  
W. Averell Harriman (B.A. 1913, S&B 1913) – Director of Mutual Security Agency (1951-1953)  
F. Trubee Davison (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – Director of CIA for Personnel (1951-1952)  
Robert A. Taft (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – U.S. Senator (R-Ohio, 1939-1953); Senate Majority Leader (1953)  
Prescott S. Bush (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – U.S. Senator (R-Connecticut, 1952-1963); Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1972)  
John Sherman Cooper (B.A. 1923, S&B 1923) – U.S. Senator (R-Kentucky, 1946-1949, 1952-1955, 1956-1973)  
John Martin Vorys (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – U.S. Congressman (R-Ohio, 1939-1959)  
Charles M. Spofford (B.A. 1924; S&B 1924) – Chairman of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies and European Coordinating Committee (1950-1952)  
Stanley Woodward (B.A. 1922, S&B 1922) – U.S. Ambassador to Canada (1950-1953)  
Harold Stanley (B.A. 1908, S&B 1908) – Partner of Morgan, Stanley & Co. (1941-1955)  
Knight Woolley (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1982)  
Ray Morris (B.A. 1901, S&B 1901) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1956)  
J. Richardson Dilworth (B.A. 1938, S&B 1938) – Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1951-1958)  
Charles Jacob Stewart (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – President of New York Trust Co. (1949-1952)  
George L. Harrison (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – Chairman of the board of New York Life Insurance Co. (1948-1954)  
George Herbert Walker Jr. (B.A. 1927, S&B 1927) – General Partner of G.H. Walker & Co. (1929-1974)  
Morehead Patterson (B.A. 1920, S&B 1920) – Chairman of the board of American Machine & Foundry Co. (1943-1962)  
Henry John Heinz II (B.A. 1931, S&B 1931) – President of H.J. Heinz Company (1941-1959)  
Frank Ford Russell (B.A. 1926, S&B 1926) – President of National Aviation Corp. (1939-1954)  
Robert Guthrie Page (B.A. 1922, S&B 1922) – President of Phelps Dodge Corporation (1947-1967)  
H. Neil Mallon (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – President of Dresser Industries, Inc. (1929-1958)  
Allen T. Klots (B.A. 1909, S&B 1909) – Member of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm in New York City] (1921-1965)  
Henry R. Luce (B.A. 1920, S&B 1920) – Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)  
E. Roland Harriman (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Chairman of the board of Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1946-1969); President of American Red Cross (1950-1953)



# Yale University Graduates & Korean War: War Profiteers or Damn Yankees?



Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, U.S.A.



Yale graduates Averell Harriman (left), U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett (center), and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson meet privately in January 1951. (Photo by Lisa Larsen/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)



Members of the Yale Corporation on October 7, 1950

Front row, left to right: Wilmarth S. Lewis, Rt. Rev. Henry Knox Sherrill (**President of the National Council of Churches USA**), F. Trubee Davison, Rev. Arthur Howe Bradford, A. Whitney Griswold (**President of Yale University**), Robert A. Taft (**U.S. Senator**), Dean G. Acheson (**U.S. Secretary of State**), George Van Santvoord, Morris Hadley (**lawyer; Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley**).

Back row, left to right: Jonathan B. Bingham, Lewis H. Weed, Charles D. Dickey, Edwin F. Blair, Rev. Morgan Phelps Noyes, Irving S. Olds (**Chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp.**), Juan T. Trippe (**President of Pan American World Airways, Inc.**), Robert T.B. Stevens (**Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York**).

F. Trubee Davison, Rev. Arthur Howe Bradford, Sen. Robert A. Taft, Morris Hadley, Jonathan B. Bingham, and Edwin F. Blair were members of Skull & Bones. Wilmarth S. Lewis, Dean G. Acheson, Lewis H. Weed, and Charles D. Dickey were members of Scroll & Key. A. Whitney Griswold was a member of Wolf's Head.



Yale University Graduates and Their Occupation during the Israeli War of Independence (1948-1949),  
Korean War (1950-1953), Second Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), and French Indochina War (1945-1954)

Government Officials:

- \*Dean G. Acheson (B.A. 1915, S&K 1915) – U.S. Secretary of State (1949-1953); Under Secretary of State (1945-1947)
- \*Robert A. Lovett (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – U.S. Secretary of Defense (1951-1953); Deputy Secretary of Defense (1949-1951); Under Secretary of State (1947-1949)
- \*W. Stuart Symington (B.A. 1923) – Secretary of the Air Force (1947-1950); Chairman of National Security Resources Board (1950-1951)
- \*Roswell L. Gilpatric (B.A. 1928, LL.B. 1931) – Under Secretary of the Air Force (1951-1953)
- Eugene M. Zuckert (B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1937) – Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (1947-1952); Member of the Atomic Energy Commission (1952-1954)
- \*John H. Ferguson (B.A. 1936) – Deputy Director of Policy Planning Staff at U.S. Department of State (1951-1953)
- \*F. Trubee Davison (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for Personnel (1951-1952)
- \*T. Keith Glennan (B.S. 1927) – Member of the Atomic Energy Commission (1950-1952)
- \*W. Averell Harriman (B.A. 1913, S&B 1913) – U.S. Secretary of Commerce (1946-1948); Director of Mutual Security Agency (1951-1953)
- C. Dickerman Williams (B.A. 1922, LL.B. 1924) – General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Commerce (1951-1953)
- James Pomeroy Hendrick (B.A. 1923) – Assistant to the Administrator of Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) (1948-1953)
- \*Richard M. Bissell Jr. (B.A. 1932, Ph.D. 1939) – Assistant Administrator for Program at Economic Cooperation Administration (1948-1951); Staff Member of Ford Foundation (1952-1954)
- \*Charles M. Spofford (B.A. 1924; S&B 1924) – Chairman of the North Atlantic Council of Deputies and European Coordinating Committee (1950-1952)
- Hubert B. Holland (Ph.B. 1925) – Assistant U.S. Attorney General (1953-1956)
- Charles Ruffin Hook Jr. (B.A. 1937) – Deputy Postmaster General of the United States (1953-1955)
  
- \*Chester Bowles (B.A. 1924) – U.S. Ambassador to India (1951-1953)
- \*Ellsworth Bunker (B.A. 1916) – U.S. Ambassador to Argentina (1951-1952); U.S. Ambassador to Italy (1952-1953)
- Louis G. Dreyfus Jr. (B.A. 1910) – U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (1949-1951)
- Stanley Woodward (B.A. 1922, S&B 1922) – U.S. Ambassador to Canada (1950-1953)
- Paul Clement Daniels (B.A. 1924) – U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador (1951-1953)
- Howard Donovan (Ph.B. 1920) – U.S. Consul General in Zurich, Switzerland (1953)
- Edward Louis Freers (B.A. 1933) – U.S. Consul at Vladivostok, Russia (1947); Counselor at U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia (1950-1951); First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in Rome, Italy (1951-1955)
- Richard Tucker Ewing (B.A. 1940, S&K 1940) – Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, Republic of China [Taiwan] (1951-1956); Attaché at the U.S. Legation in Switzerland (1947-1949)
- Roberto Manuel Heurtematte (B.A. 1931, S&K 1931) – Ambassador of Panama to the United States (1951-1954); Comptroller General of Panama (1954-1959)
  
- Robert A. Taft (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – U.S. Senator (Republican Party-Ohio, 1939-1953); Senate Majority Leader (January 3, 1953-July 31, 1953); died in office
- \*William Benton (B.A. 1921) – U.S. Senator (Democratic Party-Connecticut, 1949-1953)
- Prescott S. Bush (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – U.S. Senator (Republican Party-Connecticut, 1952-1963)
- \*John Sherman Cooper (B.A. 1923, S&B 1923) – U.S. Senator (Republican Party-Kentucky, 1946-1949; 1952-1955; 1956-1973); Member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations (1949-1951)
- John Taber (B.A. 1902) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-New York, 1923-1963)
- James Wolcott Wadsworth Jr. (B.A. 1898, S&B 1898) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-New York, 1933-1951)
- John Martin Vorys (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-Ohio, 1939-1959)
- John Crain Kunkel (B.A. 1916) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-Pennsylvania, 1939-1951, 1961-1966)
- James C. Auchincloss (B.A. 1908, S&K 1908) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-New Jersey, 1943-1965)
- Thruston B. Morton (B.A. 1929) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-Kentucky, 1947-1953)
- Edward Tylor Miller (B.A. 1916) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-Maryland, 1947-1959)
- J. Foster Furcolo (B.A. 1933) – U.S. Congressman (Democratic Party-Massachusetts, 1949-1952)
- John Jarman (B.A. 1937) – U.S. Congressman (Democratic Party-Oklahoma, 1951-1977)
- Harmar D. Denny Jr. (B.A. 1908) – U.S. Congressman (Republican Party-Pennsylvania, January 3, 1951-January 3, 1953); Member of Civil Aeronautics Board (April 7, 1953-November 15, 1959)
  
- Stanley F. Reed (B.A. 1906) – Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1938-1957)
- Thomas Walter Swan (B.A. 1900) – Chief Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1951-1953)
- Charles Edward Clark (B.A. 1911, LL.B. 1913) – Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1939-1963)
- Edward Jordan Dimock (B.A. 1911) – Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (1951-1961)
- Carroll Clark Hincks (B.A. 1911) – Chief Judge of U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (1948-1953)
- John Joseph Smith (B.A. 1925, LL.B. 1927) – Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut (1941-1960)
- Walter Joseph Cummings (B.A. 1937) – Solicitor General of the United States (1952-1953)
- William Marvel (B.A. 1932, S&K 1932) – U.S. Attorney for the District of Delaware (1948-1953)
- Walter J. Kohler Jr. (Ph.B. 1925) – Governor of Wisconsin (1951-1957)
- Gordon MacLean Tiffany (B.A. 1935) – Attorney General of New Hampshire (1950-1953)
- J. Quigg Newton Jr. (B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1936, S&B 1933) – Mayor of Denver, Colorado (1947-1955)
- Patrick Brett O'Sullivan (B.A. 1908) – Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut (1950-1957)
- Kenneth O'Brien (B.A. 1917) – Justice of the Supreme Court of New York (1934-1954)
- Howard S. Cullman (B.A. 1913) – Chairman of Port of New York Authority (1945-1955)
- Harold Armstrong Jones (B.A. 1920) – Member of the Civil Aeronautics Board [Washington, D.C.] (1948-1951)
- James Lawrence Houghteling (B.A. 1905) – Chairman of the Fair Employment Board, Civil Service Commission (1946-1952)

Edward Harvey Cushing (B.A. 1919, S&K 1919) – Assistant Chief Medical Director for Research and Education at Veterans Administration (1946-1952)

#### Bankers:

\*William McChesney Martin Jr. (B.A. 1928) – Chairman of the Federal Reserve (April 2, 1951-January 31, 1970); Assistant U.S. Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (1949-1951)  
Robert Ten Broeck Stevens (B.A. 1921) – Chairman of Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1948-1953); Secretary of the Army (1953-1955)  
Walter Seth Logan (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1928-1953)  
Harold D. Hodgkinson (Ph.B. 1912) – Chairman (1951-1955) and Class C Director (1947-1955) of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston  
\*Russell C. Leffingwell (B.A. 1899) – Chairman of J.P. Morgan & Co. (1948-1950)  
James Stillman Rockefeller (B.A. 1924, S&K 1924) – President of National City Bank of New York [Citibank] (1952-1959)  
Samuel Sloan Colt (B.A. 1914, S&K 1914) – President of Bankers Trust Co. (1931-1957)  
Boylston Adams Tompkins (B.A. 1915, S&K 1915) – Vice President of Bankers Trust Co. (1921-1955)  
Charles Jacob Stewart (B.A. 1918, S&B 1918) – President of New York Trust Co. (1949-1952)  
\*Alfred Hayes (B.A. 1930) – Vice President of the New York Trust Co. (1949-1956)  
Prescott S. Bush (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1972)  
\*E. Roland Harriman (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1978)  
\*Knight Woolley (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1982)  
\*Ray Morris (B.A. 1901, S&B 1901) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1956)  
Thacher M. Brown (B.A. 1897) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1954)  
Moreau Delano Brown (B.A. 1926) – Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1939-1974)  
\*John M. Schiff (B.A. 1925) – Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1931-1977)  
\*Joseph Richardson Dilworth (B.A. 1938, LL.B. 1942, S&B 1938) – Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1951-1958)  
\*Robert Lehman (B.A. 1913) – Partner of Lehman Brothers (1925-1969)  
Joseph Albert Thomas (B.A. 1928, S&K 1928) – Partner of Lehman Brothers (1937-1977)  
\*Harold Stanley (B.A. 1908, S&B 1908) – Partner of Morgan, Stanley & Co. (1941-1955)  
Dean Witter Jr. (B.A. 1944, S&B 1944) – Partner of Dean Witter & Co. (1946-1970)  
Eliot G. Fitch (B.A. 1918) – President of Marine National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee (1942-1992)  
Frederic Augustus Potts (B.A. 1926) – President of Philadelphia National Bank (1947-1964)  
Gardner Dominick Stout (B.A. 1926) – Partner of Dominick & Dominick [investment firm in New York City] (1926-1968)  
Edward Howard York Jr. (B.A. 1912) – Partner of Drexel & Co. [investment bank in Philadelphia] (1931-1935, 1943-1961)  
Edward Starr, Jr. (B.A. 1922, S&K 1922) – Partner of Drexel & Co. [investment bank in Philadelphia] (1937-c.1966)  
\*William Frederick Machold (Ph.B. 1927) – Partner of Drexel & Co. [investment bank in Philadelphia] (1949-1966)  
Everett Smith (B.A. 1915) – Fiscal agent for Federal Home Loan Banks (1937-1962)  
Robert James Lewis (B.A. 1921) – Partner of Estabrook & Co. [banking firm in New York City] (1931-1968)  
Edward McCrady Gaillard (B.A. 1919) – President of Union & New Haven Trust Co. [bank in New Haven, Connecticut] (1943-1962)  
Henry Eugene Coe III (B.A. 1946) – Assistant Treasurer of Chase Manhattan Bank (1953-1960)  
Robert George Wiese (B.A. 1925) – Partner of Scudder, Stevens & Clark [investment firm in Boston] (1936-1978)  
Roger Conant Damon (B.A. 1929) – Senior Vice President (1952-1959) and Vice President (1943-1952) of First National Bank of Boston

#### Businessmen:

\*Irving S. Olds (B.A. 1907) – Chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp. (1940-1952)  
\*E. Roland Harriman (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – Chairman of the board of Union Pacific Railroad Co. (1946-1969)  
Leroy A. Lincoln (B.A. 1902) – Chairman of the board of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1951-1957)  
\*George L. Harrison (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – Chairman of the board of New York Life Insurance Co. (1948-1954)  
Morgan B. Brainard (B.A. 1900, LL.B. 1903) – President of Aetna Life Insurance Co. [Hartford, Connecticut] (1922-1957)  
Francis Fitz Randolph (B.A. 1911, S&B 1911) – Senior Partner of J&W Seligman & Co. (1940-1973)  
George Herbert Walker Jr. (B.A. 1927, S&B 1927) – General Partner of G.H. Walker & Co. (1929-1974)  
\*Morehead Patterson (B.A. 1920, S&B 1920) – Chairman of the board of American Machine & Foundry Co. (1943-1962)  
\*J. Irwin Miller (B.A. 1931) – Chairman of the board of Cummins Engine Co. (1951-1977); President of Cummins Engine Co. (1947-1951)  
Frederick Glade Wacker Jr. (B.A. 1940) – Chairman of the board and President of Ammco Tools, Inc. [North Chicago, Illinois] (1948-1987)  
Charles Christian Haffner Jr. (B.A. 1919, S&B 1919) – Chairman and CEO of R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. [Chicago printing firm] (1952-1964)  
Walter Paul Paepcke (B.A. 1917) – Chairman and CEO of Container Corp. of America (1946-1960); Trustee of University of Chicago  
\*John E. Bierwirth (B.A. 1917) – President of National Distillers & Chemical Corp. (1949-1958)  
H. Mansfield Horner (B.S. 1926) – President of United Aircraft Corporation (1943-1956)  
\*Juan Terry Trippe (Ph.B. 1921) – President of Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1927-1964)  
\*Henry John Heinz II (B.A. 1931, S&B 1931) – President of H.J. Heinz Company (1941-1959)  
Gaylord Donnelley (B.A. 1931, S&B 1931) – President of R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (1952-1964); Trustee, Univ. of Chicago (1947-1980)  
\*Frank Ford Russell (B.A. 1926, S&B 1926) – President of National Aviation Corp. (1939-1954)  
\*Robert Guthrie Page (B.A. 1922, S&B 1922) – President of Phelps Dodge Corporation (1947-1967)  
H. Neil Mallon (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – President of Dresser Industries, Inc. (1929-1958)  
\*Walter Hochschild (B.A. 1920) – President of The American Metal Co. Ltd. (1950-1957)  
\*B. Brewster Jennings (B.A. 1920, S&K 1920) – President of Socony-Mobil Oil Co. (1944-1955)  
\*Edmund Fitzgerald (Ph.B. 1916) – President of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1947-1958)  
Thomas Eugene Lovejoy Jr. (Ph.B. 1928) – President of Manhattan Life Insurance Co. (1950-1967)  
\*Charles Shipman Payson (B.A. 1921, S&K 1921) – former Chairman of the board of Vitro Corp. of America  
Louis S. Rothschild (Ph.B. 1920) – President of Rothschild & Sons, Inc. [Kansas City, Missouri] (1942-1955)  
Tecumseh Sherman Fitch (B.S. 1931) – Chairman of the board of Washington Steel Corp. [Pennsylvania] (1945-1969)  
Robert Upjohn Redpath Jr. (B.A. 1928) – life underwriter for Lawyers Mortgage Co. [New York City] (1933-1987)  
Reuben Buck Robertson (B.A. 1900) – Chairman of the board (1950-1960) and President (1946-1950, 1955-1962) of Champion Papers, Inc.  
Henry Webb Johnstone (B.A. 1916, S&B 1916) – Senior Vice President of Merck & Co., Inc. [pharmaceutical company] (1950-1957)  
Henry Stuart Harrison (B.A. 1932) – Treasurer of Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. (1945-1952)



Howard MacGregor Tuttle (B.A. 1904) – President of National Casket Company, Inc. [Boston] (1943-c.1958)  
 Samuel J. Walker (B.A. 1917) – President of Chicago Railway Equipment Company (1947-1961)  
 \*Joseph Peter Grace, Jr. (B.A. 1936, S&K 1936) – President and CEO of W.R. Grace & Co. (1945-1981)  
 Horace Havemeyer, Jr. (B.A. 1936, S&K 1936) – President of National Sugar Refining Co. [New York City] (1948-1966)  
 F. Thatcher Lane (B.A. 1917) – President of Seamless Rubber Co. (1933-1954); Vice President of Rexall Drug & Chemical Co., Inc. (1942-54)  
 Pierpont V. Davis (B.A. 1905) – Vice President of National City Company (1919-1934); President of Harriman Ripley & Co. (1942-1956)  
 Walter M. Jeffords Jr. (B.A. 1938) – Chairman of Brooklyn Borough Gas Company (1949-1959)  
 Floyd Wellman Jefferson (B.A. 1902) – Partner of Iselin Jefferson Co., Inc. [textile merchant in New York City] (1927-1946); President of Iselin Jefferson Co., Inc. (1946-1950); Chairman of the board of Iselin Jefferson Co., Inc. (1950-c.1961)  
 Philip Rogers Mallory (B.A. 1908) – Chairman of the board of P.R. Mallory & Co., Inc. [manufacturing company] (1946-1965)  
 Allan A. Ryan (B.A. 1924) – Chairman of the board of Royal Typewriter Company, Inc. (1945-1954)  
 Samuel A. Smith Jr. (Ph.B. 1921) – Treasurer of General Cable Corp. (1950-1953)  
 Robert Forbes Niven (B.A. 1932) – Secretary of Union Oil Co. (1947-1972); Member of the Bohemian Club in San Francisco  
 William M. Day (B.A. 1927) – Vice President of Michigan Bell Telephone Co. [Detroit] (1950-1956)  
 John M.K. Davis (B.A. 1929) – President of Connecticut Printers Inc. [Hartford, Connecticut] (1952-c.1972)  
 Frank Courtenay Dodd (B.A. 1897) – Chairman of the board of Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. [publishing company in New York City] (1942-1968)  
 Edward Howard Dodd Jr. (B.A. 1928) – Vice President of Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc. [publishing company in New York City] (1941-1953)  
 Richard C. Doane (B.A. 1919) – Vice President of International Paper Co. [New York City] (1948-1954)  
 Laurence Harper Norton (B.A. 1910) – Director (1928-1960) and Treasurer (1957-1960) of Oglebay, Norton Co. [Cleveland, Ohio]  
 Horace Ransom Mustard (B.A. 1931) – Treasurer of Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. (1944-1964)

#### Lawyers:

\*Allen Wardwell (B.A. 1895, S&K 1895) – Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell [law firm in New York City] (1909-1953)  
 \*George Roberts (B.A. 1905, LL.B. Harvard 1908) – Partner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts (1914-1968)  
 \*Allen T. Klots (B.A. 1909, S&B 1909) – Member of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm in New York City] (1921-1965)  
 James William Husted (B.A. 1918) – Partner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts (1930-1969)  
 Morris Hadley (B.A. 1916, S&B 1916) – Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (1924-1979)  
 Daniel Gleason Tenney Jr. (B.A. 1935, LL.B. 1938, S&K 1935) – Partner of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (1948-c.1983)  
 \*Charles M. Spofford (B.A. 1924, S&B 1924) – Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell [law firm in New York City] (1940-1950, 1952-1973)  
 Charles Hastings Willard (B.A. 1926, S&B 1926) – Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1950-1973)  
 Edward Rogers Wardwell (B.A. 1927, S&B 1927) – Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1946-c.1972)  
 \*Samuel Hazard Gillespie Jr. (B.A. 1932, LL.B. 1936, S&B 1932) – Member of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1948-2011)  
 Allen Evarts Foster (B.A. 1906) – Partner of Lord, Day & Lord [law firm in New York City] (1919-c.1970)  
 Louis Melville Loeb (B.A. 1919) – Partner of Lord, Day & Lord (1948-1972); General Counsel of The New York Times Co. (1948-1967)  
 Sherman Baldwin (B.A. 1919, S&B 1919) – Member of Lord, Day & Lord (1929-1969)  
 John Dorsey Garrison (B.A. 1931, LL.B. 1934) – Member of Lord, Day & Lord (1943-1980)  
 Garrard Wood Glenn (B.A. 1933, S&K 1933) – Partner of Lord, Day & Lord (1948-1954, 1958-c.1974)  
 \*Douglas Maxwell Moffat (B.A. 1903, LL.B. Harvard 1907) – Partner of Cravath, Swaine & Moore [law firm in New York City] (1913-1956)  
 Chauncey Brewster Garver (B.A. 1908, S&K 1908) – Partner of Shearman & Sterling [law firm in New York City] (1917-1973)  
 Allen Skinner Hubbard (B.A. 1911, S&K 1911) – Partner of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed [law firm in New York City] (1937-1981)  
 \*William S. Gaud (B.A. 1929, LL.B. 1931) – Member of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn [law firm in New York City] (1946-1961)  
 Edward Bancroft Twombly (B.A. 1912, S&B 1912) – Partner of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Skidmore [law firm in New York City] (1919-1966)  
 Frederick P. Haas (B.A. 1935, S&B 1935) – Partner of Webster, Sheffield, Fleischmann, Hitchcock & Chrystie [law firm in New York City] (1946-1965)  
 Sidney Wetmore Davidson (B.A. 1916; J.D. 1918) – Member of Davidson, Dawson & Clark [law firm in New York City] (1949-1974)  
 \*Jerome S. Hess (B.A. 1903) – Member of Hardin, Hess & Eder [law firm in New York City] (1907-1970); Member of Hardin, Hess & Suarez [law firm in Mexico City] (1921-1970); President of American Foreign Law Association (1944-1947)  
 Gerhard A. Gesell (B.A. 1932) – Member of Covington & Burling [law firm in Washington, D.C.] (1941-1967)  
 Isaac Henry Mayer (B.A. 1884) – Senior Member of Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt [law firm in Chicago] (1922-1967)  
 Merrill Shepard (B.A. 1925) – Partner of Pope, Ballard, Kennedy, Shepard & Fowle [law firm in Chicago] (1936-c.1986)  
 Anthony Lee Michel (B.A. 1926, S&B 1926) – Partner of Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Chilgren & Waud [law firm in Chicago] (1942-1966)  
 Norman Waite (B.A. 1927; LL.B. Harvard 1930) – Partner of Schiff Hardin & Waite [law firm in Chicago] (1940-c.1976)  
 George Alfred Ranney (B.A. 1934, LL.B. 1939, S&B 1934) – Member of Sidley, Austin, Burgess & Smith [law firm in Chicago] (1939-1962)  
 John Loomer Hall (B.A. 1894, LL.B. 1896, S&B 1894) – Member of Choate, Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1904-1960)  
 \*Harvey H. Bundy (B.A. 1909, S&B 1909) – Member of Choate, Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1933-1941, 1945-1963)  
 Marcien Jenckes (B.A. 1921, S&B 1921) – Member of Choate, Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1927-1971)  
 Brinley Morgan Hall (B.A. 1934, S&K 1934) – Partner of Choate, Hall & Stewart [law firm in Boston] (1951-1962)  
 Sidney Norwood Towle Jr. (B.A. 1935, LL.B. 1938, S&K 1935) – Partner of Withington, Cross, Park & McCann [law firm in Boston] (1947-1959)  
 George Frederick Baer Appel (B.A. 1924, S&B 1924) – Partner of Townsend, Elliott & Munson [law firm in Philadelphia] (1938-1970)  
 John Herron More (B.A. 1924) – Partner of Taft, Stettinius & Hollister [law firm in Cincinnati] (1935-1970)  
 John Bourne Dempsey (B.A. 1911, S&B 1911) – Partner of Squire, Sanders & Dempsey [law firm in Cleveland, Ohio] (1935-1963)  
 Howard Tallmadge Foulkes (B.A. 1911) – Partner of Wickham, Borgelt, Skogstad & Powell [law firm in Milwaukee] (1913-1973)  
 Olcott Damon Smith (B.A. 1929) – Partner of Day, Berry & Howard [law firm in Hartford, Connecticut] (1937-1962)  
 John Caldwell Parsons (B.A. 1922; LL.B. 1926) – Partner of Robinson, Robinson & Cole [law firm in Hartford, Connecticut] (1931-1973)  
 Pomeroy Day (B.A. 1928; LL.B. 1931) – Member of Robinson, Robinson & Cole [law firm in Hartford, Connecticut] (1936-1958)  
 Henry Cornick Coke (B.A. 1926, LL.B. 1929, S&B 1926) – Member of Coke & Coke [law firm in Dallas, Texas] (1930-1977)  
 Alvin Huey Lane (B.A. 1915; LL.B. Harvard 1920) – Partner of Lane & Savage (and predecessor) [law firm in Dallas, Texas] (1936-1957); Co-General Counsel of the Republican Party of Texas (1942-1952)  
 Cornelius E. Lombardi (B.A. 1911, S&B 1911) – Partner of Lombardi, Robertson, Fligg & McLean [law firm in Kansas City] (1936-1956)  
 Richard Marden Davis (B.A. 1933, S&B 1933) – Partner of Davis, Graham & Stubbs [law firm in Denver] (1937-c.1982)  
 Joseph Martin Jr. (B.A. 1936; LL.B. 1939) – Partner of Wallace, Garrison, Norton & Ray [law firm in San Francisco] (1946-1955)  
 Charles Dudley Pratt (B.A. 1922, LL.B. 1924) – Member of Pratt, Tavares & Cassidy [law firm in Honolulu, Hawaii] (1947-1960)

Lloyd Frank Thanhouser (Ph.B.1923, LL.B. 1926) – Vice President and General Counsel of Continental Oil Co. (Conoco) [Houston, Texas] (1949-c.1966)

#### Journalists:

\*Eugene Meyer (B.A. 1895) – Chairman of the board of The Washington Post Co. (1947-1959)  
\*Whitelaw Reid (B.A. 1936) – President of New York Herald Tribune (1952-1955)  
\*Henry R. Luce (B.A. 1920, S&B 1920) – Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)  
\*Charles Merz (B.A. 1915) – Editor of *The New York Times* (1938-1961)  
\*Walter Millis (B.A. 1920) – staff writer for *New York Herald-Tribune* (1924-1954)  
\*August Heckscher (B.A. 1936) – Chief Editorial Writer for *New York Herald-Tribune* (1952-1956)  
Charles Latimer Stillman (B.A. 1926) – Treasurer (1930-1960) and Executive Vice President (1949-1959) of Time, Inc. [Time magazine]

#### Organization Executives:

\*Russell C. Leffingwell (B.A. 1899) – Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1946-1953)  
\*Frank Altschul (B.A. 1908) – Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1951-1971)  
\*Percy W. Bidwell (B.A. 1910, Ph.D. 1915) – Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (1937-1953)  
\*W. Averell Harriman (B.A. 1913, S&B 1913) – Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1950-1955)  
\*E. Roland Harriman (B.A. 1917, S&B 1917) – President of American Red Cross (1950-1953)  
\*William Vincent Griffin (B.A. 1912, S&K 1912) – President of English-Speaking Union of the United States (1947-1957)  
The Rt. Rev. Henry Knox Sherrill (B.A. 1911) – President of the National Council of Churches USA (1950-1952)  
Horace Jeremiah (Jerry) Voorhis (B.A. 1923) – Executive Director of the Cooperative League of the United States of America (1947-1967)  
Angus Dun (B.A. 1914) – Protestant Episcopal Bishop for the Episcopal Diocese of Washington, D.C. (1944-1962)  
John Williams Andrews (B.A. 1920; LL.B. 1926) – Director of Washington Institute of Mental Hygiene (1951-1952)  
William Payne Roberts (B.A. 1909) – Pastor of St. Paul's Church in Nanking, China (1923-1937); Bishop of the Missionary District of Shanghai of the American Church Mission in China (1937-1950)  
William Reginald Wheeler (B.A. 1911) – Executive Secretary of Yale-in-China (1947-1949); Secretary of Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (1938-1942); Executive Secretary of Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions (1923-1932)  
Y.C. James Yen (B.A. 1918) – Founder and General Director of Chinese National Association of Mass Education Movement in Peiping [Beijing], China (1924-1951)

#### College Administrators and College Professors:


\*Alfred Whitney Griswold (B.A. 1929; Ph.D. 1933) – President of Yale University (1950-1963)  
Laurence G. Tighe (B.A. 1916, S&B 1916) – Treasurer of Yale University (1942-1954)  
Carl A. Lohmann (B.A. 1910, S&B 1910) – Secretary of Yale University (1927-1953)  
August Sidney Lovett (B.A. 1913, S&B 1913) – Chaplain of Yale University (1932-1958)

Robert L. Johnson (B.A. 1918) – President of Temple University (1941-1959)  
Richard Daniel Weigle (B.A. 1931, Ph.D. 1939) – President of St. John's College [Annapolis, Maryland] (1949-1980)  
Robert Maynard Hutchins (B.A. 1921) – Chancellor of University of Chicago (1945-1951); Associate Director of Ford Foundation (1951-1954)  
George Hoyt Whipple (B.A. 1900) – Dean of the School of Medicine and Dentistry at University of Rochester (1921-1953)  
Paul Shipman Andrews (B.A. 1909, LL.B. Columbia 1912) – Dean of Syracuse University College of Law (1927-1952)  
Shelden D. Elliott (B.A. 1927) – Dean of University of Southern California Law School (1948-1952)


Ralph Henry Gabriel (B.A. 1913, M.A. 1915, Ph.D. 1919) – Professor of History at Yale University (1928-1958)  
Karl N. Llewellyn (B.A. 1915, LL.B. 1918) – Betts Professor of Jurisprudence at Columbia University (1930-1951); Professor of Law at University of Chicago (1951-1962)  
Stanley Morrison (B.A. 1915) – Professor of Law at Stanford University (1929-1955); Member of the Bohemian Club in San Francisco  
\*Walt W. Rostow (B.A. 1936, Ph.D. 1940) – Professor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1950-1960)  
Alexander Hamilton Frey (B.A. 1919, LL.B. 1921) – Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania Law School (1932-1968)  
Walter Freeman (B.A. 1916, M.D. U.Penn. 1920) – Professor of Neurology at George Washington University (1927-1954)

Note: \*=Member of the Council on Foreign Relations; S&B = Skull & Bones; S&K = Scroll & Key

## Prominent Yale Graduates & Their Occupation during the Korean War



Roswell L. Gilpatric  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Under Secretary of the Air  
Force (1951-1953)




W. Stuart Symington  
B.A. Yale 1923  
Secretary of the Air Force  
(1947-1950)



Dean G. Acheson  
B.A. Yale 1915  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1949-1953)



William McC. Martin Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Chairman of the Federal  
Reserve (1951-1970)



Eugene Meyer  
B.A. Yale 1895  
Chairman of the board of  
The Washington Post Co.  
(1947-1959)



Ellsworth Bunker  
B.A. Yale 1916  
U.S. Ambassador to  
Argentina (1951-1952);  
U.S. Ambassador to Italy  
(1952-1953)



Chester Bowles  
B.A. Yale 1924  
U.S. Ambassador to India  
(1951-1953, 1963-1969)



Frank Altschul  
B.A. Yale 1908  
Vice President of the  
Council on Foreign  
Relations (1951-1971)



Russell C. Leffingwell  
B.A. Yale 1899  
Chairman of the Council  
on Foreign Relations  
(1946-1953)



Allen Wardwell  
B.A. Yale 1895  
Member of Davis, Polk,  
Wardwell (1909-1953)



Alfred Whitney Griswold  
B.A. Yale 1929  
President of Yale  
University (1950-1963)



William Vincent Griffin  
B.A. Yale 1912  
President of English-  
Speaking Union of the  
United States  
(1947-1957)



J. Irwin Miller  
B.A. Yale 1931  
Chairman of the board of  
Cummins Engine Co.  
(1951-1977)



John K. Jessup  
B.A. Yale 1928  
Chief Editorial Writer of  
*Life* magazine  
(1951-1969)



B. Brewster Jennings  
B.A. Yale 1920  
President of Socony-Mobil  
Oil Co. (1944-1955)



Stanley F. Reed  
B.A. Yale 1906  
Justice of the U.S.  
Supreme Court  
(1938-1957)



Robert Ten Broeck  
Stevens  
B.A. Yale 1921  
Secretary of the Army  
(1953-1955)



James S. Rockefeller  
B.A. Yale 1924  
President of National City  
Bank of New York  
[Citibank] (1952-1959)



John Taber  
B.A. Yale 1902  
U.S. Congressman  
(R-New York, 1923-1963)



Thruston B. Morton  
B.A. Yale 1929  
U.S. Congressman  
(R-Kentucky, 1947-1953)



## Prominent Yale Graduates (Skull & Bones) & Their Occupation during the Korean War



Harold Stanley  
B.A. Yale 1908  
Partner of Morgan,  
Stanley & Co.  
(1941-1955)




George L. Harrison  
B.A. Yale 1910  
Chairman of the board of  
New York Life Insurance  
Co. (1948-1954)



Robert A. Lovett  
B.A. Yale 1918  
U.S. Secretary of Defense  
(1951-1953)



F. Trubee Davison  
B.A. Yale 1918  
Director of Central  
Intelligence Agency (CIA)  
for Personnel (1951-1952)



John Martin Vorys  
B.A. Yale 1918  
U.S. Congressman  
(R-Ohio, 1939-1959)



John Sherman Cooper  
B.A. Yale 1923  
U.S. Senator  
(R-Kentucky, 1946-1949,  
1952-1955, 1956-1973)



Robert A. Taft  
B.A. Yale 1910  
U.S. Senator  
(R-Ohio, 1939-1953)



Prescott S. Bush  
B.A. Yale 1917  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co. (1931-  
1972); U.S. Senator  
(R-Conn., 1952-1963)




E. Roland Harriman  
B.A. Yale 1917  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co. (1931-  
1978); President of  
American Red Cross  
(1950-1953)




Knight Woolley  
B.A. Yale 1917  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co.  
(1931-1982)



Harvey H. Bundy  
B.A. Yale 1909  
Trustee, World Peace  
Foundation (1934-1963)



W. Averell Harriman  
B.A. Yale 1913  
Director of the Council on  
Foreign Relations  
(1950-1955)



Henry R. Luce  
B.A. Yale 1920  
Editor-in-Chief of *Time*  
magazine (1923-1964)




James W. Wadsworth Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1898  
U.S. Congressman  
(R-New York, 1933-1951)



Charles M. Spofford  
B.A. Yale 1924  
Member of Davis, Polk &  
Wardwell [law firm]  
(1940-1950, 1952-1973)



J. Quigg Newton Jr.  
B.A. Yale 1933  
Mayor of Denver,  
Colorado (1947-1955)




Morris Hadley  
B.A. Yale 1916  
Partner of Milbank,  
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy  
[law firm] (1924-1979)



J. Richardson Dilworth  
B.A. Yale 1938  
Partner of Kuhn, Loeb &  
Co. [bank] (1951-1958)



H. Neil Mallon  
B.A. Yale 1917  
President of Dresser  
Industries, Inc.  
(1929-1958)




Henry John Heinz II  
B.A. Yale 1931  
President of H.J. Heinz  
Company (1941-1959)



# Korean War and Special Interest: Council on Foreign Relations




Harold Pratt House, the headquarters of the Council on Foreign Relations, is located on southwest corner of Park Avenue and 68<sup>th</sup> Street in the Manhattan borough of New York City.



Left to right: Secretary of State Dean Acheson, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett, and Averell Harriman stand together in 1952. All four men in that photo were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Acheson, Eisenhower, and Harriman were members of the Council on Foreign Relations at the time this photo was taken in 1952.




# Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations during the Korean War (1950-1953)



W. Averell Harriman, Allen W. Dulles, John W. Davis, Russell C. Leffingwell, Joseph E. Johnson, Philip D. Reed



Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Lewis W. Douglas, Thomas K. Finletter, Devereux C. Josephs, Henry M. Wriston, David Rockefeller



Frank Altschul, Grayson L. Kirk, Walter H. Mallory, Whitney H. Shepardson, Myron C. Taylor, William A.M. Burden

Name	Director (Year)	Occupation (1950-1953)
John W. Davis	1921-1955	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed [law firm] (1921-1955)
Whitney H. Shepardson	1921-1966	Director of British Dominions and Colonies Fund at Carnegie Corp. of New York (1946-1953)
Allen W. Dulles	1927-1969	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency (1951-1953)
Russell C. Leffingwell	1927-1960	Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1946-1953)
George O. May	1927-1953	Senior Partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co. public accountants (1911-1961)
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	1928-1972	Editor of <i>Foreign Affairs</i> magazine (1928-1972)
Frank Altschul	1934-1972	Secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations (1944-1972)
John H. Williams	1937-1964	Nathaniel Ropes Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University (1933-1957)
Lewis W. Douglas	1940-1964	Chairman of Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (1950-1959)
Clarence E. Hunter	1942-1953	Chief of ECA [Marshall Plan] Special Mission to the Netherlands (1949-1951)
Myron C. Taylor	1943-1959	Representative of the President of the U.S. on Special Mission (1950-1953)
Henry M. Wriston	1943-1967	President of Brown University (1937-1955)
Thomas K. Finletter	1944-1967	Secretary of the Air Force (1950-1953)
William A.M. Burden	1945-1974	Partner of William A.M. Burden & Co. (1949-1984)
Walter H. Mallory	1945-1968	Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1959)
Philip D. Reed	1945-1969	Chairman of the board of General Electric Co. (1940-1942, 1945-1958)
David Rockefeller	1949-1985	Senior Vice President of Chase National Bank (1951-1955)
W. Averell Harriman	1950-1955	Director of Mutual Security Agency (1951-1953)
Joseph E. Johnson	1950-1974	President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1950-1971)
Grayson L. Kirk	1950-1973	Provost of Columbia University (1949-1953)
Devereux C. Josephs	1951-1958	President of New York Life Insurance Co. (1948-1954)



## Council on Foreign Relations Members during the Korean War



Harold Stanley  
Partner, Morgan, Stanley  
& Co. (1941-1955)



Eugene R. Black  
President of The World  
Bank (1949-1962)




Winthrop W. Aldrich  
Chairman of Chase  
National Bank  
(1934-1953)




William McC. Martin Jr.  
Chairman of the Federal  
Reserve (1951-1970)



Allan Sproul  
President of the Federal  
Reserve Bank of New  
York (1941-1956)



Henry R. Luce  
Editor-in-Chief of *Time*  
magazine (1923-1964)



Arthur Hays Sulzberger  
President of The New  
York Times Co.  
(1935-1957)



Eugene Meyer  
Chairman of the board of  
The Washington Post Co.  
(1947-1959)



David Sarnoff  
Chairman of the board of  
Radio Corporation of  
America (1947-1966)



William S. Paley  
Chairman of the board of  
Columbia Broadcasting  
System (1946-1983)



George F. Kennan  
U.S. Ambassador to the  
Soviet Union (1952)



Paul H. Nitze  
Director of State Dept.  
Policy Planning Staff  
(1950-1953)



Dean G. Acheson  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(1949-1953)



John Foster Dulles  
Chairman of The  
Rockefeller Foundation  
(1950-1952); U.S.  
Secretary of State  
(1953-1959)



Gen. Walter Bedell Smith  
Director of Central  
Intelligence Agency  
(1950-1953)




Maj. Gen. Maxwell D.  
Taylor  
Army Deputy Chief of  
Staff for Operations and  
Administration  
(1951-1953)




Maj. Gen. Lyman L.  
Lemnitzer  
Army Deputy Chief of  
Staff for Plans and  
Research (1952-1955)



Dwight D. Eisenhower  
Supreme Allied  
Commander of Europe  
(1951-1952); President of  
the U.S. (1953-1961)



Herbert H. Lehman  
U.S. Senator  
(D-New York, 1949-1957)



H. Alexander Smith  
U.S. Senator  
(R-New Jersey,  
1944-1959)



Benjamin J. Bittenwieser  
Partner of Kuhn, Loeb &  
Co. [New York City]  
(1932-1977)



Frederick M. Warburg  
Partner of Kuhn, Loeb &  
Co. (1931-1973)



William G. Brady Jr.  
Chairman of the board of  
National City Bank of New  
York (1948-1952)



Howard C. Sheperd  
President (1948-1952)  
and Chairman (1952-  
1959) of National City  
Bank of New York




C. Douglas Dillon  
Chairman of the board of  
Dillon, Read & Co.  
(1946-1953)



Eugene G. Grace  
Chairman of Bethlehem  
Steel Corp. (1945-1960)



Alfred P. Sloan Jr.  
Chairman of the board of  
General Motors Corp.  
(1937-1956)



Thomas J. Watson Sr.  
Chairman of International  
Business Machines Corp.  
(IBM) (1949-1956)




George L. Harrison  
Chairman of the board of  
New York Life Insurance  
Co. (1948-1954)



B. Brewster Jennings  
President of Socony-Mobil  
Oil Co. (1944-1955)



Paul G. Hoffman  
President of Ford  
Foundation (1950-1953)



Edward R. Murrow  
CBS journalist  
(1935-1961)




Felix Frankfurter  
Justice of the U.S.  
Supreme Court  
(1939-1962)



Christian A. Herter  
Member of the U.S.  
House of Representatives  
(R-Mass., 1943-1953)



David K.E. Bruce  
U.S. Ambassador to  
France (1949-1952)



Arthur H. Dean  
Partner of Sullivan &  
Cromwell  
[law firm in New York City]  
(1929-1976)



Allen Wardwell  
Member of Davis, Polk,  
Wardwell  
[law firm in New York City]  
(1909-1953)



Charles M. Spofford  
Member of Davis, Polk &  
Wardwell  
(1940-1950, 1952-1973)



E. Roland Harriman  
Chairman of the board of  
Union Pacific Railroad Co.  
(1946-1969)



Juan Terry Trippe  
President of Pan  
American World Airways,  
Inc. (1927-1964)



## Council on Foreign Relations Members and Their Occupation during the Korean War (1950-1953)


Name	CFR Membership (Year)	Primary Occupation
<b>Bankers:</b>		
Eugene R. Black	1950-1963	President of The World Bank (1949-1962)
William McC. Martin Jr.	1947-1995	Chairman of the Federal Reserve (April 2, 1951-January 31, 1970) Assistant U.S. Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs (1949-1951)
Allan Sproul	1935-1955	President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1941-1956)
Winthrop W. Aldrich	1927-1973	Chairman of the board of Chase National Bank (1934-1953)
David Rockefeller	1942-present	Senior Vice President of Chase National Bank (1951-1955) Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations (1950-1970)
Thomas S. Lamont	1931-1966	Vice President of J.P. Morgan & Co. (1940-1953)
William G. Brady Jr.	1944-1952	Chairman of the board of National City Bank of New York (1948-1952)
Howard C. Sheperd	1939-1962	President of National City Bank of New York (1948-1952)
C. Douglas Dillon	1940-2002	Chairman of the board of Dillon, Read & Co. (1946-1953)
J.C. Traphagen	1933-1973	Chairman of the board of Bank of New York (1948-1957)
Harold Stanley	1925-1959	Partner of Morgan Stanley & Co. (1941-1955)
E. Roland Harriman	1933-1969	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1978) President of American Red Cross (1950-1953)
Ray Morris	1947-1956	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1956)
Knight Woolley	1948-1977	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1931-1982)
Thomas McCance	1949-1978	Partner of Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. (1945-1979)
Frederick M. Warburg	1933-1970	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1931-1973)
John M. Schiff	1938-1986	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1931-1977)
Benjamin J. Buttenwieser	1942-1991	Partner of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. (1932-1977)
Robert Lehman	1940-1968	Partner of Lehman Brothers (1925-1969)
John L. Loeb Sr.	1949-1996	Partner of Loeb, Rhoades & Co. [New York City brokerage firm] (1931-1955)
Broderick Haskell	1946-1981	Vice President of Guaranty Trust Company of New York (1937-1953)
Alfred Hayes	1948-1985	Vice President of the New York Trust Company (1949-1956)
B.A. Tompkins	1944-1955	Vice President of Bankers Trust Co. (1921-1955)
Alfred W. Weld	1947-1956	Partner of Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis [brokerage firm in Boston]
Hugh Bullock	1947-1993	Wall Street banker
<b>Businessmen:</b>		
Alfred P. Sloan Jr.	1933-1965	Chairman of the board of General Motors Corp. (1937-1956)
Thomas J. Watson	1924-1955	Chairman of International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) (1949-1956)
Philip D. Reed	1942-1988	Chairman of the board of General Electric Co. (1940-1942, 1945-1958)
Irving S. Olds	1935-1962	Chairman of the board of United States Steel Corp. (1940-1952)
Eugene G. Grace	1925-1958	Chairman of the board of Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1945-1960)
Lewis W. Douglas	1935-1973	Chairman of the board, Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York (1950-1959) U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain (March 25, 1947-November 16, 1950)
George L. Harrison	1929-1953	Chairman of the board of New York Life Insurance Co. (1948-1954)
Devereux C. Josephs	1946-1961	President of New York Life Insurance Co. (1948-1954)
Juan Terry Trippe	1933-1976	President of Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1927-1964); Chairman of The Economic Club of New York (1950-1952)
B. Brewster Jennings	1946-1960	President of Socony-Mobil Oil Co. (1944-1955)
Jack I. Straus	1942-1985	President of R.H. Macy & Co. [Macy's department store] (1940-1956)
B. Edwin Hutchinson	1927-1960	Vice President of Chrysler Corp. (1925-1953)
Byron K. Elliott	1944-1992	Executive Vice Pres. of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (1947-1957)
Lammot du Pont Copeland	1942-1983	Secretary of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1947-1954)
Emilio G. Collado	1948-1992	Assistant Treasurer of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey [Exxon] (1949-1954)
Laird Bell	1949-1960	Chairman of the board of Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. (1947-1955)
George O. May	1924-1960	Senior Partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co. public accountants (1911-1961); Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1953)
Percival F. Brundage	1935-1978	Partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co. public accountants [New York] (1930-1954)
Sosthenes Behn	1930-1953	Member of the board of directors of National City Bank of New York (1925-1956)
Cleveland E. Dodge	1931-1982	Member of the board of directors of National City Bank of New York (1926-1960)
W. Randolph Burgess	1939-1978	Member of the board of directors of National City Bank of New York (1938-1952)
<b>Lawyers:</b>		
John W. Davis	1921-1955	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed [New York City](1921-1955)
Allen Wardwell	1921-1953	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed (1909-1953)
Ralph M. Carson	1938-1969	Member of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Gardiner & Reed (1935-1977)
George A. Brownell	1947-1977	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1930-1972)
Taggart Whipple	1951-1992	Partner of Davis, Polk & Wardwell (1950-1992)
Eustace Seligman	1926-1976	Member of Sullivan & Cromwell [law firm in New York City] (1923-1976)
Arthur H. Dean	1938-1987	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1929-1976)
George C. Sharp	1946-1972	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1929-1971)
Norris Darrell	1946-1983	Partner of Sullivan & Cromwell (1934-1976)
Eli Whitney Debevoise	1935-1989	Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton [law firm in New York City] (1931-1990)
Francis T.P. Plimpton	1933-1983	Partner of Debevoise & Plimpton (1933-1961, 1965-1983) President of Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association [TIAA] (1951-1975)



George Roberts	1932-1967	Partner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm] (1914-1968)
Allen T. Klots	1934-1964	Member of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts [law firm] (1921-1965)
Roland L. Redmond	1924-1963	Member of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn [law firm in New York City] (1925-1955)
William S. Gaud	1948-1977	Member of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn [law firm in New York City] (1946-1961)
George W. Ball	1949-1993	Partner of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton [law firm in NYC] (1946-1961)
Jerome S. Hess	1930-1968	Member of Hardin, Hess & Eder [law firm in New York City] (1907-1970)
Henry J. Friendly	1942-1985	General Counsel of Pan American World Airways (1946-1959)
<b>Organization Executives:</b>		
Joseph E. Johnson	1948-1990	President of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1950-1971)
Paul G. Hoffman	1942-1972	President of Ford Foundation (1950-1953)
Chester I. Barnard	1947-1955	President of The Rockefeller Foundation (1948-1952)
Charles Dollard	1949-1970	President of Carnegie Corporation of New York (1948-1955)
Brooks Emeny	1938-1980	President of Foreign Policy Association (1947-1953)
Patrick Murphy Malin	1948-1964	Executive Director of American Civil Liberties Union (1950-1962)
William Vincent Griffin	1950-1957	President of English-Speaking Union of the United States (1947-1957)
Kenneth Holland	1951-1977	President of Institute of International Education (1950-1973)
Oliver C. Carmichael	1945-1958	President of Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1946-1953)
Evans Clark	1931-1938, 1948-1956	Executive Director of 20th Century Fund, Inc. (1928-1953)
Frank Aydelotte	1938-1954	Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1927-1956)
Harvey Bundy	1934-1962	Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1934-1963)
Bruce C. Hopper	1930-1972	Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1937-1969)
David Dubinsky	1939-1976	President of International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (1932-1966)
Russell C. Leffingwell	1921-1959	Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations (1946-1953)
Walter H. Mallory	1928-1979	Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1959)
Frank Altschul	1921-1973	Secretary of the Council on Foreign Relations (1944-1972)
<b>Corporate Media:</b>		
Eugene Meyer	1930-1958	Chairman of the board of The Washington Post Co. (1947-1959)
Arthur Hays Sulzberger	1927-1968	President of The New York Times Co. (1935-1957); Publisher of <i>The New York Times</i> (1935-1961)
William S. Paley	1936-1989	Chairman of the board of Columbia Broadcasting System [CBS] (1946-1983)
David Sarnoff	1947-1969	Chairman of the board of Radio Corporation of America [RCA] (1947-1966)
Henry R. Luce	1934-1966	Editor-in-Chief of Time, Inc. (1923-1964)
Edward R. Murrow	1934-1964	CBS journalist (1935-1961)
Cass Canfield	1923-1985	Chairman of the board of Harper & Brothers [later Harper & Row] (1945-1955)
David Lawrence	1931-1970	President and Editor of U.S. News & World Report (1948-1959)
Philip L. Graham	1948-1962	Publisher of <i>The Washington Post</i> (1946-1961)
Emanuel R. Freedman	1950-1970	Foreign News Editor of <i>The New York Times</i> (1948-1964)
Geoffrey Parsons	1925-1953	Chief Editorial Writer for <i>New York Herald-Tribune</i> (1924-1952)
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	1921-1972	Editor of <i>Foreign Affairs</i> magazine (1928-1972)
<b>College Professors:</b>		
A. Whitney Griswold	1942-1962	President of Yale University (1950-1963)
James B. Conant	1934-1976	President of Harvard University (1933-1953)
Harold W. Dodds	1934-1968	President of Princeton University (1933-1957)
John Sloan Dickey	1946-1983	President of Dartmouth College (1945-1970)
Henry M. Wriston	1926-1978	President of Brown University (1937-1955)
Charles W. Cole	1946-1953, 1960-1977	President of Amherst College (1946-1960)
James P. Baxter III	1938-1971	President of Williams College (1937-1961)
Robert G. Sproul	1945-1964	President of University of California at Berkeley (1930-1958)
J.E. Wallace Sterling	1946-1978	President of Stanford University (1949-1968)
Robert L. Johnson	1940-1961	President of Temple University (1941-1959)
Everett N. Case	1940-1981	President of Colgate University [New York] (1942-1962)
Arthur G. Coons	1950-1964	President of Occidental College [California] (1946-1965)
Kenneth C.M. Sills	1938-1953	President of Bowdoin College (1918-1952)
John W. Nason	1942-1985	President of Swarthmore College (1940-1953)
Arthur A. Hauck	1939-1970	President of University of Maine (1934-1958)
Donald K. David	1942-1975	Dean of Harvard Business School (1942-1955)
Carl W. Ackerman	1940-1953	Dean of Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University (1931-1956)
Edward S. Mason	1945-1972	Dean of Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard Univ. (1947-1958)
Zechariah Chafee Jr.	1928-1956	Professor of Law at Harvard University (1919-1956)
Alvin H. Hansen	1939-1953	Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Harvard Univ. (1937-1958)
Clarence H. Haring	1931-1954	Professor of Latin American History and Economics at Harvard Univ. (1923-1953)
Manley O. Hudson	1921-1956	Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School (1923-1960) President of The American Society of International Law (1949-1952) Trustee of World Peace Foundation (1923-1960)
William L. Langer	1927-1977	Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard University (1936-1964)
John Kenneth Galbraith	1947-1970	Professor of Economics at Harvard University (1949-1960, 1963-1975)
Lindsay Rogers	1927-1970	Burgess Professor of Public Law at Columbia University (1929-1959)
John N. Hazard	1942-1994	Professor of Public Law at Columbia University (1946-1977)
Geroid T. Robinson	1942-1969	Seth Low Professor of History at Columbia University (1950-1971)

Leo Wolman	1934-1958	Professor of Economics at Columbia University (1931-1958)
Henry C. Wallich	1952-1988	Professor of Economics at Yale University (1951-1974)
<b>Government Officials:</b>		
Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower	1949-1968	President of the United States (January 20, 1953-January 20, 1961) Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (1951-1952)
John Foster Dulles	1921-1959	U.S. Secretary of State (January 26, 1953-April 22, 1959) Chairman of The Rockefeller Foundation (1950-1952)
Allen W. Dulles	1927-1969	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency (1951-1953) Director of Central Intelligence Agency (February 26, 1953-November 29, 1961) Director of the Council on Foreign Relations (1927-1969)
Frank G. Wisner	1947-1965	Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency for Plans (1951-1959)
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith	1953-1960	Director of Central Intelligence Agency (1950-1953)
Dean G. Acheson	1948-1953, 1960-1971	U.S. Secretary of State (1949-1953)
(Adm.) Alan G. Kirk	1950-1962	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1949-1951)
George F. Kennan	1947-1973, 1977-2004	U.S. Amb. to the Soviet Union (1952); Counselor, State Dept. (1949-1951)
Charles E. Bohlen	1953-1973	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union (April 20, 1953-April 18, 1957)
Walter S. Gifford	1928-1965	U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain (December 21, 1950-January 23, 1953)
David K.E. Bruce	1946-1977	U.S. Ambassador to France (1949-1952); Under Secretary of State (1952-1953)
Selden Chapin	1948-1962	U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands (1949-1953)
Lincoln MacVeagh	1935-1971	U.S. Ambassador to Portugal (1948-1952)
John M. Cabot	1957-1980	U.S. Minister to Finland (1950-1952); U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai, Republic of China (1948-1949)
Ellsworth Bunker	1942-1984	Chairman of the board of National Sugar Refining Co. (1948-1951) U.S. Ambassador to Argentina (1951-1952) U.S. Ambassador to Italy (1952-1953)
Herschel V. Johnson	1948-1965	U.S. Ambassador to Brazil (1948-1953)
Claude G. Bowers	1948-1954	U.S. Ambassador to Chile (1939-1953)
John C. Wiley	1949-1951	U.S. Ambassador to Panama (1951-1953)
Norman Armour	1938-1977	U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela (1950-1951)
Waldemar J. Gallman	1950-1960	U.S. Ambassador to [Apartheid] South Africa (1951-1954)
Joseph C. Green	1947-1972, 1974	U.S. Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (1952-1953)
James G. McDonald	1921-1963	U.S. Ambassador to Israel (March 28, 1949-December 13, 1950)
William P. Maddox	1939-1972	Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, Portugal (1949-1952) U.S. Consul-General in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago (1952-1955)
John J. McCloy	1940-1989	High Commissioner of Germany (1949-1952)
W. Averell Harriman	1923-1986	Director of Mutual Security Agency (1951-1953)
Paul H. Nitze	1949-2004	Director of State Department Policy Planning Staff (1950-1953)
Herbert Feis	1930-1971	Member of State Department Policy Planning Staff (1950-1951)
Willard L. Thorp	1950-1991	Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (1946-1952)
Charles M. Spofford	1947-1990	Chairman of North Atlantic Council of Deputies and European Coordinating Committee (1950-1952)
Thomas K. Finletter	1935-1979	Secretary of the Air Force (April 24, 1950-January 20, 1953)
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor	1946-1985	Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration (1951-1953)
Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer	1946-1987	Commanding General, 7 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (1951-1952) Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research (1952-1955)
H. Alexander Smith	1934-1966	U.S. Senator (Republican-New Jersey, 1944-1959)
Ralph E. Flanders	1939-1960	U.S. Senator (Republican-Vermont, 1946-1959)
William B. Benton	1945-1972	U.S. Senator (Democrat-Connecticut, 1949-1953)
Herbert H. Lehman	1921-1963	U.S. Senator (Democrat-New York, 1949-1957)
Christian A. Herter	1930-1933, 1938-1942, 1946-1966	Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Republican-Mass., 1943-1953); Governor of Massachusetts (January 8, 1953-January 3, 1957)
Felix Frankfurter	1932-1964	Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1939-1962)

## The Origins of the Korean War: Russo-Japanese War & Taft-Katsura Agreement




Imperial Japanese Army (大日本帝國陸軍) troops march through the West Gate in Seoul, Korea in 1904. The city of Seoul was the capital city of the Korean Empire (大韓帝國, 1897-1910) and the former Joseon Dynasty, or Kingdom of Joseon (朝鮮國, 1392-1897). (Photo: [Library of Congress](#))



# From the Grassy Knoll in Shanghai, China: Lone Gunman or Patsy?

The Assassination of Korean community organizer Kim Ok-kyun on March 28, 1894



A portrait of Korean community organizer **Kim Ok-kyun (left)** while he was living in Nagasaki, Japan as a refugee. Kim Ok-kyun participated in a failed coup d'état, formally known as the Gapsin Coup, in December 1884. Kim Ok-kyun fled Korea and lived in Japan as a refugee from 1884 until 1894. Korean patriot **Hong Chong-u (right)** shot and killed Kim Ok-kyun in Shanghai, China on March 28, 1894. British police officers in Shanghai arrested Korean patriot **Hong Chong-u** shortly after the assassination and transferred **Hong Chong-u** to Chinese authorities for trial. However, the Chinese government decided to release Korean patriot **Hong Chong-u** from prison. **Hong Chong-u** and the corpse of **Kim Ok-kyun** arrived in Korea on April 12, 1894.



Japanese diplomats and Chinese diplomats sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki at Shimonoseki, Japan on April 17, 1895, ending the First Sino-Japanese War. Japan acquired the island of Taiwan from China and required China to recognize the independence of Korea. Japan also obtained additional diplomatic and economic privileges, including the opening of several Chinese ports to Japanese trade.

# The Assassination of Queen Min of Korea: Organized Crime?



A portrait of Queen Min of Korea (Empress Myeongseong) (October 19, 1851–October 8, 1895)



Funeral of Queen Min of Korea (Empress Myeongseong) in Seoul, Korea in October 1895. Queen Min of Korea had been assassinated by a group of Japanese thugs in Seoul, Korea on October 8, 1895 due to her pro-Russian stance and her desire to establish an alliance with the Russian Empire.





The alleged Japanese murderers of Empress Myeongseong (Queen Min) pose for a group portrait in front of Hanseong Shinbo (Hanseong Newspaper) building in Seoul, Korea in 1895. Among the perpetrators include the Japanese Minister to Korea Viscount Miura Gorō. The Japanese murderers were tried for their crime inside a district court in Hiroshima; however, the Japanese murderers were acquitted by the court due to insufficient evidence.



Viscount Miura Gorō, Japanese Minister to Korea in 1895





Left photo: Emperor Gwangmu (Gojong) of the Korean Empire ruled Korea from 1863 to 1907.

Right photo: A photo of Koreans who died in fighting in Gwanseong Garrison during the Korean Expedition of 1871. The United States Navy engaged in a military campaign, also known as the Korean Expedition of 1871 or Shinmiyangyo, on and around the Korean island of Ganghwa near present-day Seoul in 1871. Ulysses S. Grant, a former U.S. Army general during the American Civil War, was the President of the United States in 1871. (Source of photograph: Ulysses S. Grant III Photographic Collection Relating to the Korean Punitive Expedition)



One of the 'righteous armies' that were formed in the early 1900s after the Japanese occupation. In 1907 a righteous Army of 10,000 tried to liberate Seoul but were defeated. Most of the resistance armies in the south were hunted down, while those in the north survived by being able to retreat and resupply in Manchuria and Russia. (Photo: <http://koreanhistory.info/japan.htm>)




TAFT, WILLIAM H. - AS SECY OF WAR



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Leaving the dock at Yokohama.

U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft speaks with Japanese dignitaries while leaving the dock at Yokohama, Japan in July 1905. William Howard Taft and Prime Minister Taro Katsura engaged in a “gentlemen’s agreement”, later known as the Taft-Katsura Agreement. The Taft-Katsura Agreement virtually invalidated the United States-Korea Treaty of 1882. (Photo: [Library of Congress](#))




Left photo: Lee Wan-Yong (1858-1926) was the Prime Minister of Korea (1906-1910) who signed the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty on August 22, 1910. The Korean diplomats who agreed to the annexation in 1910 were under the impression that the Japanese annexation of Korea would lead to a political union similar to Austria-Hungary; the annexation of Korea would transform Korea into a Japanese colony.

Right: Sunjong (1874-1926) was the last King (Emperor) of Korea who governed Korea from 1907 to 1910. Sunjong did not sign the annexation treaty in 1910. The Imperial Japanese government provided Sunjong and other members of the Korean royal family a pension and a Japanese title of nobility following annexation. Sunjong died at his palace in Seoul in 1926.






The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (also known as the Eulsa Protective Treaty or Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty) was established under duress in Seoul, Korea on November 17, 1905. Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi entered Jungmyeongjeon Hall (above) in Seoul, Korea in November 1905 and coerced Korean Cabinet ministers to sign the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905. The unequal treaty deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty and made Korea a protectorate (and later a colony) of Japan.



A copy of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905





William Howard Taft (left), the U.S. Secretary of War (and later President of the United States), and Taro Katsura (桂 太郎) (right), the Prime Minister of Japan. The Taft-Katsura Memorandum (commonly called the Taft-Katsura Agreement) consists of notes containing portions of a long, confidential conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura and U.S. Secretary of War William Howard Taft held in Tokyo, Japan on July 27, 1905. Taft and Katsura discussed America's presence in the Philippines, Japan's eventual colonization of Korea, and the balance of power in eastern Asia during their meeting. Taro Katsura was the Prime Minister of Japan on three separate occasions (1901-1906, 1908-1911, and 1912-1913); **Taro Katsura was the Prime Minister of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) and during the Annexation of Korea in 1910.** William Howard Taft was the President of the United States when Japan annexed Korea in 1910.



Left: Field Marshal Masatake Terauchi (寺内 正毅) served as the first Governor General of Korea (October 1, 1910-October 9, 1916) and served as the Prime Minister of Japan (October 9, 1916-September 29, 1918). Masatake Terauchi adopted a policy of "assimilation" towards the Koreans and required Koreans to learn and speak the Japanese language. Japan governed Korea as a protectorate from 1905 until 1910 and as a colony from 1910 until the end of World War II in 1945.

Right: Field Marshal Yoshimichi Hasegawa (長谷川 好道) served as the Governor General of Korea from October 1916 until August 1919. Yoshimichi Hasegawa served as the Commander of the Korea Garrison Army from September 1904 until December 1908. Yoshimichi Hasegawa brutally suppressed Samil Independence Movement (March 1st Movement) that developed in Korea during and after World War I.

# From the Grassy Knoll in Harbin, China: Lone Gunman or Patsy?

The Assassination of Ito Hirobumi, Former Prime Minister of Japan,  
by Korean Patriot Ahn Jung-geun (October 26, 1909)



A painting depicting the assassination of Ito Hirobumi by Ahn Jong-kun at Harbin station Manchuria in October 1909


*A Handbook of Korea-1993, KOIS.*

**“I’m just a patsy!”:** Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun assassinates and kills Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi, who served as Resident General of Korea from December 21, 1905 to June 14, 1909, at the Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, China [Manchuria] on October 26, 1909. (Painting: <http://www.pennfamily.org/KSS-USA/korean-on-stamp-5.html>)






Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi, Prime Minister of Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War, leaves the train at the Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, China on October 26, 1909.



Hirobumi Ito, second from left, steps from the train in Harbin Railway Station, on Oct. 26, 1909. A few minutes later, he was killed by young Korean independence fighter Ahn Jung-geun. / Korea Times

Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi, who served as the Prime Minister of Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), leaves the train at the Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, China on October 26, 1909. Ito Hirobumi (伊藤 博文, 1841-1909) was the Prime Minister of Japan (1885-1888, 1892-1896, 1898, 1900-1901) and Resident General of Korea (December 21, 1905-June 14, 1909). An Jung-geun, a Korean nationalist, assassinated Hirobumi Itō at the Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, China [Manchuria] on October 26, 1909 as Ito prepared to meet with Vladimir Kokovtsov, a Russian representative in Manchuria.





The Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty (日韓併合条約) was signed on August 22, 1910 by the representatives of the Korean and Japanese Imperial Governments. The Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty went into effect on August 29, 1910, officially starting the period of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. In South Korea, August 29 is known as "the day of national shame."



A portrait of Ahn Jung-geun, the Korean nationalist and Christian soldier who assassinated Hirobumi Itô at the Harbin Railway Station in Harbin, China [Manchuria] on October 26, 1909. Ahn Jung-geun was executed by hanging at Port Arthur, China [Japan] on March 26, 1910.



Sunjong, the last Emperor of Korea (reign, July 20, 1907–August 29, 1910) never signed the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty.




Korean diplomat Lee Wan-yong (1858-1926) signed the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, an unequal treaty in which Japan formally annexed Korea, in 1910.





The largest uprising against Japanese rule occurred in March 1919 after a failure of the Korean delegation to gain the rights of self-determination at the Versailles Conference following WWI. Here university students demonstrate. (Photo: <http://koreanhistory.info/japan.htm>)




A group of Koreans involved in the 1919 uprising (March First Movement, or Samil Movement) stand in front of Japanese judges in Korea during a trial. An estimated 1-2 million Koreans participated in the uprising with some 7,000 Koreans being executed. (Photo: <http://koreanhistory.info/japan.htm>)



Members of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, including Dr. Syngman Rhee, pose for a group photo on October 11, 1919. (Photo: [http://www.ahnchangho.or.kr/site/bbs/board.php?bo\\_table=group\\_01\\_a01\\_04&wr\\_id=5](http://www.ahnchangho.or.kr/site/bbs/board.php?bo_table=group_01_a01_04&wr_id=5))






Assassination attempt on Emperor Hirohito of Japan by Korean independence activist Lee Bong-chang in Tokyo, Japan on January 9, 1932. Frontpage of French newspaper Lillustre du petit Journal, 1932.



Korean patriot Lee Bong-chang (center, 1900-1932) is arrested by the Japanese police in Tokyo, Japan on January 9, 1932 after Lee attempted to assassinate Emperor Hirohito with hand grenades. Lee Bong-chang was sentenced to death and hanged in prison on October 10, 1932. Lee Bong-chang met with exiled Korean leader Kim Ku in Shanghai in 1931. (Source: Japanese book "Showa History Vol.6: Manchurian Incident" published by Mainichi Newspapers Company.)



Left: *Sōshi-kaimei* (創氏改名) was a Japanese policy created by General Jiro Minami (南次郎), the Governor-General of Korea, in 1939 and 1940 that required Koreans living in Korea to abandon their Korean name and adopt a Japanese name. General Jiro Minami was the the Governor-General of Korea from 1936 to 1942, Governor-General of Kwantung Leased Territory from 1934 to 1936, and the Japanese Minister of War (April 1931-December 1931) during the infamous Mukden Incident in Manchuria. General Jiro Minami was tried and convicted of war crimes at the Tokyo Trials held after World War II.

Right: Announcement of the *Sōshi-kaimei* policy issued by the Daegu court in Korea, written bilingually in Japanese and Korean, in a special parallel style in which hanja/kanji were printed only once and were "shared" by the hangul and kana texts. The literal meaning of *Sōshi-kaimei*: "Create a surname (shi) and change (your) given name".



The Imperial Japanese Army conscripted (drafted) Korean men and boys during the final years of World War II.





A photo of downtown Seoul, Korea under Japanese colonial rule in the early 1940s. A sign advertising Kirin Beer (キリンビール) in Japanese *katagana* (alphabet) can be seen on the right. Seoul was known as Keijo from 1910 to 1945.  
 (Photo: <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=611726>)



The Japanese Government-General Office in Seoul, Korea before 1945  
 (Source: Japanese book "The General view of Korea" published by Chosen-Bunka Fukyu Kai)





HEAD OFFICE OF CHOSŬN BANK, KEIJO.  
朝鮮銀行の頭取 (京城)

Bank of Chosen (朝鮮銀行), located in Seoul (formerly Keijo), was the central bank of Korea under Japanese colonial rule. The Bank of Chosen was a privately-owned corporation owned and operated by the Japanese bankers. Bank of Chosen was formally dissolved by U.S. Allied Occupation authorities in 1950 and was replaced by the Bank of Korea, the central bank for the Republic of Korea.



Korean city of Pyongyang (formerly Heijo, current capital of North Korea) under Imperial Japanese colonial rule





Photographs of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America, Maryknoll, New York, 1912-1945. East Gate, Pyeng Yang [Pyongyang], Korea, ca. 1920-1940. Photograph of "East Gate of ancient walled city of Pyeng Yang."  
(The Maryknoll Mission Archives) <http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=4688>



A Mitsukoshi department store in Seoul (Keijo), Korea in the 1930s





Imperial Japanese Army soldiers surrender their rifles to American soldiers in Korea in September 1945.  
(Photo: <http://demons.swallowthesky.org/post/29208782741>)



Imperial Japanese Army soldiers surrender their rifles to American soldiers in Korea in September 1945.  
(Photo: <http://www.histomil.com/viewtopic.php?f=95&t=3918&p=33489&hilit=149>)





Imperial Japanese Army troops prepare to withdraw from Korea in 1945.

(Source: Japanese book "Showa History of 100 million people: Occupation of Japan Vol.1" published by Mainichi Newspapers Company) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Withdrawal\\_of\\_Japanese\\_troops\\_from\\_Korea.JPG](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Withdrawal_of_Japanese_troops_from_Korea.JPG)




A color photo of Seoul, Korea shortly before the beginning of the Korean War



# Korean War: Partition, Supervision, Rebellion, and Assassinations (1945-1950)



The Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at Panmunjom. (Photo: [National Defense University](#))



John McCloy (center), the Assistant Secretary of War during World War II, appointed two Rhodes Scholars, Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel III, to assist him in dividing Korea into two military districts. U.S. Army Colonel Dean Rusk (left), who later served as Secretary of State during the Vietnam War, and U.S. Army Colonel (later General) Charles H. Bonesteel III (right), who served as the Commander of the U.S. 8th Army [Korea] and Commander of United Nations Command Korea from 1966 to 1969, made the decision to divide Korea at the 38th Parallel near the end of World War II on August 10-11, 1945. John McCloy, Dean Rusk, and Charles H. Bonesteel III were members of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private internationalist organization in New York City.





An American Army soldier (right, foreground) is seen guarding the Demilitarized Zone along with South Korean soldiers as a North Korean soldier stands behind the meeting hall. (Photo: [United States Army](#))



The Bridge of No Return near Panmunjom (Photo: [Flickr](#))





**The future of Korea is discussed at the Potsdam Conference.** View of the conference table at Cecilienhof Palace, scene of the Potsdam Conference, in Potsdam, Germany on July 19, 1945. U.S. President Harry S. Truman is in left foreground. Adm. William Leahy is seated to the right of the President. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is seated at upper left of table. Clement Attlee is seated two to the right of Mr. Churchill. Soviet leader Josef Stalin is at upper right of table. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov is to the immediate left of Mr. Stalin in the photo. Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is standing at extreme left; Averell Harriman was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private political organization in New York City, and a member of Skull & Bones secret society at Yale University.





The Potsdam Conference in late July 1945 brought the Soviet Union's commitment to entering the war against Japan. The result was a Soviet occupation of northern Korea, American occupation of southern Korea, and Korea's partition along the 38th parallel. A picture of a conference session at the Potsdam Conference include British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Soviet Commissar Joseph Stalin, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy (Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief), Joseph E. Davies, U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, and U.S. President Harry S. Truman.



Opening session of meetings between the Soviet and American occupation commands in Korea at Seoul in January 1946. Seated at left at the front of the table is Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, the head of the U.S. occupation in the south. To his left is Colonel General Terentii F. Shytkov, the head of the Soviet occupation in the north.

(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)



Terenti Shtykov, head of the Soviet delegation, leaves after the first meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Union Joint Commission at Deoksu Palace in central Seoul, Korea in 1946. After World War II, Korea was under the control of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Terenti Shtykov was the Soviet military governor of the northern half of Korea.  
Korea Times file (Photo: [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2012/12/363\\_103451.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/issues/2012/12/363_103451.html))



This 1947 file photo shows American and Soviet representatives attending a meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Union Joint Commission in Seoul.  
/ Korea Times file





The primary negotiators of the agreement on Korea in Moscow, December 1945, from left to right: British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin; Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov; U.S. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)



South Korean citizens protest allied trusteeship in December 1945.



American soldiers watch as the Japanese flag is lowered from a flag pole during surrender ceremonies in Seoul, Korea on September 9, 1945. (Photo taken by a USS San Francisco (CA-38) photographer; Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives)





**Photo # 80-G-391465 U.S. flag goes up, Seoul, Korea, 1945**

American soldiers salute as the American flag is raised during surrender ceremonies in Seoul, Korea on September 9, 1945. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) (재조선미육군사령부군정청; 在朝鮮美陸軍司令部軍政廳) was the official ruling body of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula from September 8, 1945 to August 15, 1948. (Photo taken by a USS San Francisco (CA-38) photographer; Official U.S. Navy Photograph, National Archives)



**Photo # 80-G-490506 U.S. delegates at Japanese surrender, Keijo, Korea, Sept. 1945**

Surrender of Japanese Forces in Southern Korea on September 9, 1945. U.S. delegates Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid and Lieutenant General John R. Hodge (Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea) sign the surrender documents during the surrender ceremonies in the Government Building at Keijo (Seoul), Korea on September 9, 1945.

U.S. representatives present include (seated along table, left to right): Rear Admiral Francis S. Low; Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey; Admiral Kinkaid; Lieutenant General Hodge; Major General A.V. Arnold; Major General G.X. Cheeves, and Brigadier General Joseph T. Ready. **Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.**

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-k/t-kinkad.htm>

“Imagine how the peaceful garden of the world has been deserted by the cold wind of capitalism and how it has been destroyed by the storms of communism.... Let us, the thirty million people, combine together under one principle. We Koreans are not a heterogeneous race of two or more different peoples, but a homogenous race.... And now, it is the supreme command of our nation and the sacred obligation of our people to rise and smash the partition of the 38th parallel line, which was erected by the hands of the foreign forces, by our own hands and unify the divided territories and combine the divided people together into one people.” – *An Ho-sang*





Koreans in Seoul, Korea jubilantly greet United States Army troops arriving in the city in October, 1945.  
(U.S. Army Photo / Getty Images)



Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division Band march on the capital grounds of Seoul, Korea in 1945. The American flag is displayed on a flagpole in front of the former Imperial Japanese Government-General Building.



American soldiers, Russian soldiers, and a group of Korean boys congregate around a U.S. Army jeep in Korea in 1945.  
(Photo: <http://www.histomil.com/viewtopic.php?f=95&t=3918&p=33489&hilit=149>)





Koreans are preparing to take the occupation administration (Office building displaying flags of occupying forces and portraits of the leaders of Allied countries) Seoul, Korea in late 1945.

(Photo: <http://www.histomil.com/viewtopic.php?f=95&t=3918&p=33489&hilit=149>)





“Welcome the Allied Forces!”: A welcome sign is posted on a building in Seoul, Korea in late 1945 (Photo: [Flickr](#))



A welcome sign is posted in downtown Seoul in early October 1945.





A welcoming ceremony for Syngman Rhee is held by the U.S. Army in Seoul, Korea in October 1945.  
(Photo: [http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Syngman\\_Rhee\\_Welcome\\_Ceremony,\\_1945\\_\(1\).jpg](http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/F%C3%A1jl:Syngman_Rhee_Welcome_Ceremony,_1945_(1).jpg))





Korean statesman Dr. Syngman Rhee, Ph.D. (Rhee earned a Ph.D. at Princeton University in 1910) speaks to the Korean people on his return to Korea in October 1945. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in Korea, is seated at left, wearing sunglasses. (Photo: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/dok1/111087982/>)





The Korean flag is displayed alongside the flags of the United States of America, Republic of China, and Soviet Union outside the National Assembly in Seoul, Korea in October 1945.



U.S. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, (center, foreground) and U.S. Army Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge (center, standing next to Patterson) attend a conference held in Seoul, Korea in December 1945.





Koreans celebrate on Sejongno street in downtown Seoul, Korea [U.S. Army occupation zone] on August 15, 1946, the first anniversary of their independence from Japanese rule.





A group of Korean men pull rickshaws in the streets of Seoul, Korea during the fall of 1945.



A political message condemning the military occupation written in English is posted on a wall in Seoul, Korea.





A banner at Seoul's South Gate welcomes members of the UN Temporary Commission on Korea in January 1948. (UN/DPI Photo)



South Koreans wait in line to cast ballots in UN-supervised election of May 10, 1948. (UN/DPI Photo)  
(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)





U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur and Dr. Syngman Rhee, the first President of the Republic of Korea, sit together during a celebration marking the birth of the Korean Republic on August 15, 1948. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)



President of the Republic of Korea Dr. Syngman Rhee (left), U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur (center), and U.S. Army Lieutenant General John R. Hodge attend a ceremony for the establishment of the Republic of Korea in Seoul, Korea on August 15, 1948.





Koreans celebrate independence and the inauguration of the government of the Republic of Korea in Seoul, Korea on August 15, 1948. (Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)



Seoul, Republic of Korea in 1949





An American soldier (left) observes a Korean family (right) escaping the Soviet occupation of northern Korea at the 38<sup>th</sup> Parallel. (Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))



Korean men wave the Korean flag in Tokyo, Japan in March 1948. (Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))





Dr. Syngman Rhee delivers a speech in front of the Capitol Building in downtown Seoul, Korea in May 1948. (Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))



U.S. Army Lieutenant General John R. Hodge (left) greets Korean Army Gen. Song Ho, Commanding General of the Korean Constabulary, in circa 1948. (Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))





Young Korean men hold an anti-communist banner in downtown Seoul, Republic of Korea in 1948.  
(Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))



Two Korean men in the background render a stiff-arm salute similar to the salute displayed by members of Adolf Hitler's inner circle in Nazi Germany. (Photo: *Pictorial History of the Korean War* (Veterans of Foreign Wars memorial edition))



Seoul, Republic of Korea in January 1949 (Photo: <http://www.vintag.es/2013/09/colour-pictures-of-seoul-in-1948-49.html>)



Seoul, Republic of Korea in January 1949 (Photo: <http://www.vintag.es/2013/09/colour-pictures-of-seoul-in-1948-49.html>)





Seoul, Republic of Korea in January 1949 (Photo: <http://www.vintag.es/2013/09/colour-pictures-of-seoul-in-1948-49.html>)



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Seoul, Republic of Korea in January 1949 (Photo: <http://www.vintag.es/2013/09/colour-pictures-of-seoul-in-1948-49.html>)





Seoul, Republic of Korea in January 1949 (Photo: <http://www.flickr.com/photos/64147332@N02/6892129643/>)



Seoul, Korea during the Korean War





Korean and American soldiers watch large fires in a village during the communist [Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion](#) in 1948. (Photo: Carl Mydans/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) (Note: Not originally published in *Life* magazine.)



South Korean Army soldiers patrol a village and interrogate civilian residents during the [Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion](#) in 1948. (Photo: Carl Mydans/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) (Note: Not originally published in *Life* magazine.)





South Korean soldiers detain a group of young female “communist prisoners” during the [Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion](#) (a political uprising against the Rhee government) in 1948. (Photo: Carl Mydans/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)  
(Note: Not originally published in *Life* magazine.)



South Korean store owners are killed by communist rebels during the [Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion](#) in 1948. (Photo: Carl Mydans/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images) (Note: Not originally published in *Life* magazine.)



The Jeju Uprising was a political rebellion that occurred on Jeju Island (large island located southwest of Pusan) beginning on April 3, 1948. The South Korean army suppressed a rebellion on Jeju Island that was initiated by members of the communist Workers Party of South Korea. An estimated 14,000-60,000 Koreans on Jeju Island were killed in fighting or execution between various factions on the island, and many villages were destroyed during the rebellion. The Jeju Uprising began after local police officers on Jeju Island opened fire on a group of demonstrators. The Workers Party of South Korea, established on November 23, 1946, merged with the Workers Party of North Korea in Pyongyang on June 30, 1949 to form the Workers' Party of Korea (currently the ruling party of North Korea).



Koreans in South Korea participate in a political campaign during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1948. (Photo: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures\\_past/4969750850/in/photostream](http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures_past/4969750850/in/photostream))





South Korean police showing the location of an attack by communist insurgents during the South Korean elections of 1948.  
(Photo: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures\\_past/4969140291/in/photostream](http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures_past/4969140291/in/photostream))

“The Koreans call it “the *great Juche* idea,” but it is less an idea than a state of mind. The term literally means being subjective where things Korean are concerned, putting Korea first in everything. The second character, *ch’e* in the Korean pronunciation, is found in the famous Chinese term of the late nineteenth-century self-strengthening movement, *t’i* of *t’i-yung*, meaning Chinese learning for the base (*t’i*) and Western learning for use; it is also the *tai* of *kokutai*, a concept promoted in Japan in the 1930s that meant, in essence, what it means to be Japanese as opposed to everything else, what is authentically Japanese. It was deeply identified with the prewar emperor system and with ultra-nationalism. Japanese scribblers would write on and on about “getting *kokutai* firmly in mind,” once you have it firmly in your mind all else follows. The Koreans use *juche* in much the same way, its goal being a subjective, solipsistic state of mind, the correct thought that must precede and that will then determine correct action. The term is really untranslatable; for a foreigner its meaning is ever-receding, into a pool of everything that makes Koreans Korean, and therefore ultimately inaccessible to the non-Korean. It is from this basic philosophical stance, which can be linked to a doctrine of essences, that the rest of Korean voluntarism flows – all the talk about ideas come first, the leader comes first. In discussing “how to study appearances to reach essences,” Mao once said that you start with appearances, observations, and then go on “to reveal the substance and contradictions of objective things and events.” And once the essence is grasped, one can then act in the real world, linking theory or essence to concrete praxis. Kim Il Sung thinks the same way, except with less emphasis on praxis. This is an Asian way to think, it is not in the least surprising. If Asians place too much emphasis on states of mind, Westerners place too little. Although one can find uses of the term *Juche* in the 1940s in North and South, no one would notice were it not for its later prominence. But Kim’s rhetoric rang with synonymous language; a variety of terms translating roughly as self-reliance and independence structured Kim’s ideology in the 1940s: *chajusong* (self-reliance), *minjok tongnip* (national or ethnic independence), *charip kyongje* (independent economy). All these terms were antonyms of *sadaejuiiii*, serving and relying upon foreign power, which had been the scourge of a people whose natural inclination was toward things Korean. Kim at this time was a modal if early variant of third world revolutionary nationalism, reinforced by the Korean “Hermit Kingdom” past toward a left-isolationist tendency.”

– *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings, Chapter 9, p. 313



Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic of China (4<sup>th</sup> left) meets with Republic of Korea's President Syngman Rhee (center) and Republic of Korea's Defense Minister Lee Beom-Seok (standing behind Rhee, wearing glasses) for a three-day meeting at Chinnae, Korea in August 1949. Chiang Kai-shek had recently fled mainland China for the island of Taiwan after Communist Chinese forces defeated his army and occupied the Chinese mainland.

(Photo: [U.S. Coast Guard](#)) (Source: [http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Korean\\_War.asp](http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Korean_War.asp))

“...[M]issionaries in villages reported on repressive KNP activity, teachers "spoke of the activity of provocateurs and spies in the universities." The police, the dispatch said, resembled the Japanese *kempeitai*. British observers noted that Rhee's picture was in nearly every police station in South Korea in February 1948, months before his election. The police needed Rhee to protect them from reprisals, given that most of the officers had served the Japanese. Rhee for his part needed the police "because they alone can decide the course of elections and keep him in power." More evidence could be adduced on the nature of the southern system, but why be tiresome about an obvious reality? More interesting perhaps was the range of American attitudes, moving from cynical support of the system, to a tepid distance that disclaimed fatherhood of an unpleasant offspring, to demands for reform that never got beyond the limits of the American spectrum, a Graham Green-like "Quiet American" project of reform that sought to bolster a middle that barely existed. A centrist and modal position in American society became in Korea a quixotic and weak posture, while exposing one to charges of procommunism. The dog that so rarely barked was any sign of American support for a thorough renovation of Korean society. **The harsh truth is that the United States as a matter of high policy vastly preferred the southern police state to any sort of serious revolutionary regime. The repression of the Rhee regime, in other words, had a joint Korean-American authorship. At the same that American officials praised and privately censured the southern regime, they nonetheless misconstrued the reality. The South [Korea] did have a police state, and it was an agent of a small class of landlords. But it was more than that, or it could not have survived even to June 1950. The landlord class held both obtuse reactionaries and vibrant capitalists.** Korean capitalism may not have had articulate proponents, but it had impressive practitioners, of which the Kim Song-su group was the most formidable. This was hardly the visionary entrepreneur, however, looking for the main chance; the main chance had been the Japanese regime and the opportunities that close alliance with it brought to this, Korea's first *chaebol* (conglomerate). Americans found this sort of capitalism hard to dignify or legitimate, as did Koreans, seeing little virtue in business that hewed close to the state. But it was a source of dynamism in the Korean economy, this state-led capitalism implanted by a Japanese imperialism different from more stagnant varieties, such as the Dutch in Indonesia or the Portuguese in Angola. It laid the foundations for the economic growth of the 1960s. But it did not fit a textbook description of capitalism, anymore than the Standard Oil Trust did in America.”

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 189





Soviet Russia's Commissar Josef Stalin (left) and Red China's Commissar Mao Tse-tung (center, standing) watch Chou Enlai, Premier of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China [Red China], sign the Signing Ceremony of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and related agreements on **February 14, 1950**. Josef Stalin gave tacit approval to Kim Il Sung's proposed "liberation" (invasion) of the Republic of Korea [South Korea] and Mao Tse-tung's proposed "liberation" (invasion) of the island of Taiwan, governed by the Chinese Nationalists, in 1950. (Photo: [http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/album/cornerstone\\_e/1-1-4.htm](http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/album/cornerstone_e/1-1-4.htm))



Koreans in North Korea engage in political demonstrations and carry posters of Kim Il Sung and Josef Stalin in 1948. (Photo: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures\\_past/4969147645/in/photostream](http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures_past/4969147645/in/photostream))

"Korean Communist leaders from the five provinces in the North began organizing a branch bureau in the North, and Hyon [Chunhyok] headed this effort. **But in [sic] September 28, 1945, Hyon was assassinated on his way back from a meeting with Major General Romanenko.** He was in the front seat of a truck with Choo Man-sik, but his assailant killed only Hyon. There is an elaborate account of his death implicating Kim Il Sung as the culprit. Kim had arrived in Wonsan on September 19, 1945, less than ten days before the shooting, and it is unlikely that he was involved in the plot to eliminate Hyon. It was reported that Kim had conspired with Chang Si-u, head of the Justice Department of P'yongnam Provincial Bureau, to have one of their henchmen murder Hyon. Political assassination was common in both North and South Korea shortly after the liberation."

– *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* by Dae-Sook Suh (1988), p. 70

## North Korean Invasion of South Korea: Prior Knowledge?



John Foster Dulles (center), a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City and a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1950, visits the 38th Parallel in the Republic of Korea on **June 19, 1950**, six days before the Communist North Korean army crossed the 38th Parallel and attacked South Korea. The Korean dignitary holding a binocular is South Korea's Defense Minister Shin Sung-mo. (Photo: John Foster Dulles Papers, Public Policy Collections, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library)

“After the Korean War, Herbert Feis in his best choir-boy manner queried Acheson on John Foster Dulles's well-marked visit to the thirty-eighth parallel on June 19, 1950: "Are you sure his presence didn't provoke the attack Dean? There has been comment about that-I don't think it did. You have no views on the subject?" Acheson's deadpan response: "No, I have no views on the subject." Kennan then interjected, "There is a comical aspect to this, because the visits of these people over there, and their peering over outposts with binoculars at the Soviet people, I think must have led the Soviets to think that we were on to their plan and caused them considerable perturbation." **"Yes," Acheson said, "Foster up in a bunker with a homburg [hat] on – it was a very amusing picture."** Yes, funny, amusing-and illogical: were Kennan right, Dulles was "on to their plan," why then would the attack have ensued? If Dulles's presence might have "provoked the attack," a presence where-at the thirty-eighth parallel, where all American dignitaries visit? Or in Japan, supping with the zaibatsu elite? And above all, why? Why would either the Russians or the Koreans take such a strong risk of American intervention, at this time? It is not a question likely to be answered without a full consideration of all the possible explanations. It is obviously not a question that interested Acheson, whose wonderful and well-tutored memory mysteriously dimmed. Suddenly Acheson had "no views" on a subject of critical import: **whether Dulles's visit provoked a war. So, why did Dulles go to Korea?** He originally had no plans to visit the peninsula; instead he had thought of detouring to Taiwan: bird-dogging Louis Johnson should the latter run off to see the generalissimo and his Madame. But then Korea came up front and center during a dinner with the Korean ambassador to the United States, Chang Myon, on June 10, 1950. Present were Dulles, Rusk, Allison, and Niles Bond. Chang told them his regime was in crisis. Four days later, the CIA warned of the possibility of a North Korean attack, and on the same day Dulles told Wellington Koo he would "go to Korea for a look." The Korean ambassador reports that his regime is in crisis. The CIA reports that the North Koreans can attack at any moment. Dulles decides to have "a look." It will be remembered that Chang Myon was an American favorite, and that he was a leader of the opposition *DNP/KDP*, also an American favorite. The CIA was on record before the May 1950 elections hoping for a DNP victory, and it lauded Chang's qualities in its biographical sketches. In April and May Rhee's most provocative allies were rapidly undermining DNP stalwarts in the bureaucracy, and by early June it was clear that left-leaning and moderate politicians had scored a major victory over both Rhee and the DNP – even the Americans' *capo di tutti capi*, Cho Pyong-ok, had been voted out. At the same time, South Korean intelligence reported an impending attack and put the Army on full alert. Chang knew Dulles as well as any Korean, having worked "very hard hand in hand" with him at the United Nations in 1948, when the two interacted on a daily basis. He liked to call Dulles "the Father of the Republic of Korea." Chang had returned to Korea in May, meeting MacArthur along the way; there is no record of the substance of their talks. He came back urgently to Washington in mid-June, seeking to convince American officials that the ROK was on the verge of collapse; after the fact he said that he had also warned that a North Korean attack was "imminent."”

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 500-501



“By June 1950, alarms about an invasion of the South were old hat, standard fare for intelligence officers. American intelligence sources first predicted a North Korean invasion in the spring of 1946, and available reports show many repetitions over the next four years, with no particular increase just before the war. Gen. John R. Hodge had warned for years that the North Koreans would attack the South once American troops withdrew, and perhaps even before they left, leading to frequent invasion alerts during his tenure. John Muccio reported that American troops went on invasion alert six times between March 1 and August 25, 1948, and in October American intelligence sources drew up a two-page, single-spaced list of invasion threat reports received around the time of the Yosu Rebellion. Rumors and reports of imminent attack continued in November and December. Throughout 1949 this situation persisted, particularly around times of intense border fighting. As we have seen, rumors of war were strong enough in September to send Preston Goodfellow scampering off to Seoul, although it was by no means clear whether this had to do with Northern instead of Southern threats. In February 1950, two G-2 reports cited invasion threats for May 1950 and another said it would come in June 1950; in March it was said that the ROK would be destroyed on July 14, 1950; and in early May the G-2 chief wrote, “the war of nerves is once more receiving its annual stimulant ... reports during this period had the North Koreans invading South Korea on the 7th, 8th, and 9<sup>th</sup> of May .... Next reported invasion date is 12 May with a 'rain check' for the 20th of May.” The weary tone was the best evidence that American intelligence officers thought the spring 1950 alarms were, as Yogi Berra once put it, “deja vu all over again.” Roberts said in March 1950 that invasion threats were far more numerous in 1948 and 1949 than in the previous six months, and that “[38th] parallel incidents had dropped off markedly.” There was a quickening of border fighting in May and June 1950, with an average of about fifteen incidents per week from May 5 to June 16, but all of them were minor compared to the previous summer. In the early months of 1950, Korean Military Advisory Group (K MAG) intelligence got frequent reports of the southward deployment of KPA troops and equipment. In January, it thought the KPA 2d Division headquarters displaced southward from Hamhung to Wonsan, along with an artillery regiment, and noted other indicators of southward movement of tanks and troop units. In February, it came to the conclusion that DPRK intelligence was deceiving ROK intelligence by reporting false southward troop movements; in March and April scattered evidence of southward deployments came in again, including reports of the arrival of more tanks at Chorwon, and then the materials grow thin, with little of note mentioned in May and June. The evidence of southward deployment would seem to be the most significant sort of information, given that invasion alarms could easily be scare tactics by either Pyongyang or Seoul, whereas the new deployments enhanced invasion capabilities. Yet indications of southward deployment were if anything stronger in late 1949 than in the spring of 1950. There were many such reports in September, October, and November, combined with evidence of the receipt of Soviet heavy weapons through North Korean ports, and the movement of civilian families just north of the parallel, viewed by some as preparatory to an invasion (although it was standard Soviet procedure to clear civilians from tense borders). In late November 1949 half of the total number of tanks in the Pyongyang area were said to have been shipped to the vicinity of the parallel, one hundred tanks reportedly arrived in Chorwon a week later, another thirty-seven arrived in Pokkye from Wonsan the next week. In mid-December K MAG G-2 said that some three thousand soldiers thought to be in Hamhung were now near the parallel at Kaesong, and cited barracks construction to house thousands of new troops close to the border. KP A order of battle estimates were changed to reflect this southward deployment as early as September, 1949. Once again, in other words, the events of previous years clearly shaped perceptions in 1950. Americans on the scene had lived with invasion threats since 1946; the South had “cried wolf” so many times that few bothered to listen; there was so much “noise” in five years of American intelligence reports in Korea that no one saw the war coming, or so it seems. Furthermore, the battles in 1949 shaped immediate perceptions in 1950. War seemed so likely in the summer of 1949 that the intelligence evidence of 1950 paled by comparison; more important, in 1949 knowledgeable Americans knew that the South sought to provoke war, and therefore viewed North Korean threats and deployments *in that context*, finding them to be predictable, at times even understandable, defensive responses to southern activities. Thus it was that both British and American intelligence estimated that an invasion would not come in the summer of 1950.”

– *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings, Chapter 9, p. 448-450

“There is increasing confidence in the [South Korean] Army. An aggressive, offensive spirit is emerging. Nerves that were frayed and jittery the past few months may now give way to this new spirit. A good portion of the Army is eager to get going. More and more people feel that the only way unification can be brought about is by moving North by force. I have it from Dick Johnston [*New York Times* reporter] that Chiang Kai-shek told Rhee that the Nationalist air force could support a move North and that *they discussed the possibility of the Nationalists starting an offensive move against Manchuria through Korea!* There is some feeling that now is the time to move North while the Chinese communists are preoccupied. I doubt whether Rhee would actually order a move North in his saner moments. Captain Shin, I know, is dead against it. [Defense Minister of South Korea] *Lee Bum Suk* [Lee Beom-seok] *would love it*. However, should we have another Kaesong or Ongjin flare-up, a counter-attack might lead to all sorts of unpredictable developments [emphasis added].”

– John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, in August 1949

Source: *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings, p. 394

“The CIA noted one week before the war that the KPA had deployed new units, tanks, and artillery southward “in recent months,” but argued that the North had far from exhausted the potential for internal war in the South... What the evidence does indicate is that the North had the capability to destroy the South by June 1949, not June 1950, and that it was on a virtual war footing from September 1949 onward, if not earlier. The result of the 1949 fighting underlined Northern capabilities, since they devastated ROKA units in the major battles. By the end of the year the North had placed near the parallel much of the men and equipment it would later use in the South, and added to this in the spring of 1950, but with no visible qualitative change in the equipment. In short, both sides confronted each other in June 1950 about the way they had in the fall of 1949. Both sides moved forces close to the parallel in the weeks and months preceding the war, and observers on all sides would have every reason to believe that 1950 would repeat 1949: more border clashes, more guerrilla war. The one interesting caveat to this analysis is a growing awareness by the Americans that the North had the capability to achieve the limited goal of capturing Seoul, which would then probably lead to a collapse of the Rhee regime. This judgment was based both on the military capabilities of the North and the political inadequacies of the South. Muccio told the British ambassador in December 1949 that “he could not believe that the present regime could survive for more than a few days if the government abandoned the capital,” and the CIA in June 1950 said that although the “combat effectiveness” of the KPA and the ROKA was “nearly equal,” KPA superiority in tanks, heavy artillery, and aircraft gave it “a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul.” Seoul was the core area both of regime support and its sinews of control in the form of elaborated bureaucracies and transportation and communication facilities; beyond Seoul and the surrounding Kyonggi Province, and with the exception of the sparsely populated Chungchong Provinces, opened an abyss of poorly-controlled populations mostly sympathetic to the Left. **Furthermore the Korean political perspective on both sides was that an elimination of the center would be the key to the collapse of the opposing regime: Rhee wanted to seize Pyongyang, and Kim wanted to seize Seoul.**”

– *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings, Chapter 9, p. 450-451



John Foster Dulles at the 38th Parallel in Korea on June 19, 1950, six days before the North Korean invasion.  
(Photo: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures\\_past/4969750758/in/photostream](http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures_past/4969750758/in/photostream))



“The war that came like a thunder clap in June 1950 was immanent in the fighting of the previous summer. Border battles lasted from early May until late October, taking hundreds of lives and embroiling thousands of troops. The reason that war did not come in 1949 is at once simple, and essential to grasping the civil origins of the Korean conflict: the South wanted a war then, the North did not, and neither did the United States. A year later this had changed. The border battles of 1949 established the setting for June 1950. The fighting did not start all at once in the early morning hours, but began in the remote Ongjin Peninsula, spread to Kaesong, thence to Ch’unch’on, and finally to the East coast. June 1950 was the microcosm of the summer of 1949, collapsing it in time but not changing its character: the difference was that now the North was ready to fight. In most histories of the war there is next to no reference to the 1949 fighting, and if there is, the initiation of all battles is routinely blamed on the North, with the South portrayed in a state of original innocence, arrayed defensively and either unwilling or incapable of threatening anyone. One stalwart Korea hand told me, “I certainly hope you’re not going to take Rhee’s threats to march North seriously! Why, his commanders used to laugh behind his back when he said those things.” Formerly classified sources, however, tell a different story. An Army G-2 study stated that South Korean forces “took advantage of the withdrawal of the U.S. forces to become more aggressive,” and that leaders of the ROK government “will go to any ends to insure the continued presence of U.S. forces upon which their own positions, fortunes, and perhaps even their lives depend.” Thus, the study said, various border incidents in the summer of 1949 were “not only encouraged, but probably even initiated by certain members” of the ROK government. That was an understatement. **General Roberts, KMAG commander, said that in the numerous clashes in August, “Each was in our opinion brought on by the presence of a small South Korean salient north of the parallel. ... The South Koreans wish to invade the North. We tell them that if such occurs, all advisors will pull out and the ECA spigot will be turned off.” Roberts went on to say that “both North and South are at fault” in the back-and-forth “needling” along the parallel. But according to captured documents sent to the United Nations by North Korea, in an August 2, 1949, meeting with Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) divisional commanders, Roberts said that “almost every incident has been provoked by the South Korean security forces,” a stronger allegation; but in the atmosphere of 1950 about the only American newspaper willing to bring these allegations out was *The Daily Worker*. During this period Rhee rapidly expanded the Army.** Two new divisions (the Capital and the 8th) were activated in June 1949; Army strength was at 81,000 by the end of July, and 100,000 by the end of August. By then it was much bigger than the accepted strength of the North Korean army; the subsequent buildup and the return of China-linked soldiers could thus be viewed as the North’s attempt to establish a balance (U.S. intelligence thought the KPA was 95,000 strong in June 1950). **Rhee also brought into the Army officers who had served the Japanese and who were refugees from the North, at the expense of nationalist figures who had fought with the Chinese Nationalists; the main reason was to surround Rhee with military people who owed everything to him, and who could be counted on not to mount a coup (and to loath communists).** Two Paek brothers, Son-yop and In-yop, led a northwest faction in the Army, which also included Generals Yang Kuk-jin, Kim Sok-bom, and many members of the North[w]est Youth. Both Paeks were born near Pyongyang a few years after Kim Il Sung, and had been Japanese Kwantung Army officers. Chong Il-gwon, also an officer in the Kwantung Army, led the northeast or *Tongbuk* faction. Chong was thirty-two, and Paek Son-yop thirty, in 1950. **The border had been a potential flash point since late September 1945, when the United States and the Soviets erected check points and barriers that exemplified the developing division of the peninsula. But for the next three years little serious fighting occurred, and the border points served to exchange millions of people backwards and forwards, as well as a considerable amount of North-South trade. Fighting flared up in early 1948, however, Gen. John R. Hodge reporting that although the South “invariably” placed the blame on the North, much of it occurred because of provocations by elements of the Northwest (*Sobuk*) Youth.** After the May 1948 elections a number of border incidents were provoked by both sides. In August 1948 the ROK set up a “Korean Research Bureau,” patterned after the American Counter-Intelligence Corps; it routinely sent agents into the North on spying and sabotage missions, assisted by rightist youth organizations, of which the most prominent was the Northwest Youth (NWY). According to American Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) findings, in January 1949 elements of the NWY formed a special crack brigade in the ROK Army, given the best equipment and supplies, and posted near the parallel – thus to act as “the spearhead in the event that the [ROK] Army invades North Korea.” In other words, the border fighting, like just about everything else on the peninsula, illustrated the continuing pattern of revolution and counterrevolution. The border also served as a bellwether of Northern intentions. During the Yosu-Sunch’on Rebellion, as we have seen, it was exceedingly quiet. In the summer of 1949 the North wanted the American troops to leave, and so was less aggressive than the South, which wanted to provoke enough fighting to make them stay. Nonetheless, the North was hardly passive, and mixed the fighting with a unification politics that also presaged June 1950. The 1949 battles began at Kaesong on May 4, in an engagement lasting about four days and taking an official toll of four hundred North Korean and twenty-two South Korean soldiers, as well as upwards of one hundred civilian deaths in Kaesong, according to American and South Korean figures. The South committed six infantry companies and several battalions, of which two defected to the North. It is unlikely that the South killed so many northern soldiers since later reports said the southerners were badly mauled. Months later, the North Koreans alleged that several thousand troops led by Kim Sok-won attacked across the parallel on the morning of May 4, near Song’ak Mountain. Kim was indeed the commander of the critically-important First Division. He was a former north Korean who had tracked Kim Il Sung in the Manchurian wilderness in the late 1930s as the head of the “Special Kim Detachment” in the Kwantung Army. He was known then as Kaneyama Shakugen; Emperor Hirohito decorated him with the Order of Merit for “bravery” in campaigns in Shansi Province. He sported a Kaiser Wilhelm moustache, and was widely thought to be responsible for numerous atrocities against Chinese citizens during the war.

Kim was close to Rhee, Louise Yim, and Yi Ch'ong-ch'on, among others. On June 2, 1948, Kim had led 2,500 veterans of the Japanese Army through the streets of Seoul, their wartime uniforms now shabby but their goose-stepping smartness still impressive; Yi Ch'ongch'on was on the reviewing stand and described the group as the nucleus of the ROK army. Kim's son told a reporter that Yi and his father were good friends in spite of Yi being on the other side in the war, since they once attended the same Japanese military academy. Roberts seemed to confirm the North Korean charge, by later writing that the "flare-up" at Kaesong resulted from "needling" of the North Koreans by Kim Sok-won – "stuffed-shirt, blown-up, Japanese-trained friend of the President, who commands the 1st Division there. We Americans and the Korean staff are all after his scalp, as he has all his B[attalio]ns now on line of the Parallel and one Co[mpany] in reserve. He snow jobs the [KMAC] Advisors and does as he pleases." The defectors were from the 1st and 2d battalions of the 8th ROKA regiment, a total of about 245 soldiers, led by Majors P'yo Mu-won and Kang T'ae-mu. During interviews with northern reporters, the two majors said that "the majority of ROK Army officers had been running dogs of Japanese imperialism," of whom the most notorious was Kim Sok-won, who "forcibly mobilized Korean youths to fight Japan's aggressive war in China," and "slaughtered the Chinese people." ROKA officers fighting under him were his "clients," former officers in the Japanese Army. The head of the 6th Division was Kim Paek-il, who, they said, had been head of "a special detachment of the Japanese Army in China." Although the reader already knows the background of Kim Sok-won and Kim Paek-il, it is significant that these names come up in the early fighting in May 1949. In mid-May the North Koreans noticeably escalated their propaganda rhetoric, saying that "Chiang Kai-shek is demolished and Syngman Rhee is tumbling down," and accusing Rhee of turning to the Japanese imperialists to save himself. On May 21 some minor incidents touched off a major assault by two KPA Border Guard battalions on the Ongjin Peninsula, in the Turak Mountains. The South brought in reinforcements by sea, raising their force levels to eight battalions within days. The North now occupied positions as much as five kilometers below the parallel, so the South launched an assault on T'aet'an, ten kilometers north of the parallel. On May 28 five hundred Korean People's Army (KPA) soldiers moved south of the parallel again, touching off fighting in which several tens of men died on each side. The southern side was badly flogged in this engagement, too: its units "proved unable to launch a coordinated large-scale attack." Kim Paek-il took up the general command of the Ongjin region on June 5; his deputy was Kang Yong-hun (who in 1989 was prime minister of the ROK). The Ongjin fighting continued through the end of June, often at rather heavy levels punctuated by minor battles elsewhere along the parallel. The North Korean press accused Rhee of provoking fighting to find a way to keep American troops in the South. The North also heated up a big campaign to welcome a "national" meeting of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Motherland [*Choguk t'ongil minjujuui ui chonson*] on June 25 in Pyongyang, a year to the day before the [Korean] war began. On the last Sunday in June 1949, heavy fighting opened up in the dawn hours on the Ongjin Peninsula; three days later the South sent about 150 *Horim* (forest tiger) guerrillas on a long foray across the parallel; they roamed around causing problems in the area above and to the east of Ch'olwon for a few days, but were wiped out by July 5. The Sunday, June 26 battle is important because UNCOK sent a delegation to Ongjin after hearing of "heavy fighting." It arrived courtesy of an ROK naval vessel and was guided around by ROKA personnel. UNCOK members remained on the peninsula for a day or so and then returned to Seoul on Monday evening, from which they then filed a report to the UN blaming "northern invaders" for the trouble. It is quite possible that the North was to blame, but what is remarkable is UNCOK's failure to investigate and report upon provocations by the South as well, and instead publicly to take both the ROK and the American word as gospel; it thus became a partisan in the civil conflict. It is also noteworthy that just before this incident, Kim Sok-won gave UNCOK a briefing in his status as commander of ROKA forces at the thirty-eighth parallel: North and South "may engage in major battles at any moment," he said; Korea has entered into "a state of warfare." "We should have a program to recover our lost land, North Korea, by breaking through the 38th border which has existed since 1945"; the moment of major battles, Kim thought, is rapidly approaching. Such southern threats resulted in the posting of UNCOK military observers...After the war began a year later, the former ROK home minister, Kim Hyo-sok, who had by then defected to the North, said that Rhee had plotted a "northern expedition" to begin on July 15, 1949, with Kim Sokwon attacking northward from the Ongjin Peninsula with the goal of occupying Haeju and then Pyongyang. Whatever the truth of this, it is documented that in mid-July American authorities worried that the South was readying an attack on the North. Captured documents in this period showed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) had fully mined the roads leading into the North, and feared an amphibious landing at the port city of Wonsan. This came just after the end of American operational control of the southern military, and was apparently a prelude to the near-war of early August. As of August 1, if not earlier, southern forces were in occupation of Unpa Mountain (Unp'asan), an important salient north of the thirty-eighth parallel on Ongjin which commanded much of the nearby terrain. KMAC dispatched an advisory group to Ongjin on the same date, probably to restrain the South Koreans. In the early morning hours on August 4[, 1949] the North opened up great barrages of artillery and mortar fire, and then at 5:30 A.M. some four to six thousand North Korean Border guard soldiers attacked, seeking in Roberts's words "to recover high ground in North Korea occupied by [the] South Korean Army.""

– *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings, p. 388-392



*Notes, p. 2* *Elsey*

*M.*  
Mr. John Foster Dulles and Mr. John Allison to the  
Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary Rusk  
[Extract from Telegram]



Tokyo, June 25, 1950

[Received June 25, 1950,  
10:35 a.m.]

It is possible that the South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse the attack and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so, then we believe that United States force should be used.... To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. We suggest that the Security Council might call for action on behalf of the organization under Article 106 by the five powers or such of them as are willing to respond.

*Chiang*

*(Never presented  
under 106)*

*Thinks State did not find  
a good idea - we wanted to broaden it -  
take anybody in - in a recommendation.*

# Korean War: Invasion and Intervention (1950-1953)



American military forces, including the U.S. Army 24th Infantry Division, prepare to retreat from Taejeon [Daejeon], Korea in July 1950 after the North Korean Communist army defeated the American and South Korean army in the Battle of Taejeon (July 14-21, 1950). The U.S. Army retreated to areas around Pusan and established the "Pusan Perimeter".

"This threat continued to bedevil the defenses of the Pusan perimeter, and accounted for the majority of guerrilla casualties in the summer of 1950. The Americans allowed Korean National Police battalions to deal with real and suspected guerrillas with their customary brutality, while adopting draconian methods of their own. Virtually any village suspected of harboring or supporting guerrillas was burned to the ground, usually from the air. Furthermore, cities and towns thought to be leftist in inclination were simply emptied of their population through forced evacuations. All but 10 percent of civilians were moved out of Sunch'on, Masan was emptied of tens of thousands of citizens, "all civilians", were moved out of Yech'on. Amid a threat that "the leftists and Fifth column, living in Taegu, are conspiring to create a big disturbance," and with the perimeter under great strain, vast numbers of Taegu citizens were evacuated for fear of "an uprising." By mid-August, many of these removed citizens were concentrated on islands near Pusan, forbidden to leave. Meanwhile the war barely affected Cheju Island, scene of the strongest guerrilla movement in the late 1940s. Although a few minor incidents in mid-August caused an Irish priest to inform the embassy that "the communists were beginning to run rampant," only one hundred or so partisans were left on the island. At the start of the war the ROKA commander, Japanese-aligned Gen. Yi Ung-jun, put some 1,100 suspects in prison and placed the island under martial law; those arrested included Cheju's chief judge, the chief procurator, the chief of administration, the chief of agriculture, the mayor of Cheju city, and several businessmen and lawyers. (They were charged with conspiring to arrange a welcome for KPA soldiers.) General Yi maintained a 9:00 P.M. curfew throughout the summer, confiscated all radios, and censored all news in advance; understandably, the islanders knew little about the course of the fighting. The chief of the Cheju police force was a former "youth leader." It was business as usual on Cheju."

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 690





The United Nations Security Council voted to send military troops to North Korea on June 27, 1950. The United Nations also established the United Nations Command Korea, a unified military command structure. (Photo: Ralph Morse/Time Life)



Soviet delegate to the United Nations gets up to leave in protest during a United Nations Security Council meeting in June 1950. (Photo: [http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures\\_past/4969147537/in/photostream](http://www.flickr.com/photos/pictures_past/4969147537/in/photostream))



Task Force Smith arrives at the Taejon rail station. On July 5, 1950, near Osan, this untried force of about half a battalion, mostly teenagers, stood alone against a North Korean division and a large tank force. (Photo: U.S. Department of Defense)




Left photo: United States Army checkpoint, 38th Parallel, Korea circa 1948



Right photo: South Korean military policeman escorts a North Korean prisoner-of-war to the rear during the summer of 1950.





Fresh and eager U.S. Marine troops arrive at the vital southern supply port of Pusan, Republic of Korea in August 1950 prior to advancing to the front lines. (Photo: USIA/NARA FILE #: 306-PS-50-11298)



A group of American U.S. Army infantrymen march into the Nakdong River region on August 11, 1950, as they pass a line of fleeing Korean refugees. The North Korean army under the command of North Korea's "Dear Leader" Kim Il Sung invaded South Korea (Republic of Korea) on June 25, 1950 and overran the capital city of Seoul three days later. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



The mass execution of suspected Korean Communists by the South Korean military and police at Taejon [Daejeon], Korea in July 1950. (Photo: <http://www.korea-is-one.org/spip.php?article3105>)





Pre-landing reconnaissance photo of Inchon taken by an RF-80 on Aug. 31, 1950. (U.S. Air Force photo)  
<http://www.edwards.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=529&page=41>







Photo # NH 96876 Marines landing at Inchon, 15 September 1950



(Photo: U.S. Navy)

Photo # NH 96378 U.S. Marines fighting in Seoul, Korea, Sept. 1950



U.S. Marines engage in street fighting during the liberation of Seoul, Korea circa late September 1950. Note M-1 rifles and Browning Automatic Rifles carried by the Marines, dead Koreans in the street, and M-4 "Sherman" tanks in the distance.  
([U.S. Naval Historical Center Photograph](http://www.history.navy.mil/our-naval-historical-center-photograph))



General Douglas MacArthur (in leather jacket) and an entourage of press and brass examine bodies of North Korean soldiers at advanced marine positions east of Inchon on September 17, 1950. The marine in camouflage helmet holds a Russian-made submachine gun known to Americans as a burp gun. (U.S. Army photo) <http://www.bevinaalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>





**Seoul Campaign, September 1950:** South Korean infantry and irregulars rounding up prisoners in the Seoul area, as U.S. Marine Corps M-26 tanks roll past, 26 September 1950. The irregulars in the right center appear to be armed with Russian Mosin-Nagant rifles. Photographed by SSgt. John Babyak, Jr., USMC.

*(Official U.S. Marine Corps Photograph, from the collections of the Naval Historical Center.)*



A marine tank supports South Korean soldiers guarding North Korean Communist prisoners captured in the assault on Seoul on September 26, 1950. (Photo: U.S. Marine Corps/National Archives)



Marine Pvt. 1st Class Luther Leguire raises U.S. Flag at American Consulate in Seoul, Korea on September 27, 1950 while fighting for the city raged around the compound. Sgt. John Babyak, Jr. (Marine Corps)





A ceremony is held restoring the Republic of Korea (ROK) government in Seoul on September 29, 1950. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of UN forces in Korea, is seen standing to the right the podium while President of Korea Syngman Rhee is seen standing to the left. Standing behind MacArthur, wearing a bow tie, is Ambassador John J. Muccio, the American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)




U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur discusses the military situation with U.S. Ambassador to South Korea John J. Muccio at the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army headquarters outside Seoul on June 29, 1950. (National Archives)





Korean women and children search the rubble of Seoul, Korea on November 1, 1950 for anything that can be used or burned as fuel. (Photo by Captain F. L. Scheiber, U.S. Army/National Archives) <http://www.flickr.com/photos/pingnews/1861121040/>




Four LSTs unload on the beach at Inchon as marines gather equipment to move rapidly inland on September 15, 1950. Landing ships were stuck in the deep mud flats between one high tide and the next. (U.S. Navy photo)





American soldiers of the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division fire into a tunnel with their 75-mm rifles after the North Korean army ignore a surrender ultimatum during a battle in northern Korea in October 1950. (Photo: Hank Walker/Time Life)



When UN forces captured Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, during the third week of October 1950, they found the capitol building heavily camouflaged.

(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)



John J. Muccio (right), the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, appears with President of the Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee.





American army soldiers force surviving soldiers of the North Korean army to surrender during a patrol in northern Korea on November 18, 1950. (Photo: Hank Walker/Time Life)

“The North Korean soldier must not be underestimated. He is a tough opponent, well-led, combines the infiltration tactic of the Japanese with the tank tactics of the Russian of World War II. He is able to march and maneuver and to attack at night with cohesion...” – U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur, July 1950



U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur inspects the wreckage of a Russian-made NKPA tank near the Inchon battlefield in September 1950. (National Archives)



Marines move around North Korean T34 tanks knocked out in Pusan Perimeter battle in the late summer of 1950. A dead North Korean soldier lies on the tank in the foreground. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)





Fighting with the 2nd Infantry Division north of the Chongchon River, Sergeant First Class Major Cleveland (left), weapons squad leader, points out Communist-led North Korean position to his machine gun crew on November 20, 1950. The U.S. Army was desegregated (racially integrated) by the beginning of the Korean War. (Photo: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration)  
<http://www.army.mil/-images/2008/07/24/19887/>



At the beginning of the Korean War, U.S. Marines cover a wounded North Korean soldier as he hoists himself on to a stretcher, in the Naktong River sector of the Korean front, in 1950. (CORBIS)





North Korean prisoners, taken by the U.S. Marines in a foothills fight, march single file across a rice paddy in 1950.  
(U.S. Marine Corps/NARA FILE #: 127-N-A3242) <http://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/2919554267/in/set-72157607808414225/>

“The prevalence of guerrillas in the South meant that Americans found themselves in a new kind of war in Korea, in which the enemy and people became indistinguishable. A People's Army soldier might doff uniform for the characteristic white raiment of the peasantry and solve into the mass; someone's grandmother or a ten-year old kid pull a gun from a bundle and kill you. The result was a very dirty war. The average G.I. arrived in Korea with the barest knowledge of where he was, who he was fighting, and why; he was thrown into battle in the steaming humidity, frequent rain squalls and muddy terrain of midsummer; he slogged through rice paddies fertilized with human waste, something common in peasant societies but overwhelming at the first scent; if he slaked his thirst with paddy water he got amoebic dysentery. In this UN “police action” he faced an enemy who fought a total war, using every resource to turn Korean weakness into strength. Sometimes this meant using little kids to ferry ammunition; sometimes it meant driving weeping refugees into American lines to cover an infantry assault. The average G.I. also came from an American society where people of color were subjugated and segregated, and where the highest law officer in the land, Attorney General McGrath, had called communists “rodents.” It thus did not take long for soldiers to believe that Koreans were subhuman, and act accordingly. This element of the Korean War has been lost from the collective memory, as if Vietnam were the only intervention where “My Lai” occurred. But in 1950, the people in “white pajamas” and what they provoked in Americans was as accessible as the neighborhood barbershop reading table. Military historian Walter Karig, writing in *Collier's*, likened the fighting to “the days of Indian warfare” (a common analogy); he thought Korea might be like Spain—a testing ground for a new type of conflict, which might be found later in places like Indochina and the Middle East. “Our Red foe scorns all rules of civilized warfare,” Karig wrote, “hid[ing] behind women's skirts.””

— *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 690-691





United Nations forces withdraw from Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, and recrossed the 38th parallel in 1950.  
(Photo: USIA/NARA FILE #: 306-FS-259-21)



South Korean army troops shoot political prisoners and suspected Communist agents near Daegu, South Korea during the Korean War.  
(AP/U.S. Army) <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asia/korea/2008/07/06/164182/Families-recount.htm>



**Attacks on Yalu River Bridges, November 1950.** Yalu River bridges at Sinuiju, North Korea, under attack by planes from USS *Leyte* (CV-32). Three spans have been dropped on the highway bridge, but the railway bridge (lower bridge) appears to be intact. The Manchurian city of Antung is across the river, in upper right. Photograph is dated 18 November 1950, but may have been taken on 14 November. (*Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.*)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/un-2a.htm>



~~TOP SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (F)

D. pr. of State letter, 10-21-77

PROJECT NLT 77-34  
By NLT-NC, NARS Date 12-1-77Copy No. 2 of 4 copies.  
November 6, 1950Copies 3 & 4  
destroyed B&B

MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE  
BETWEEN Secretary Acheson  
Under Secretary of Defense  
Lovett and Mr. Dean Rusk.

Shortly after ten o'clock this morning Mr. Robert Lovett came over from the Pentagon with an urgent message from General Stratemeyer. This message reported that the Air Forces had been ordered to take off at one o'clock p.m. EST today on a bombing mission to take out the bridge across the Yalu River from Sinuiju (Korea) to Antung (Manchuria). They were to use radio controlled bombs and would attempt to bomb on the Korean side of the bridge.

Mr. Lovett expressed his view that from an operational standpoint he doubted whether the results to be achieved would importantly interrupt traffic and that the danger of bombing the city of Antung and other points on the Manchurian side of the River were very great.

Mr. Rusk explained that we had a commitment with the British not to take action which might involve attacks on the Manchurian side of the River without consultation with them. He also said that the British Cabinet was meeting this morning to reconsider their whole attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government and that ill-considered action on our part might have grave consequences. He also told Mr. Lovett that we had filed General MacArthur's report concerning Chinese intervention with the United Nations Security Council and had asked for an urgent meeting tomorrow or Wednesday at which we were going to present a resolution calling on the Chinese to cease activities in Korea, thus attempting to get UN support for any action which might be necessary in the event of their refusal to accept the UN action. He also mentioned the possibility of Russian involvement under the Sino-Russian Treaty.

After some discussion we all thoroughly agreed that this action should be postponed until the reasons for it were more clearly known.

Mr. Lovett telephoned General Marshall, who agreed that the action was unwise unless there was some mass movement across the River, which threatened the security of our troops. Mr. Lovett called Mr. Finletter and instructed him to tell the Joint Chiefs the facts which Mr. Rusk had stated, as set forth above, and to add that he had talked with the Secretary of State, who believed

~~TOP SECRET~~



The First Marine Division begins their “advance in another direction” from the Chosin Reservoir in northern Korea in December 1950. (Photo: <http://www.mixedmartialarts.com/mma.cfm?go=forum.posts&forum=2&thread=2051026&page=11>)



Chinese Communist General Lin Piao (left) and U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur (right)

“I never would have made the attack and risked my men and my military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington would restrain General MacArthur from taking adequate retaliatory measures against my lines of supply and communication.”  
– Gen. Lin Piao





These are some of the 385 able-bodied survivors of the 2,500 army 7th Division men caught in a series of Chinese ambushes along the eastern shore of the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir in late November 1950. (U.S. Marine Corps photo.)



Marine Corsairs have just struck Chinese positions in the Changjin (Chosin) reservoir area of northeast Korea with jellied gasoline napalm. Close air support was a key to the successful retreat to the sea in December 1950. (U.S. Marine Corps photo)

<http://www.bevinaalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>



American forces target rail cars south of Wonsan, North Korea, an east coast port city, during the Korean War. (U.S. Army Military History Institute)



American soldiers establish their position above a railway tunnel with a .30 caliber air-cooled machine gun during the Korean War. (United States Army)





American marines of the U.S. 1st Marine Division capture Chinese Communists during fighting on the central Korean front near Hoengsong, Korea on March 2, 1951. (Photo: Pfc. C.T. Wehner/Marine Corps/National Archives)



U.S. Army soldiers of the U.S. Army's Second [Infantry] Division move up to the front past a sign warning them to keep on the road as the fields are mined by the Allies in Korea on May 20, 1951. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



As the Korean War went on, American air power methodically demolished virtually everything in North Korea having any military significance whatsoever. Here supply warehouses at the east-coast port of Wonsan (North Korea) are bombed in July 1951.  
(Photo: <http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>)



A Fifth Air Force F-51 Mustang drops napalm jellied gasoline tanks on an industrial target in North Korea in August 1951.  
(U.S. Air Force photo) <http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>





A marine F4U Corsair pulls up from a bombing run on a Chinese-held hill in western Korea in October 1952. (U.S. Navy photo)  
<http://www.bevinaalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>



American army soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division advance in central Korea in late March 1951. (U.S. Army photo)



**"Republic of Korea Army is Trained in U.S. Army Style"**

"Major Harry W. Hoffman ..., Weapons Advisor for the Infantry School, watches target practice on a known distance rifle range." (Quoted from the original caption) Photograph is dated 9 February 1952. The ROK soldiers are firing M1 "Garand" rifles. Note Major Hoffman's Korean Military Advisory Group shoulder patch and emblems painted on the Korean troops' helmets. (*Official U.S. Army Photograph, from the "All Hands" collection at the Naval Historical Center.*)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/un-rok/rok-tng.htm>





An American Army soldier guards a group of North Korean prisoners of war on July 10, 1950 before they are interrogated at the 21st Infantry Regiment's command post, south of Chonui. (Photo: U.S. Army. Source: National Archives Central Plains Region)  
[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/photos/nr0710\\_0.htm](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/korea/photos/nr0710_0.htm)



A prisoner of war camp in South Korea during the Korean War (U.S. Army photo)





Chaplain Kenny Lynch conducts services north of Hwachon, Korea, for men of the 31st Regiment on August 28, 1951.  
(Photo: Pvt. Jack D. Johnson/U.S. Army/National Archives/NARA FILE # 111-SC-378917)

<http://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/2919537683/in/set-72157607808414225/>





View of F-86 airplanes on the flight line getting ready for combat in Korea in June 1951. (U.S. Air Force/USIA/NARA FILE #: 306-PS-51-9760)  
<http://www.flickr.com/photos/imcomkorea/2919501753/in/set-72157607808414225/>



General of the Army Douglas MacArthur greets John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the State Department, at the Haneda Air Force Base in Tokyo, Japan on June 21, 1950. Dulles, on a Far East fact-finding mission, had just left Korea and was in Tokyo when the first reports of the invasion arrived. John Foster Dulles was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.  
(Photograph: U.S. Army, Corporal Dangel/Source: Truman Library)



Averell Harriman visits U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur (left) in Tokyo, Japan some time after World War II.  
(Photo: *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946* by W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel)





해리만이 방문하다. 확인된 것은 아니었지만 맥아더 장군이 타이완 장제스 총통을 허가없이 방문한 사실 때문에 트루먼 행정부에 대한 비난이 거세지자 대통령 특별보좌관 애버렐 해리만(W. Averell Harriman)이 맥아더와 상의를 하기 위해 도쿄로 왔다. 8월 6일, 하네다 공항에 해리만이 도착하자 맥아더 장군이 반갑게 맞이하고 있다(위). 백악관으로 돌아가기 전에 그는 한국의 유엔군 전선을 방문하였다. 아래, 8월 7일 평양. B-29 전투기들이 460톤의 고성능 폭탄을 철도 조차장에 투하한 모습이다.

Averell Harriman visits U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur



General Douglas MacArthur greets Assistant U.S. Secretary of War John McCloy (right) and Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger (center) in Japan in 1945. (Photo by Hulton Archive/Getty Images)



President Harry Truman returns from the Wake Island Conference with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Radford in October 1950. Left to right: Presidential advisor Averell Harriman; Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall; Secretary of State Dean Acheson; Ambassador at Large Phillip C. Jessup; Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder; Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Omar Bradley. Harriman, Acheson, Jessup, and Pace were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Photo: Harry Truman Presidential Library and Museum)



Chinese Communists carry posters with pictures of Soviet Russia's Communist leader Joseph Stalin as they celebrate the second anniversary of the establishment of the Communist regime in mainland China on October 1, 1951. (© CORBIS)





President Harry S. Truman returned to Washington, D.C. on October 18, 1950 after his Pacific Conference with U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur. Left to right: W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President; Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall; President Truman; and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. (Bettmann/CORBIS)

“On a quiet Saturday night on the quietest weekend in June 1950, Dean Acheson had repaired [sic] to his Sandy Spring farm in Maryland after "one of his routine late nights at the State Department." At 9:26 P.M. that evening, June 24, John Muccio's first cable arrived; within an hour Dean Rusk was at the State Department. John Hickerson phoned Acheson immediately, who told him "to take the steps which were necessary" to have the Security Council meet the next day. At 11:30 P.M. Hickerson made this request to Trygve Lie. The decision was, as Rusk later acknowledged, based on this first telegram from Seoul. **Acheson and Rusk were virtually the only high officials in Washington at the time. Truman had left for Independence that morning, and paid a quiet visit to his brother's farm on Sunday before returning to Washington. In succeeding days, Acheson dominated the decision-making which soon committed American air and ground forces to the fight. Acheson (along with Rusk) made the decision to take the Korean question to the UN, before he had notified Truman of the fighting; he then told Truman there was no need to have him back in Washington until the next day.** At the Blair House meetings on the evening of June 25 Acheson argued for increased military aid to the Republic of Korea (ROK), American air cover for the evacuation, and the interposition of the 7<sup>th</sup> fleet between Taiwan and the mainland; on the afternoon of June 26 Acheson labored alone on the fundamental decisions committing American air and naval power to the Korean War, approved that evening at Blair House. Thus the decision to intervene was Acheson's decision, supported by the president but taken before United Nations, Pentagon, or Congressional approval.' George Kennan, who supported the June decisions, recalled from taken at the time that Acheson broke off collegial discussions on afternoon of June 26..."

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 625

“The only reason I told the President to fight in Korea was to validate NATO.” – Dean Acheson



President Harry S. Truman (right) presents the U.S. Medal of Merit to John J. Muccio (center), United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, at Wake Island on 14 October 1950. General Douglas MacArthur is on the left.  
(Photo: U.S. State Department)





President Harry S. Truman and General Douglas MacArthur meet for the first time on Wake Island on October 14, 1950. (Source: Harry S. Truman Presidential Library)



U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur, former commander of Allied forces, first in World War II and then in Korea, gives his farewell address before the U.S. Senate on April 19, 1951. President Harry S. Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command over differences in opinion on strategy in Korea. (© CORBIS)

“In war there is no substitute for victory. There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement had led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only alternative.” – U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur, on April 19, 1951 in his farewell address to Congress



General Douglas MacArthur receives a hero's welcome in New York City on April 20, 1951, after he was relieved of his command in Korea by President Harry S. Truman. An estimated 7 million people turned out in New York City to cheer him. (Bettmann/Corbis)





Major General Lemnitzer, *right*, with General Matthew B. Ridgway, *left*, and General James A. Van Fleet, *center*, in Korea, January 1952.

Left to right: General Matthew B. Ridgway (left), General James A. Van Fleet (center), and Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (later General) appear in Korea in January 1952. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an internationalist organization in New York City, from 1946 to 1987; General Matthew B. Ridgway was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1954 to 1973.



Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett (left), Secretary of the Army Frank Pace Jr. (second from right), and Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (NATO) Gen. Dwight Eisenhower (right) listen to President Harry Truman in June 1952. Eisenhower was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1952. (Source: *Ike 1890-1990: A Pictorial History (Commemorative Edition)* by Douglas Kinnard)



Communist Chinese Premier Chou Enlai receives Madame Vijayalakshmi Pandit, with an Indian cultural delegation, and K.M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to Peking. (Eastphoto) <http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>





go. Gen. Charles Willoughby, Gen. Mathew Ridgway, and Walter Bedell Smith

CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith (right) visits U.S. Army Gen. Charles Willoughby (left) and Gen. Matthew Ridgway (center) in South Korea during the Korean War. **Walter Bedell Smith served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from October 7, 1950 until February 9, 1953.**

(Photo: *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990))



# Korean War Armistice Negotiations



Communist Chinese and North Korean delegates leave the conference room for dinner during armistice talks at Kaesong, Korea in 1951. **The armistice conference was held initially at Kaesong and later at Panmunjom.**

(Photo: U.S. Department of Defense/National Archives)

[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Korean\\_War\\_Peace\\_talks.\\_Kaesong,\\_Korea\\_-\\_NARA\\_-\\_292621.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Korean_War_Peace_talks._Kaesong,_Korea_-_NARA_-_292621.jpg)





The Kaesong Armistice Conference Site during the Korean War



In the patio of the main conference building at Kaesong, Korea, the United Nations delegation at the cease-fire talks pose for pictures by cameramen and photographers representing friendly and enemy forces on August 13, 1951. Left to right: Major Gen. Henry I. Hodes (8th Army); Major Gen. L.C. Craigie (USAF); Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy (USN) the chief delegate; Major General Paik Sun Yup of the Republic of Korea Army and Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke (USN). (© Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS)



Photo # 80-G-432028 UN Delegates to Korean Armistice talks, 10 July 1951



United Nations' delegates stand by a U.S. Air Force H-5 helicopter with U.S. Army General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief of United Nations Command, prior to take off for the initial Armistice talks meeting on July 10, 1951. They are (from left to right): Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN; Major General Laurence C. Cragie, U.S. Air Force; Major General Paik Sun Yup, Republic of Korea Army; Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, Chief Delegate; General Ridgway, and Major Henry I. Hodes, U.S. Army. The Armistice negotiations began at Kaesong, Korea on July 10, 1951.

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph/National Archives)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-j/ct-joy.htm>





North Korean Army officers (left) and American military representatives (right) review maps defining the future Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) at Panmunjom, October 1951. (U.S. Air Force photo)

<http://www.edwards.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=529&page=31>



American military officers and a South Korean army officer attend the Korean War Armistice Negotiations at Panmunjom, Korea on November 30, 1951. They are (from left to right): Major General Howard Turner, USAF; Major General Lee, Republic of Korea Army; Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, Senior Delegate; Rear Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, USN; Major General Henry I. Hodes, U.S. Army, and Rear Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, USN RAdm. Libby was RAdm. Burke's relief on the delegation. *(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives.)*





U.N. Command Senior Delegate U.S. Navy Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy gives correspondents a report following a conference session at Panmunjom on 10 May 1952. On this date the Communist prisoners of war at Kojedo were holding as their captive Brigadier General Francis Dodd, who was the POW camp commandant at the time of his capture on 7 May.

(Official U.S. Navy Photograph, now in the collections of the National Archives)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/pers-us/uspers-j/ct-joy.htm>






Communist Chinese and North Korean delegates leave the conference area at Panmunjom, Korea, circa early 1952. These officers appear to be Communist Chinese People's Liberation Army Major General Hsieh Fang and North Korean Army Major General Lee Sang Cho. Note North Korean Army guards, wearing quilted winter uniforms and armed with Russian M1891 Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifles. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph)




American soldiers interrogate captured Koreans during the Korean War. Some of the captured Korean men were civilians while some of the captured Korean men were enemy soldiers in disguise.





Military Police officers of the United States Army patrol the South Limit of the Korean De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) during the Korean War. (Photo: Rene Noorbergen / Camera Press London Pix Inc.)



American and South Korean officials meet at South Korea's President Syngman Rhee's residence in Seoul, Korea on June 13, 1953, only days before Rhee's release of Communist prisoners threatened an early armistice. Left to right: U.S. Navy Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman-designate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; President Rhee; U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Ellis O. Briggs; Foreign Minister of South Korea Pyun Tung Tai; U.S. Army Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor, Commander of the Eighth Army. **U.S. Army Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private organization in New York City, in 1953.**

(Photo: *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* by William Stueck)





U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Ellis O. Briggs (center) talks with American peace negotiator Arthur H. Dean (center, right) before taking part in the Peace Negotiations at Panmunjom, Korea in October 1953. Both men were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. **Arthur H. Dean was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1953.** (Photo: Joseph Scherschel/Time Life)



Chinese Communist commander Peng Dehuai signs the Korean War armistice at Kaesong, Korea, a city near the De-Militarized Zone. (Eastphoto) <http://www.bevinaalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>





The armistice is signed on July 27, 1953. U.S. Army Gen. W.K. Harrison (left table) and North Korean General Nam Il (right table) sign documents. General Nam Il served as Foreign Minister of North Korea from 1953 to 1967. General Nam Il was killed in a strange car accident in Pyongyang in 1976. (U.S. Air Force photo)  
<http://www.edwards.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=529&page=30>



General Nam Il of North Korea appears at the Truce Conference site in Panmunjom, South Korea in April 1953. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





U.S. Army General Mark W. Clark, Far East commander, signs the Korean armistice agreement on July 27, 1953, after two years of negotiation, during which hundreds of thousands of men were killed and wounded in continued hostilities. (U.S. Navy photo)


<http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>



North Korea's Premier Kim Il Sung (left) prepares to sign armistice that is handed to him by General Nam Il, head of the communist delegation at Panmunjom, on July 27, 1953. (Eastphoto) <http://www.bevinalexander.com/korea/korean-war-photos.htm>



# The Korean War, 1950-1953





# THE KOREAN WAR

1950 - 1953



1 JUNE- SEPTEMBER, 1950



3 NOV. 1950 - JAN. 1951



JAN. 1951 - JULY 1953




## THE KOREAN WAR 1950-1953

- City or Town
- - National Boundaries
- ★ Battle Site
- Communist Movement
- U. N. Forces Movement
- Yellow Box Communist - Occupied Territory
- Green Box United Nations Occupied Territory
- Dashed Line U. N. Forces Front Line

# INVASION AND COUNTER STROKE

25 JUNE - 26 NOVEMBER 1950







A former North Korean soldier shouts for joy upon reaching Seoul, South Korea, and freedom. Many North Korean and Chinese POWs renounced communism and chose to be released to new lives in South Korea and Taiwan. (U.S. Air Force photo) <http://www.edwards.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=529&page=31>



U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur (left) visits Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (right), President of the Republic of China, in Taipei on July 31, 1950. General Douglas MacArthur and his entourage traveled to Taipei without notifying the Truman administration or the U.S. State Department. General Douglas MacArthur was ordered not to attack the North Korean communist army and the Chinese Communist army that were stationed on the Communist Chinese side of the Yalu River. U.S. President Harry S. Truman deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits during the Korean War to keep the "peace" and restrain both the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists.



Fourteen thousand former Communists defied Mao's brainwashers and chose freedom in Taiwan at the end of the Korean War

Caption: "Fourteen thousand former Communists defied Mao's brainwashers and chose freedom in Taiwan at the end of the Korean War."





Chinese prisoners of war in Korea ride in the back of a U.S. Army truck as they carry the flag of the Republic of China and a portrait of Republic of China's President Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek enroute to the island of Taiwan. Many Chinese prisoners of war chose to relocate to the island of Taiwan rather than return to Communist-ruled mainland China.



Anti-communist Chinese prisoners-of-war of the Korean War march along a road to Incheon, South Korea on January 26, 1954, where they were transported to Taiwan, the offshore island governed by the Republic of China. They carried Nationalist Chinese flags and pictures of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (Photo: © Hulton-Deutsch Collection/CORBIS)





Recently released Chinese prisoners-of-war (POWs) carrying the flags of the Republic of China (Taiwan) board a United States Air Force (USAF) transport in January 1954 for the flight to Taiwan and freedom after renouncing communism. Those communist POWs who returned to Communist China and North Korea faced uncertain futures – they were regarded as traitors for being captured. (U.S. Air Force photo)

<http://www.edwards.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=529&page=31>





President of South Korea Syngman Rhee (center) visits Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (left) at an airport in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China on November 27, 1953.

**CHIANG GREETES RHEE:** TODAY in Taipei, Formosa—President Syngman Rhee of South Korea was greeted at the airport by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of Nationalist

China. From left were Chiang, Korean Ambassador Kim Hong Il, Rhee and Nationalist Premier Chen Cheng (back to camera).—A. P. wirephoto.

NOV 29 1953

## Rhee Sees Chiang; Pact Hinted

By Associated Press

TAIPEH, Formosa, Nov. 27.—Syngman Rhee made a secret flying visit today to Chiang Kai-shek, who expressed the hope that Nationalist China and South Korea "will closely cooperate in a common effort to eliminate Communism and the Russian invader."

Chiang's remarks strength-

ened belief that an alliance between the two republics might develop from the South Korean President's visit.

The Nationalist President's remarks were made as Rhee presented Chiang with the Order of Meritorious Reconstruction. Rhee said the medal, South Korea's highest, was for Chiang's long support of the Republic of South Korea.

Rhee acclaimed Chiang as a leader who "had fought Communism longer than anyone else."

Responding, Chiang pointed out that Rhee also has waged a "valiant fight against Communism." Then he expressed the hope that "with close cooperation of the peoples of the Republics of China and Korea, final victory will be ours."

NOV 29 1953



# Korean War: Organized Crime?

## Korean War: In Their Own Words



Gen. Smedley D. Butler

“WAR is a racket. It always has been. It is possibly the oldest, easily the most profitable, surely the most vicious. It is the only one international in scope. It is the only one in which the profits are reckoned in dollars and the losses in lives. A racket is best described, I believe, as something that is not what it seems to the majority of the people. Only a small “inside” group knows what it is about. It is conducted for the benefit of the very few, at the expense of the very many. Out of war a few people make huge fortunes.”


– Smedley D. Butler, Retired Major General of the U.S. Marine Corps, *War is a Racket*



Hermann Goering

“Why, of course the people don’t want war. Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia nor in England, nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along whether it’s a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. ...but voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country.”

– Hermann Goering, in a conversation with U.S. Army Captain Gustave Gilbert in a prison cell during the Nuremberg trials, on April 18, 1946. from *Nuremberg Diary*, by Gustave M. Gilbert



John Jay

“But the safety of the people of America against dangers from *foreign* force depends not only on their forbearing to give *just* causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to *invite* hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are *pretended* as well as just causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people.”

– John Jay, *Federalist* No. 4



James Madison

“Of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded, because it comprises and develops the germ of every other. War is the parent of armies; from these proceed debts and taxes; and armies, and debts, and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few. In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is extended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to those of subduing the force, of the people. The same malignant aspect in republicanism may be traced in the inequality of fortunes, and the opportunities of fraud, growing out of a state of war, and in the degeneracy of manners and of morals engendered by both. No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.”

– U.S. Congressman James Madison, from *Political Observations*, April 20, 1795



# **“Postwar” Armistice & Modern Korea**

Photo # SC 426684 Meeting of Korean Military Armistice Commission, 28 July 1953



Major General Blackshear M. Bryan, U.S. Army (2nd from left), Senior Member of the Military Armistice Commission, United Nations' Command, exchanges credentials with Major General Lee Sang Cho, North Korean Army (3rd from right), Senior Communist delegate, at the Conference Building at Panmunjom, Korea, 28 July 1953. This was the day after the Korean War Armistice went into effect. (Photograph from the Army Signal Corps Collection in the U.S. National Archives)

<http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/s400000/s426684c.htm>




Left to right: U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, and British envoy Lord Robert Cecil Salisbury (Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 5th Marquess of Salisbury), the Leader of the House of Lords (1942-1945, 1951-1957), laugh together during the Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington, D.C. in July 1953. Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles were members of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1953. **The Korean War armistice was established at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjom, Korea on July 27, 1953.** Over 33,600 American soldiers died and over 103,200 American soldiers were wounded during the Korean War. **The Bureau of Internal Revenue was formally renamed Internal Revenue Service on July 9, 1953.** According to the Chinese calendar, 1953 was known as "Year of the Snake". (Photo: George Skadding /Time Life)



“If the Korean War became a total war for Koreans, it was for Americans a moment in the making and remaking of American hegemony; as Acheson said, from this standpoint it was not a Korean War, it could have happened anywhere. **Acheson also blurted out something else, in retrospective seminars in 1954 held to aid him in writing his memoirs and to cook MacArthur's goose: "Korea came along and saved us."** The reference is to NSC 68, the most important cold war document of our time, and to Korea as a necessary *crisis* that enabled the enormous defense expenditures called for in the document. More generally, Korea was a crisis enabling the second great wave of American state-building in this century. The New Deal was the first, and the National Security state was the second, with its bureaucracies growing exponentially from the early 1950s. The Korean War thus propelled hegemony outward, and state-making inward. But this is now commonplace in the literature, at least the competent literature; Korea was an instance in the making of American hegemony. The standard argument is that Korea occasioned the globalization of containment, stretching Kennan's limited containment to Nitze-Dulles unlimited commitments. But we said making and *remaking*, and "remaking" does discover some new history. NSC 68 also had within it not just a globalization of containment, but our dialectic between containment and rollback. NSC 48 signaled the end of a thorough revaluation of United States policy toward Asia, to account for the Chinese revolution and the incipient reappearance of Japanese industry; it had the same dialectic between containment and rollback. In late August, Truman and Acheson decided to march into North Korea, thus giving MacArthur's thrust its broad backing in Washington. An unstable compromise on containment from 1947 to 1950, lacking bipartisanship on Asia but above all lacking the funds to underpin the new hegemony, was brought together via the march North – for about two months, from late August to late October. Rollback met a regrouped People's Army and two hundred thousand Chinese “volunteers,” causing the greatest crisis in the postwar period and limiting a war that could not be limited in Washington. In the winter of 1950, foreign policy centrists like Acheson and Nitze discovered belatedly that containment was the policy. Centrist rollback had failed, but it was blamed on Asia-first rollbackers. And so MacArthur slowly faded from the scene, but not without some uproarious pulling and hauling in domestic American politics, as the rollback constituency fought back against this reversal of correct verdicts. In the interests of bipartisan consensus a revisionist history had to emerge: MacArthur, the lone wolf, would be blamed for the rollback failure; Dulles would merge with the comfortable broad middle, while using rollback rhetoric to sate the outraged appetites of the right-wing. Most important, the failure of Korean rollback put decisive outer limits on “positive action” for the next several decades. Containment was the real Eisenhower policy, vastly preferable to the centrist elites then in control of foreign policy. It was Foster Dulles, putative architect of rollback, who placed these limits (following on the Chinese, that is). In 1953, for example, he suggested the ultimate civil war deterrent: placing the American army smack in front of the ROK Army, if required to keep the latter from marching north; and just like Truman and Acheson, Dulles learned that the United States could not carry the war to China, but must limit it to the Korean peninsula. More illustrative, however, was the search for a place where a mini-rollback might be accomplished, its feasibility defined by getting in and out unscathed, and not provoking the Chinese or the Russians. The paltry place of choice for Dulles, which he brought up frequently, was Hainan Island, off the Sino-Vietnamese coast. But of course, it was never tried. Like another rollbacker, Ronald Reagan at Grenada in 1983, Dulles was reduced to an “island” strategy, an irony given his purported opposition to Acheson's island perimeter. Well before the Hungarian rebellion in 1956 (usually thought to spell the end of his rollback fantasies), Dulles criticized “preventive war” doctrines and rollback: trying to “detach” satellites from the USSR, he said, “would involve the US in general war.” Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey seconded Dulles: “an aggressive course of action to roll back Communism” was out; it was “not worth the risks it entails.” Containment thus became the preferred strategy, a system with historically- forged boundaries within which choices were made, and it has been the modal preference of every administration since 1950. Kennedy's unwillingness to follow through with a big invasion at the Bay of Pigs expressed the difference between rollback in Cuba and Korea. **The 1950 episode also explains why there was no invasion of North Vietnam; the fear of provoking China animated national security elites until Nixon's opening to Beijing made it irrelevant in 1971.** No American administration could risk blowing itself apart by invading North Vietnam and getting another “glut of Chinamen.” China understood that the wars in Korea and Vietnam were proxy wars, with the Chinese revolution being the real issue. Through its bloody sacrifices in Korea and its deft deterrence in Vietnam, China placed definitive limits on American expansionism in these, its two most important former tributary states. In any case, the boundaries on containment explain the stalemate (indeed, what Daniel Ellsberg has called “the stalemate machine”) between conservatives and liberals over the Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Vietnam War, and Nicaragua throughout the 1980s. We can now understand how the anticommunist strategy of successive administrations was forged. But that does not fully explain the remaking of American hegemony. Hegemony implies something more than a strategy, more than a global division into spheres of influence in realpolitik terms. It implies a political economy. In its American internationalist mode, the essence of hegemony was to draw outer limits demarcating a grand area for free trade and economic growth. Such a system favors the automaticity of economic exchange over the necessities of spheres of influence or the use of military force. The lines for this in East Asia were drawn mostly in 1947, with the reverse course in Japan and the “great crescent” in the rest of Asia...”

– *The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-1950* by Bruce Cumings (1990), p. 761-763



Against a background of flags of the nations who have troop contingents in Korea, a foursome of Four Star Generals takes the salute at the review of more than 6,000 troops from 15 nations at Ninth-Army-Headquarters in 1953. From left are General Matthew B. Ridgeway, U.S. Army Chief of staff who formerly commanded the 8th Army and later was Supreme UN Commander; General John E. Hull, present Supreme Commander in the far east; General Maxwell Taylor, commander of the 8th Army and General Sun Yup Paik, South Korean Army chief of Staff. General Ridgeway called the United Nations force "incredible progress." General Matthew B. Ridgeway and General Maxwell Taylor were members of the Council on Foreign Relations. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



The Joint Chiefs of Staff is photographed together at the Pentagon on September 6, 1957 for the first time since Gen. Twining became Chairman. Left to right: Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force; Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Army; Gen. Nathan F. Twining, chairman; Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Randolph McC. Pate, Marine Corps, Commandant. (Bettmann/CORBIS)





Fifth Air Force, Korea--Arriving Saturday at the U.S. Air Force 17th Bomb Wing base in Korea in March 1953, Adlai E. Stevenson, former Governor of Illinois and Democratic Party presidential candidate, is flanked by the American Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Ellis O. Briggs (left) and acting Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Dr. Cho Chong-Hwan (second from right). Dr. Cho and the acting Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea, Taik Tu-chin (third from right), represented Korean President Syngman Rhee in greeting Mr. Stevenson as he arrived at the base from where B-26 light bombers take off daily in strikes against Communist supply convoys and installations in North Korea.

(Photo: AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM#: 122480 AC (Released to Public))

[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stevenson\\_and\\_Korean\\_officials\\_at\\_USAF\\_base\\_in\\_Korea\\_March\\_1953.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Stevenson_and_Korean_officials_at_USAF_base_in_Korea_March_1953.jpg)



President of South Korea Syngman Rhee (left) greets United States Under Secretary Of State Christian A. Herter (right) at the Presidential Mansion in Seoul, South Korea. **Christian A. Herter was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.**




President of South Korea Syngman Rhee (left) is shown around the new Eighth Army Headquarters at Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, Korea by U.S. Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on September 18, 1955(?). The shift to new quarters was made recently so the former location, a school compound in Seoul, could be returned to Seoul University officials. **U.S. Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.**





United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (left) and President Dwight D. Eisenhower (center) meet with Arthur H. Dean, special envoy to the Korean peace talks at Panmunjom, at the White House in Washington, D.C. on December 21, 1953. (AP Photo)



Left photo: North Korea's despot Kim Il Sung greets Red China's despot Mao Tse-tung in 1958.

Right photo: North Korean Dictator Kim Il Sung visits North Vietnamese Dictator Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi. Kim visited North Vietnam at least twice in secret.







Harry S. Truman (left), former President of the United States, greets President of South Korea Syngman Rhee in circa August 1954. (Photo: [Harry S. Truman Presidential Library](http://www.hstl.org/))



During his tour in the United States in 1954, Republic of Korea's President Syngman Rhee visited Harry Truman's house in Independence, Missouri in 1954 to thank Truman for his role in setting up the Korean government in 1948 and his decision to send American troops to Korea shortly after the invasion by the Soviet-backed North Korean army in 1950. The photo of Syngman Rhee with Truman is from the *New York Times* (July 20, 1965 edition, the day after Rhee died in Hawaii). (Photo: <http://ysfine.com/kobak/kohist.html>)



Lieutenant General Robert M. Lee, Korean President Syngman Rhee,  
U.S. Ambassador to Korea Walter C. Dowling, Captain Robert M. Krone,  
Seoul. Republic of Korea. 30 July 1958

Dr. Syngman Rhee (2<sup>nd</sup> left), President of the Republic of Korea, appears with U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Walter C. Dowling (2<sup>nd</sup> right) in Seoul, Republic of Korea on July 30, 1958. Walter C. Dowling was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a private foreign affairs organization in New York City.





Korean students march with banners reading "Down with Red China" and "Out with Red Inspection Team" in peaceful demonstration in Seoul, South Korea on August 15, 1955, the tenth anniversary of V-J Day, after South Korea's President Syngman Rhee urged the South Koreans to stage "peaceful" parades aimed at the ouster of Communist Truce Inspection Teams. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



A photo of North Korean commando Kim Shin-jo shortly after his capture in 1968 following the aborted Blue House Raid in Seoul, South Korea. North Korea's "dear leader" Kim Il Sung ordered his commandos to infiltrate South Korea in January 1968 and murder South Korea's President Park Chung-hee at his presidential palace, also known as the Blue House, and decapitate his head in the streets of Seoul in an attempt to conquer South Korea and subjugate the Korean people under Communist rule. Kim Shin-jo was the only North Korean commando to be captured alive. The remaining North Korean commandos except for one committed suicide or were eliminated by the South Korean army in firefights near the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ); only one North Korean commando returned to North Korea alive and was later promoted to the rank of a general. Shortly after his capture, Kim Shin-jo confessed: "I came down to cut Park Chung Hee's throat!" Kim Shin-jo converted to Christianity and serves as a Protestant pastor in South Korea. The North Korean commandos successfully infiltrated the U.S. Army 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division sector of the DMZ before dawn on January 18, 1968 and marched into Seoul undetected, wearing South Korean army uniforms.



Kim Shin-jo, the only survivor of a 31 man assassination team from North Korea disguised as South Korean soldiers, identifies the bodies of his comrades in 1968. 68 South Koreans and 3 Americans were killed trying to capture them. Two days later, on January 23, the USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea. (Photo: <http://koreanhistory.info/park.htm>)

Photo # K-64733 U.S. & North Korean representatives sign agreement for release of USS Pueblo crew



Representatives of the United States and North Korean governments meet at Panmunjom, Korea, to sign the agreement for the release of *Pueblo's* crew, 22 December 1968. Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, U.S. Army, Senior Member, United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission, is in the left foreground, with his back to the camera. USS *Pueblo* (AGER-2) and her crew had been captured off Wonsan on 23 January 1968. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph) <http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-p/ager2-l.htm>



Photo # K-64711 Greeting USS Pueblo crewmembers, upon their repatriation by North Korea, 23 Dec. 1968



American military officers greet USS Pueblo crewmembers upon their repatriation by North Korea on December 23, 1968. The USS *Pueblo* was captured by North Korea on January 23, 1968, just two days after North Korean commandos attempted to assassinate South Korea's President Park Chung-hee at the Blue House, South Korea's presidential residence, in Seoul, South Korea.




Left photo: The photo shows the USS Pueblo in port at Pyongyang, North Korea.



Right photo: Kim Jong Il listens to his father and North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung.  
(Photo: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/kim-jong-il.htm>)






This is picture 7 of the fight sequence. Again, UNC personnel are wearing white helmets. Compare these numbers to the official North Korean statement. The pictures were taken by U.S. Military personnel, but these are scanned in from "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom". Copied from inside the back page of the booklet "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom": Published by UN Korean War Allies Association, Inc. C.P.O. Box 936 Seoul, Korea Contents of this publication may be reproduced in part or in entirety with or without credit to the publisher. August 21, 1976

The **Axe Murder Incident** (Korean: 판문점 도끼 살인 사건) was the killing of two United States Army officers by North Korean soldiers on August 18, 1976 in the Joint Security Area (JSA) located in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) which forms the *de facto* border between North and South Korea. The killings and the response three days later (**Operation Paul Bunyan**) heightened tensions between North and South Korea as well as their respective allies, the People's Republic of China [Communist China] and the United States. The incident is also known as the **Hatchet Incident** and the **Poplar Tree Incident** because the object of the conflict was a poplar tree standing in the JSA.

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axe\\_Murder\\_Incident](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axe_Murder_Incident)





① A group of north Korean guards start a quarrel with their UNC counterparts while Korean workers are doing their routine trimming of trees in the area. Two workers are seen climbing down ladders.



④ North Koreans wield clubs and axe (see arrow) as they go after UNC personnel running for safety.



② Violence breaks out as north Korean guards in several groups assault on UNC guards at the shout "kill them" by a north Korean officer, which was apparently a pre-arranged go-sign to begin the brawl.



⑤ As the Korean workers flee for safety and look back over their shoulders, the beating behind the truck still continues. A UNC officer is seen surrounded by another group in front of the vehicle, as one north Korean guard behind him aims his axe at the UNC officer's head.

Left pictures: The first set of pictures (Images 1 and 4) of the incident. The pictures were taken by U.S. Military personnel, but these are scanned in from "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom". Copied from inside the back page of the booklet "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom": Published by UN Korean War Allies Association, Inc. C.P.O. Box 936 Seoul, Korea Contents of this publication may be reproduced in part or in entirety with or without credit to the publisher. Aug. 21, 1976

Right pictures: Pictures 2 and 5 in the series of six images. In all of the pictures, UNC Personnel are wearing white helmets. The pictures were taken by U.S. Military personnel, but these are scanned in from "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom". Copied from inside the back page of the booklet "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom": Published by UN Korean War Allies Association, Inc. C.P.O. Box 936 Seoul, Korea Contents of this publication may be reproduced in part or in entirety with or without credit to the publisher. Aug. 21, 1976





③ North Koreans chase and beat UNC personnel, who are scattering to escape the sudden mass attack by the north Koreans. Behind the truck, a group of north Koreans attack an unseen UNC officer.



⑥ A north Korean guard with an axe is going after a UNC <sup>Cpl.</sup> officer recoiling while more of the north Koreans join the beating behind the truck. The helmet of the murdered UNC officer is seen near the left front of the truck.

These are pictures 3 and 6 in the fight sequence. The pictures were taken by U.S. Military personnel, but these are scanned in from "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom". Copied from inside the back page of the booklet "Axe-wielding Murder at Panmunjom": Published by UN Korean War Allies Association, Inc. C.P.O. Box 936 Seoul, Korea Contents of this publication may be reproduced in part or in entirety with or without credit to the publisher. Aug. 21, 1976



North Korean tunnel under the DMZ found near Panmunjom (photo from *Panmunjom* by Wayne A. Kirkbride)  
(Photo: <http://www.vfwpost7591.org/Chapter-12.html>)





In July 1976 Capt Melching and MSgt Forsyth toured the 2nd North Korean DMZ Tunnel, which discovered in March 1975 and was located east of the Chorwon Valley. We flew up there with the United States Forces Korea Tunnel Neutralization Team (USFK/TNT). The photo is of our two Tunnel Team escorts, one ROK and one U.S., at the entrance of the intercept tunnel which leads down several hundred feet to the North Korean tunnel, which was blocked just north of the Military Demarcation Line. MSgt Forsyth is on the right side of this photo taking his own picture, his film was later confiscated after taking a photo at the north end of the tunnel, actually inside North Korea, although our Korean Major said we could take pictures anywhere inside the tunnel. The 548th provided imagery support to the Tunnel Team for the next 14 years, until the operation was taken over by the Korean Army. (Photo courtesy of Howard Melching)  
[http://www.548rtg.org/548th\\_at\\_Work.html](http://www.548rtg.org/548th_at_Work.html)



South Korean soldiers patrol the Demilitarized Zone.





(L to R) British Group Captain Colin Greaves, Australian Group Captain Ian Petkoff, U.S. Major General James Soligan and South Korea's Brigadier General Lee Jung-Suk arrive for a meeting August 6, 2002 in Panmunjom, on the border between North and South Korea. Representatives from United Nations Command and North Korea's Korean People's Army met to discuss ways to prevent hostilities, such as the June 29 naval clash between the two Koreas along a disputed sea border. (Pool/Getty Images)



South Korean delegate Army Col. Moon Sung-Mook (L) talks with North Korean delegate Army Col. Pak Rim-Su (R) during a military meeting at the North side of the border village of Panmunjom on July 10, 2007 in North Korea. North Korea and South Korea resumed talks after North Korea demanded the re-drawing of a disputed sea border. (Photo: Handout/Getty Images)





Major General Singlaub, senior United Nations Command representative, leads the other representatives leaving a meeting of the Armistice Commission in Panmunjom, Korea. (Photo: <http://www.vfwpost7591.org/Chapter-12.html>)



A North Korean soldier (left, rear) stands guard as South Korean soldiers keep watch while Canada's Prime Minister Stephen Harper (not pictured) visits the truce village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on December 7, 2009. (Reuters)

# Park Chung-hee, Yushin Constitution, & The Rise of National Socialism in South Korea



General Park Chung-hee (wearing sunglasses) is seen standing with his soldiers in 1961. General Park Chung-hee (박정희, 朴正熙, September 30, 1917- October 26, 1979), whose was also known as “Masao Takagi” (高木正雄) under colonial Imperial Japanese rule, rose to power in a military coup against President Yun Bo-seon on May 16, 1961. Park Chung-hee normalized diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, after Japan colonized Korea from 1910 to 1945. Japan’s colonial authorities forced Koreans to speak only Japanese and forced many Korean women into prostitution. Park Chung-hee served as a lieutenant in the Kwangtung Army, a unit in the Imperial Japanese Army, during World War II. Park Chung-hee adopted the “Yushin [Yusin] Constitution” (also known as the Fourth Republic) in 1972 and ruled as a virtual dictator until he was assassinated by Kim Jaegyu, the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), on October 26, 1979. The Yushin Constitution was modeled after the Japanese Meiji Restoration [Reformation] Movement (Meiji Yushin [Ishin]; 明治維新).





Korean protesters storm the presidential residence in Seoul, South Korea on April 19, 1960. South Korea's President Dr. Syngman Rhee resigned as President of South Korea on April 26, 1960 and fled to Hawaii, along with his Austrian-born wife Francesca Donner, in exile two days later with the assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Syngman Rhee died in exile in Hawaii on July 19, 1965. The Koreans protested in April 1960 after the vice presidential election was rigged; Syngman Rhee's preferred vice presidential candidate Lee Gibung defeated Chang Myon, a former South Korean Ambassador to the United States, by an abnormally wide margin. (Photo: [http://askakorean.blogspot.com/2009\\_05\\_01\\_archive.html](http://askakorean.blogspot.com/2009_05_01_archive.html))



South Korean police officers brutally attack Korean civilians during the April 19 Revolution in 1960.  
(Photo: <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000989&mod=skb>)



Syngman Rhee, center, arrives at Gimpo Airport to flee the country as the students' uprising overthrew the Rhee government in 1960. / Korea Times





The leaders of the Military Revolutionary Committee are pictured in Seoul, South Korea on May 20, 1961, four days after the coup: Chairman Chang Do-yong (left) and Vice-Chairman Park Chung-hee (right).

“This pseudo-socialism is one of the essential features of fascism; indeed, Hitler called his Nazi ideology “National Socialism,” whereas Kita Ikki claimed himself to be a “pure socialist.” It is, perhaps, this pure socialism that had a significant influence on the evolution of Park Chung-hee’s sociopolitical mentality. Both Park and Kita Ikki shared a personal history of vacillating between left and right, and it is indeed the case that fascist ideology itself is “conservative revolutionary theory” that embraces both leftist and rightist ideas. In one of Park Chung-hee’s speeches he said, “Have you ever seen the hands of the 1% of privileged people in our society? Delicate hands are our enemy. Those hands damage our minds.” This has the ring of traditional leftist rhetoric, but actually reflects Kita Ikki’s pure socialism. There are other indications that the roots of Park Chung-hee’s ideology lie in the realm of the Japanese rightists. For example, Park’s Saemaul (or New Village) Movement was a copy of Japanese Governor-General Ugaki’s Farming Village Promotion Movement. Park’s Revitalizing Reform (the Yushin system) in 1972 was derived from the Meiji Reforms. The National Charter of Education, drafted by philosopher Park Chong-hong at Park’s behest, is an imitation of the Japanese Imperial Message on Education. The introduction of military training classes in schools was inspired by the Japanese military education that Park received. In Park’s highly critical evaluation on the Chosun dynasty in Korea, the Japanese colonial view of Korean history can be clearly detected. Park composed a few anthems, all of them based on the Japanese musical scale. Finally, Park’s adoption of a Japanese name underlines the extent of the Japanese influence on his personal development. Observing the role played by the Japanese army in the unfolding of Japanese modern history and in setting up the puppet government with the last emperor, Pui [Puyi], persuaded Park Chung-hee of the importance of the military as a means of national reform. Up until the time of the downfall of Rhee Sung-man in April 1960, the Korean army had been politically neutral, which means, in effect, that it functioned in accordance with American ideology. After the Park Chung-hee coup in May 1961, however, the South Korean sociopolitical agenda would be dominated by the military and would remain so for more than a quarter-century.”

– *Developmental Dictatorship and The Park Chung-hee Era: The Shaping of Modernity in the Republic of Korea* by Lee Byeong-cheon, p. 304-305

# Heroic general Lee passes away at age of 91

By Lee Tae-hoon

April 30, 2012



Lee Han-lim

Retired Lt. Gen. Lee Han-lim, the only military commanding officer to publicly declare his opposition to the military coup of 1961, died of natural causes Sunday. He was 91 years old.

Lee enrolled in the Manchurian Imperial Army Academy with the late President Park Chung-hee in 1940 and entered the Japanese Military Academy with him in 1942.

He played a pivotal role in the creation of the country's first modernized armed forces following the end of Japan's 36 years of colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15, 1944.

He received the Taegeuk Medal, the highest honor for Korean soldiers, and a Silver Star from the United States, for successfully repelling Chinese troops as the 9th Division commander, during the 1950 to 53 Korea War.

The general earned respect for maintaining his political neutrality.

He rejected the demand of the top military and government authorities to force his troops to cast ballots for designated presidential and vice presidential candidates in elections on March 15, 1954.

Consequently, Lee was stripped of his post as commander of the 6th Army Corp and had to undergo the humiliation of being sent to a military graduate school as a student.

Due to his upright character, he clashed with Gen. Park, one of his best friends and military colleagues. He initially tried to deter the military coup by Park, but gave up on fears that his move could lead to a civil war and invite invasion by the communist North.

He was arrested by the coup forces and discharged from the military in 1961.

Lee was briefly exiled to the United States and had to serve a prison term on his return to his home country, largely due to his refusal to participate in Park's military regime.

Nevertheless, after repeated requests and persuasion from Park, Lee became the head of the state-run Korea Water Resources Corporation in 1963. He also served as head of Chinhae Chemical in 1968 and construction minister in 1969.

He became head of the National Tourism Organization in 1972 and served as ambassador to Turkey and Australia between 1974 and 1980.

Source: [http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/05/116\\_109974.html](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/05/116_109974.html)





South Korean army soldiers stand in front of a city hall during the coup d'état in May 1961 that brought Park Chung-hee to power. (Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)





Soldiers keep crowds off street near the National Assembly.  
(Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)



South Korean army soldiers detain South Korean civilians at a train station in Seoul.  
(Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)





South Korean army soldiers detain curfew violators in Myeong-dong, South Korea in 1961.  
 (Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)



In 1964, Lee Myung-bak (third from right), the former President of South Korea, was arrested for protesting Seoul-Tokyo talks.  
 (Grand National Party, via Reuters) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/world/asia/20lee.html>





Students at SNU called for protests, burned effigies of 'imperialist and nationalist traitors,' and held a protest against the upcoming Korea-Japan conference on Jongno on March 24, 1964. (Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)



South Korea's strongman Park Chung-hee declared martial law and ordered the South Korean army to end the protests in Seoul, South Korea on June 3, 1964 during a conference between the governments of South Korea and Japan. Koreans in South Korea protested Park Chung-hee's move to establish diplomatic relations with Japan; Koreans who were raised in Korea under Imperial Japanese colonial rule were treated like slaves by the Imperial Japanese authorities and were forced to speak Japanese while the Korean language was outlawed. (Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/search/label/Post%201945%20Era>)





President John F. Kennedy (2<sup>nd</sup> left) greets General Park Chung-hee (standing to the right of President Kennedy), Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, and members of General Park's official party for a luncheon in honor of General Park in the North Portico of the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. Clement E. "Clem" Conger, a protocol officer for the State Department, is on the far left, and Korean Ambassador to the United States II Kwon Chung is second from the right (wearing glasses and looking at the camera). All others are unidentified. (Photo: Robert Knudsen. White House Photographs. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-KN-C19433.aspx>



President John F. Kennedy greets General Park Chung Hee, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, for a luncheon in honor of General Park in the North Portico of the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. Clement E. "Clem" Conger, a protocol officer for the State Department, is on the far left. All others are unidentified.

(Photo: Robert Knudsen, White House Photographs, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (Boston))

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-B.aspx>





President John F. Kennedy (sitting in rocking chair) meets with General Park Chung-hee (wearing glasses and sitting on couch), the acting President of the Republic of Korea, inside the Oval Office of the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. Also attending the meeting are Major General Yang Soo Yoo, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee; Duk Shin Choi, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Byung Kyu Chun, Minister of Finance; Byeng Kwon Bak, Minister of National Defense; Chung Pum Song, Deputy Chairman of the Economic Planning Board; and Il Kwon Chung, Korean Ambassador to the United States.

(Photo: Abbie Rowe, White House Photographs, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-C.aspx>



First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy (right) accepts a chest of handmade clothes sent by female students in Korea and presented by General Park Chung-hee (left), Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, as President John F. Kennedy looks on during a meeting inside the Yellow Oval Room at the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. (Photo: Cecil Stoughton, White House Photographs, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-C.aspx>





President John F. Kennedy greets General Chung Hee Park, Chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of the Republic of Korea, for a luncheon in honor of General Park in the North Portico of the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. Clement E. "Clem" Conger, a protocol officer for the State Department, stands behind and to the right of General Park. All others are unidentified.

(Photo: Abbie Rowe, White House Photographs, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum)

<http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHP-1961-11-14-B.aspx>



Lieutenant General Park Chung-hee (center), leader of the South Korean military junta, meets with American President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (left) at the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961.  
(Photo: <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000989&mod=skb>)



Lieutenant General Park Chung-hee (center), leader of the South Korean military junta, meets with American President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (left) at the White House in Washington, D.C. on November 14, 1961. Park and Kennedy were assassinated by a "lone gunman". John Fitzgerald Kennedy served in the U.S. House of Representatives from January 3, 1947 until January 3, 1953, and served as a U.S. Senator (Democrat-Massachusetts) from January 3, 1953 until December 22, 1960. (Harvey Georges/AP Photo)  
Source: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-12/s-koreans-fret-world-beating-chaebol-destroys-small-busi.html>





U.S. President John F. Kennedy (right) and Gen. Park Chung-hee of South Korea appear at a conference inside the White House on November 14, 1961. Between them are Lt. Col. Sanguk Han, Korean interpreter, and Dr. Paul Crane, the American interpreter. Gen. Park, who at the time was heading South Korea's ruling military junta, was in Washington seeking economic and military assistance.



South Korea's President Gen. Park Chung-hee greets President John F. Kennedy, who was shot to death in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963 allegedly by members of the (U.S.) Central Intelligence Agency. Park Chung-hee was shot to death by Kim Jaegyu, the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), on October 26, 1979.

HUPO41705-4/17/68-HONOLULU:President Lyndon B. Johnson and South Korean President Park Chung Hee(R) chat via an interpreter at a luncheon break during meeting on the perplexing problems of Southeast Asia. WHITE HOUSE PHOTO VIA UPI



General Park Chung-hee (left), President of South Korea, meets with American President Lyndon Baines Johnson (right) in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A. on April 17, 1968. (White House Photo via UPI)



General Park Chung-hee (center), President of South Korea, meets with U.S. Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson (right) at Washington National Airport on November 13, 1961 as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk (left) looks on.





U.S. President Lyndon Baines Johnson (front, left) and South Korea's President Park Chung-hee (center) review the troops in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. in May 1965. South Korea sent an estimated 300,000 troops to Vietnam during the Vietnam War. (Photo: Francis Miller/Time Life)



### **Korea: From Rags to Riches (8)**



THE KOREA INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION



President Park Chung-hee signs the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty in this file photo taken on June 22, 1965. Following this deal, the Park government could pursue its second five-year economic development plan (1967-1972) with more confidence. (Photo: Korea Times)

SXP082101-8/21/69-SAN FRANCISCO:South Korean President Park Chung Hee (l) and President Nixon review troops during welcoming ceremonies for the two Chief Executives at San Francisco's Presidio. UPI TELEPHOTO. tf/MJ



South Korea's President Park Chung-hee (left) appears with U.S. President Richard Nixon (2nd left) at the Presidio in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. on August 21, 1969. (UPI Telephoto)



(EX1) SAN FRANCISCO, AUG. 22 - THE WORD IS FORMAL - Presidents Park Chung Hee and Nixon are shown with their wives just before going into a black tie State Dinner last night honoring President and Mrs. Chung Hee Park. Top ranking military officials, Hollywood stars and prominent Californians were among the 250 guests. (AP Wirephoto) (rh60300stf)'69



South Korea's President Park Chung-hee (left) appears with U.S. President Richard Nixon (2nd left) in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. on August 22, 1969. (AP Wirephoto)



South Korea's President Park Chung-hee, left, and his daughter Park Geun-hye, second left, pose with U.S. President Jimmy Carter, right, and U.S. first lady Rosalynn Carter, second right, and their daughter, Amy, at the Blue House in Seoul, South Korea on June 30, 1979. (AP Photo/File)

<http://bigstory.ap.org/photo/park-chung-hee-park-geun-hye-jimmy-carter-roosalynn-carter-amy-carter>



Gen. Park Chung Hee, President of South Korea, shakes hands with retired U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur at MacArthur's Waldorf Tower apartment in New York City on November 18, 1961.



Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F019521-0007  
Foto: Wegmann, Ludwig | 10. Dezember 1964

South Korea's President General Park Chung-hee (left) appears with Mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt at Tempelhof Airport in West Berlin, West Germany on December 10, 1964. (Photo: [German Federal Archives](#))






President Park Chung Hee (left) of the Republic of Korea walks with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, at Sungshan Military Air Base in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China on February 16, 1966. (Bettmann/CORBIS)



American politician and former Hollywood actor Ronald Reagan (L), the Governor of California, shakes hands with South Korea's President Park Chung-hee during Reagan's courtesy call in Seoul, South Korea on October 16, 1971. Reagan, touring Asia as President Nixon's personal emissary, arrived in Seoul from Saigon, South Vietnam. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)



American President Gerald Ford speaks with South Korea's President Park Chung Hee during a state visit in Seoul, South Korea in November 1974. (Photo by Dirck Halstead/Time Life Pictures/Getty Images)



The Seoul-Pusan Highway in South Korea was a construction project developed by South Korea's President Park Chung-hee.





City Hall in Seoul (서울), South Korea in 1967, with a poster displayed on the city hall welcoming American President Lyndon B. Johnson and South Korea's President Park Chung-hee.

(Photo: <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?s=96b6d2296442bc322dcc938a2c8ebf4d&t=611726&page=4>)



Seosomun highpass [expressway] in South Korea in 1967.

(Photo: <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?s=96b6d2296442bc322dcc938a2c8ebf4d&t=611726&page=4>)



The Samsung Group is South Korea's largest chaebol [business conglomerate, or cartel]; Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo were three of South Korea's prominent corporations that benefited from the national socialist economic policies implemented by South Korea's President Gen. Park Chung-hee. Park Chung-hee's national socialist economic plan and his First Five-year Economic Development (implemented in 1962) were modeled after the Imperial Japanese government's economic plan in Manchuria before and during World War II.



“The 424-kilometre drive up the motorway from Pusan to Seoul takes about six hours. Heavy traffic, especially in the last 60 kilometres, and especially on a Sunday night when everyone is returning to Seoul after the weekend, can really slow you down. It is hard to appreciate, when you're driving along this permanently busy road, that most sensible people in 1968, when it was built, saw it as a complete waste of money. It only got done because it was the brainchild of the president, Park Chung-hee. **Park had started to develop the country's industry to provide the means for long-term defence against north Korea and to end the dependence on the United States. As part of this strategy, and under some US prodding, he had signed diplomatic relations with Japan, earning a useful \$500 million in grants and loans, but offending the sensibilities of many Koreans, for whom the memories of occupation were still fresh. Students had protested so strongly that it almost brought the government down. Park saw that he needed good economic growth not just to build his nation, but to legitimize his regime.** Pusan was the port nearest to Japan and key to the glorious future as a trading nation. The modern road was to strike diagonally across the length of the country, linking the south-eastern port with the industrial Seoul-Inchon region in the north-west. The World Bank had advised against it. The National Assembly had refused to approve it, thinking Park was going to bankrupt the country. Park ignored them. There is a story that after a few months' work, the cement ran out. 'I don't care,' Park is alleged to have said. 'Finish it anyway.' It was done. Within three years, 80 per cent of the country's vehicles would be using the expressway and the area it serviced would be producing almost 70 per cent of GNP. If the story of south Korea's remarkably rapid transition from agricultural backwater to modern industrialised state in one generation is recalled a millennium from now and reduced to a biblical-length verse or two, this slightly apocryphal episode may do. 157 It tells of a particular miracle that characterised the bigger miracle of growth. Like the biblical loaves and fishes, the cement was there somewhere. The miracle was that people were persuaded to produce it. They were persuaded by a leader with a vision of development and the ability to push it through. It was Park who inspired, bullied, beat, cajoled and enticed Koreans out of the paddy fields and into the forefront of the industrial world. Author Mark Clifford has described him as an 'economic warrior'. He was 'a nation-builder with few peers in the modern world,' Clifford writes. 'None of the better-known national architects of the 20<sup>th</sup>-century – Atatürk, Nasser, or Lenin – have built a more durable and prosperous country than Park.' Over three decades, Korea's economy grew by an average of almost 9 per cent a year, from \$2.3 billion in 1962 to \$442 billion in 1997. Per capita income rose from \$87 in 1962 to \$9,511 in 1997. By the 1990s, it had become the world's eleventh largest economy and thirteenth trading nation, and a major producer of ships, steel, electronics and cars. Its huge conglomerates had gone multinational and joined the ranks of the world's biggest businesses. As a measure of the changes, in 1962, there were 30,800 registered vehicles in the country. By 1997, there were 10,413,427, almost all of them Korean-made. On major national holidays, when people drive out to the countryside to pay their respects at ancestral tombs, these vehicles all seem to go out at once. The Seoul-Pusan expressway and the other broad, modern motorways which now link all the major cities of this country, where people still remember army jeeps bouncing along potholed tracks and peasants slapping their lumbering oxen, get virtually gridlocked. **Park ruled from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. He is a towering figure in the Korean story.** Yet, if we can identify a fatal flaw, it was that he appeared to make economic growth itself the goal of everything that he did, and in doing so, missed the lesson that had been learned already by human beings elsewhere and was in evidence in more developed states to be borrowed. That is that the goal of decent government is happiness and a civilised life for its people and that economics is a means to this end, not an end in itself. As a result of this shortcoming, even in developed Korea today, there is a harshness. It is a state which bulldozes ancient monuments, removes entire hills, and fails to restrain developers for the broader good of making life that bit more green and pleasant. An almost brutal obsession with economy still remains with Koreans. **Like Rhee before him, Park came to believe that the nation couldn't survive without him, and altered the constitution and rigged elections so that he could stay in power. In the end, he was shot at the dinner table by his own intelligence chief.** Despite his aggressive suppression of labour unions and political dissidents, he is missed today by many Koreans, who feel that he would know how to get the nation through its current [late 1990s] economic crisis. He was the son of a *Tong-hak* rebel who had been pardoned in an amnesty and had become a subsistence farmer. His struggle began early, when his forty-five-year-old mother tried to abort him, because she already had too many children. She drank raw soybean sauce and willow soup to try to poison him, tied a belt around her belly to constrict him, and even jumped off a wall. He survived this pre-birth battering. Park did well at school and became a teacher before joining the army. He came top in his class at the Japanese Manchukuo Academy and went to the elite Tokyo Military Academy. After his graduation in 1944, he was commissioned a lieutenant in the Japanese-controlled Manchukuo [Kwantung] army. This Japanese experience was a vital component in the character of Park's future rule. Not only was he exposed to Japanese planning, but he and his fellow Korean officers were imbued with the Japanese attitude of placing the interests of the group and nation before personal or family interest. 'As a group they had scant regard for the intricacies of etiquette, which all too often limited action in Korea,' Clifford writes. 'They also placed much less importance on the family and more importance on the organisation – both the nation and the corporation. In this sense they were much less typically Korean than the generations that preceded and followed them. It is hard to over-emphasise their importance in Korean development. Despite the Japanese background, Park was not seen as having been a collaborator. After his older brother was killed by police in 1946 during a communist-led riot in Taegu, Park sided with the political left. He saw it as more organised, patriotic and less corrupt than the right. In 1948, he led a communist cell in the army and was sentenced to death for his part in a revolt of junior officers. The sentence was commuted to fifteen years and he was later pardoned due to his co-operation with investigators. He was promoted to brigadier-general during the Korean War and major-general in 1958. Park had a strong dislike of the Rhee government, which he felt was corrupt and overdependent on the United States. The Kennedy administration knew enough about his history to worry after his coup that he

may have still been a communist. The local press gave him a Russian-sounding nickname, calling him 'Parkov' (enjoying a press freedom that was later curtailed). 'Park Chung-hee was never an ideological communist,' says journalist Cho Gab-je. 'But he was an emotional communist because of his mind for independence. He thought that Japanese imperialism had been replaced by American imperialism. He was a very independently-minded and practical person. His basic way of thinking was that you can travel as far as your power allows you. **Power is the most important thing, not empty words. He endured the humiliation [of dependency] and wanted to build up Korean power in order that we could be independent from both Japan and the United States.'** In other words, *juche* by a more subtle route than Kim Il Sung's. Immediately after taking power, he launched an anti-corruption campaign, rounding up the rich, centralising economic planning and generally making it clear who was the boss. Several wealthy businessmen were arrested, but most were let off provided that they set up companies in certain designated industries. Rather than suppress businessmen, as the leftist within him may have wished, Park sought to harness their profit-hunting abilities to the cause of national growth. Thus, as economist Alice Amsden notes, within days of his coup 'an alliance had been formed between business and government that laid the basis for subsequent industrialisation.' Bankers, however, were not so favoured. Banks were nationalised. As we shall see later, this was a crucial factor in the centrally planned growth. Failure to adjust later and permit banks their independence led inevitably to the financial crisis in 1997. In 1962, Park launched his first five-year plan. No one was impressed. Burma and the Philippines were seen as the promising Asian economies of the day. The prevailing forecast for Korea was gloom. During that first five years, annual GNP growth averaged 8.3 per cent, exceeding the planners' own forecasts. Exporting was the priority and would become a patriotic duty. The mantra of growth soon became 'export good, import bad'. Companies were given export targets by bureaucrats. Firms that fulfilled gained preferential credits, tax benefits, and the grateful support of bureaucrats, who were being held responsible by the all-powerful Blue House for the results. Firms that failed to meet their targets could get into trouble and even find themselves under orders to be taken over. During the second plan annual GNP growth averaged 11.4 per cent. In the early 1970s, Park launched a major drive to build up heavy and chemical industries." – *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies* by Michael Breen, Chapter 10 (The Spectacle of Growth), p. 133-136

"Through the 1970s and '80s, as job opportunities expanded, people poured into the cities. They worked hard and invested in the education of their children. They saved, too. South Korea's savings rate is 35 per cent. In contrast to the ideologues in the North, their leaders were more pragmatic than theoretical. Park and the people around him did what they had to do to deal with the obstacles to growth. Thus the explanation for the course of Korean development is often best made with reference to the obstacles it faced. A shortage of foreign currency led logically to an emphasis on exports. The absence of natural resources led to a concentration on industrial products. Changing patterns of competitiveness and the needs of nation-building led to a natural progression of these products from textiles, to ships and iron and steel, to electronics and automobiles. In this process, Park crushed dissent, ruined businessmen who did not co-operate, and pushed workers to endure long hours. Park understood the importance of the American alliance for Korea's growth. Indeed, the rise of south Korea may be viewed, without offence to Koreans, as an American success story, too. After its initial bungling, including its responsibility for having divided the country, the US government stood by its ally, providing a security shield against possible renewed conflict with north Korea, and a market for Korean products. There have been tensions and difficulties, but the benefit to Korea was that it was both in American strategic interests and a natural consequence of American values as a nation born in opposition to imperialism, that its client state grow economically and politically from near-total dependency to equal partnership. America did not start the growth. But it provided a continued security umbrella that enabled it to happen. It also demonstrated by its own wealth and freedom what Korea, too, could become."

– *The Koreans: Who They Are, What They Want, Where Their Future Lies* by Michael Breen, Chapter 10 (The Spectacle of Growth), p. 137-138





Military Day Parade in South Korea in 1966

(Photo: <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?s=96b6d2296442bc322dcc938a2c8ebf4d&t=611726&page=4>)





South Korean soldiers honor President of South Korea Gen. Park Chung-hee during an army parade on Armed Forces Day in Seoul, South Korea on October 1, 1973.



Left photo: South Korean dissident Kim Dae-jung, later President of South Korea, talks to the press after being released from prison in the early 1970s. Park Chung-hee ordered his Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) agents to kidnap and drown Kim Dae-jung in 1973. Kim Dae-jung was a presidential candidate in the South Korean presidential election in 1971; he was "defeated" by Park Chung-hee that year.  
<http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2010/06/park-chung-hees-act-of-terrorism.html>



Right photo: South Korean dissident Kim Dae-jung appears in front of a military tribunal.  
 (Photo: <http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2010/06/park-chung-hees-act-of-terrorism.html>)





South Korean soldiers clamp down on the Kwangju Democratization Movement in May 1980.  
 (Photo: <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000989&mod=skb>)



The Kwangju Uprising of 1980 was held in South Korea in May 1980, where South Koreans advocated democratic elections and protested martial law promulgated by Korean Central Intelligence Agency chief Gen. Chun Doo Hwan. Gen. Chun ordered the South Korean army to violently disperse the protestors, and at least 140 Koreans died during the protests.



South Korean soldiers arrest protestors during the Kwangju Massacre in Kwangju, South Korea on May 27, 1980. General Chun Doo-hwan, the military strongman of South Korea, declared martial law over South Korea on May 17, 1980 in an attempt to consolidate his political powers. Protests erupted all over South Korea over Gen. Chun's decision to impose martial law. Koreans in Kwangju, South Korea engaged in a week-long uprising and barricaded the city of Kwangju until General Chun Doo-hwan sent his American-trained Special Warfare Command Troops to violently suppress the uprising.



South Korean soldiers detain protestors during the Kwangju Massacre in Kwangju, South Korea on May 27, 1980.





President of the United States Ronald Reagan (left) toasts with President of South Korea Gen. Chun Doo Hwan during a reception at the Blue House in Seoul, Republic of Korea on November 13, 1983. (Photo: [Ronald Reagan Presidential Library](#))



President of South Korea Gen. Chun Doo Hwan (left) toasts Emperor Hirohito of Japan during a state banquet at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, Japan on September 6, 1984. (© Bettmann/CORBIS)



President of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan (center) appears with Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher during her visit to South Korea.



President of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan (left) greets Prime Minister of Great Britain Margaret Thatcher.





Student protesters shout and chant during a demonstration in Seoul, Republic of Korea on June 23, 1987. Students and other demonstrators who joined them all over South Korea protested the political and economic situation and eventually brought the regime of President Chun Doo Hwan to an end. In October 1987, the National Assembly ratified a new constitution, which provided for direct presidential elections.  
(© Patrick Robert/Sygma/CORBIS)



President of South Korea Roh Tae-woo (left) meets Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in 1990.  
(Photo: <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000989&mod=skb>)

# From the Grassy Knoll in Seoul, South Korea: Lone Gunman or Patsy?

The Assassination of General Park Chung-hee on the 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the  
Assassination of Japanese Diplomat Ito Hirobumi (October 26, 1979)



Lieutenant General Kim Jae-kyu (front row, 2nd left), Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, appears on trial for his direct role in assassinating President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979. Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi was assassinated by Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun in Harbin, China on October 26, 1909.

(Photo: <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130813000989&mod=sbk>)



South Korean “patsy” Lt. Gen. Kim Jae-kyu, Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency from 1976 until 1979, assassinated President Gen. Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), now called the National Intelligence Service, was originally established by Gen. Park Chung-hee in 1961. Lt. Gen. Kim Jae-kyu was executed for murder by hanging on May 24, 1980. (Photo: <http://koreanhistory.info/park.htm>)





President of South Korea Chun Doo Hwan (left) greets United States Ambassador to South Korea William H. Gleysteen Jr. in circa 1980-1981. Ambassador Gleysteen, a Yale graduate, was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1983 until his death on December 6, 2002.

**1968**



On Jan. 21, 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated into Seoul in an attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee.

**1983**



On Oct. 9, three Northern agents bombed Aung San's tomb in Rangoon to try to kill President Chun Doo Hwan.

Failed North Korean assassination attempts on two presidents of South Korea

# Yale University Graduates and Their Occupation during the Assassination of Gen. Park Chung-hee



**William H. Gleysteen Jr.**  
B.A. Yale 1949  
U.S. Ambassador to  
South Korea (July 24,  
1978-June 10, 1981)



**Winston Lord**  
B.A. Yale 1959  
President of the Council  
on Foreign Relations  
(1977-1985)




**Cyrus R. Vance**  
B.A. Yale 1939  
U.S. Secretary of State  
(January 20, 1977-  
April 28, 1980)



**Peter B. Bensinger**  
B.A. Yale 1958  
Administrator of Drug  
Enforcement Admin.  
(1976-1981)



**Kingman Brewster Jr.**  
B.A. Yale 1941  
U.S. Ambassador to Great  
Britain (1977-1981)



**Potter Stewart**  
B.A. Yale 1937  
Justice of the U.S.  
Supreme Court  
(1958-1981)



**Jonathan B. Bingham**  
B.A. Yale 1936  
U.S. Congressman  
(Democrat-New  
York, 1965-1983)



**William S. Moorhead Jr.**  
B.A. Yale 1945  
U.S. Congressman  
(Democrat-Pennsylvania,  
1959-1981)



**Thomas "Lud" Ashley**  
B.A. Yale 1948  
U.S. Congressman  
(Democrat-Ohio,  
1955-1981)



**Leslie (Les) Aspin**  
B.A. Yale 1960  
U.S. Congressman  
(Democrat-Wisconsin,  
1971-1993)



**Lowell P. Weicker**  
B.A. Yale 1953  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-Connecticut,  
1971-1989)



**John H. Chafee**  
B.A. Yale 1947  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-Rhode  
Island, 1976-1999)



**Henry John Heinz III**  
B.A. Yale 1960  
U.S. Senator  
(Republican-  
Pennsylvania, 1977-1991)




**Henry B. Schacht**  
B.S. Yale 1956  
Chairman and CEO of  
Cummins Engine  
(1977-1995)



**Angelo Bartlett Giamatti**  
B.A. Yale 1960  
President of Yale  
University (1978-1986)




**Robert A. Lovett**  
B.A. Yale 1918  
Partner of Brown Brothers  
Harriman & Co. [bank]  
(1931-1940, 1946-1947,  
1949-1950, 1953-1986)




**George H.W. Bush**  
B.A. Yale 1948  
Chairman of First  
International Bank in  
Houston, Texas  
(1977-1980)



**Nicholas F. Brady**  
B.A. Yale 1952  
President and CEO of  
Dillon, Read & Co. [bank]  
(1971-1982)



**Samuel W. Lewis**  
B.A. Yale 1952  
U.S. Ambassador to Israel  
(1977-1985)



**W. Averell Harriman**  
B.A. Yale 1913  
Elder Statesman





The funeral of South Korea's strongman Gen. Park Chung-hee was held in Seoul, South Korea on November 3, 1979.  
(Photo: [http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2009\\_08\\_01\\_archive.html](http://populargusts.blogspot.com/2009_08_01_archive.html))



General Park Chung-hee

# PEACE IS PREREQUISITE TO UNIFICATION

By Park Chung Hee, President of the Republic of Korea

June 23, 1974



Park Chung Hee (1917-1979)

*Statement issued on June 23, 1974, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Special Statement regarding Foreign Policy for Peace and Unification*

Dear fellow countrymen at home and abroad:

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the June 23 Foreign Policy Statement for Peace and Unification, I wish to reaffirm our policy of achieving unification of the fatherland on a peaceful basis while reviewing developments on the Korean peninsula during the past year.

The aim of the Foreign Policy Statement was to improve substantially the conditions for the attainment of unification of the fatherland through our own independent efforts by consolidating peace in this land on the basis of a realistic appraisal of internal and external realities.

In that statement, I declared that the south and the north should neither interfere in each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression against each other, in order to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula; and that we for our part would exert our utmost efforts to achieve peaceful unification of the country by continuing, with sincerity and patience, our efforts to secure concrete results from the south-north dialogue.

I also made it clear that, provided these conditions were met, we would not oppose north Korea's participation with us in the United Nations and other international organizations, and that **the Republic of Korea would open its doors to all the nations of the world, including those countries whose ideologies and social system are different from ours, on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality.**

I emphasized that peace and good-neighborliness were the firm basis of the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea, and that we would further strengthen our existing ties with friendly nations.

To look back over past events, the Korean people were offered an opportunity in 1947 to achieve unification of the fatherland through independent, peaceful and democratic means when the second session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the holding of free general elections throughout both south and north Korea. This opportunity, however, was lost due to north Korea's refusal.

Moreover, the invasion of the south by the north Korean Communists on June 25, 1950 further deepened the schism of distrust and heightened the barrier of division between the south and the north.

Even after the armistice was signed in 1953, the north Korean Communists did not abandon their scheme to communize the whole of Korea, but continued to commit various acts of armed provocation against the south, including the attempted raid on the Presidential Residence in Seoul on January 21, 1968; the hijacking of the USS *Pueblo*; the large-scale infiltration of armed guerrillas into the Ulchin-Samchuk area; the hijacking of a Korean Airlines passenger plane to the north, etc. Thus tension was mounting between the south and the north, and the danger of renewed hostilities was growing.

Under the circumstances, I made a policy statement in my National Liberation Day Address on August 15, 1970 with a view to preventing another tragedy of fratricidal warfare by all means, and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula.



The following year, the Red Cross Society of the Republic of Korea proposed the convening of a south-north Red Cross conference to settle humanitarian problems, including the reuniting of separated families.

Furthermore, I secretly sent my emissary to Pyongyang in an earnest effort to reduce tension and prevent the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula, and thus to prepare a foundation for peaceful unification. As a result, the South-North Joint Communiqué was issued on July 4, 1972, opening the path toward the south-north dialogue.

In the course of the south-north talks, we took the position that both sides should endeavor to build up mutual confidence by solving easier and more practical problems first, and thus to remove gradually the barriers between the south and the north by expediting many-sided exchanges. We believed that such an approach would best serve to make the talks productive, and to accelerate the process of peaceful unification.

On the contrary, north Korea not only rejected our reasonable and realistic proposals, without working toward eliminating the causes of mutual distrust between the south and the north, but also continued to make absurd assertions which might endanger the security of the Republic of Korea.

Due to this obstinate attitude of the north Korean side, no progress was made in the dialogue, and south-north relations reached a point where mutual distrust seemed about to deepen, and tension to increase further.

In the face of these realities of the south-north relationship, as well as the international trend toward relaxation of tension and peaceful coexistence, I concluded that the improvement of basic conditions was indispensable for the attainment of our goal of peaceful unification. For these reasons, I put forward our new foreign policy in my statement on June 23 last year.

My dear fellow countrymen:

What was the north Korean reaction to our *bona fide* policy statement for peace?

In the evening of that very day, the north Korean side, in diametrical opposition to our Foreign Policy Statement, counter-proposed a number of unrealistic and stereotyped ideas for political propaganda purposes, such as a so-called "grand national conference" or "confederation" of the south and the north.

Since then, the north Koreans have resumed their slanders and libels against us at home and abroad, in violation of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and other agreements reached between the south and the north.

Externally, they have attempted to distort and vilify our just and realistic policy for peace. While at the same time establishing diplomatic relations with some of the countries which have long maintained diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea, and also joining international organizations of which we have long been a full member, they have nevertheless persisted in their inconsistent and self-contradictory assertion that their entry along with us into the United Nations would perpetuate the division of the country.

Finally, north Korea unilaterally suspended the south-north dialogue upon issuance of a statement on August 28 last year, and immediately intensified its slanders against the south.

Nonetheless, last November we urged the north Korean side, with untiring perseverance and sincerity, to resume the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee and the South-North Red Cross Conference.

Subsequently, the General Assembly of the United Nations last year adopted a decision on November 28 expressing the hope that the south and the north of Korea would continue their dialogue and expand their exchanges and cooperation in various fields, so as to expedite the independent and peaceful unification of Korea.

The decision was in complete consonance with our policy for peace and unification, and evidently reflected worldwide support for our June 23 Foreign Policy Statement.

Indeed, it is owing to our perseverance and sincerity that the south-north dialogue has barely kept in existence, in the form of contacts between the liaison officers of the South-North Red Cross Conference and the Vice Co-Chairmen of the South-North Coordinating Committee.

However, north Korea has shown no interest or sincerity about normalizing the south-north dialogue, but has newly engaged in provocative acts against five islands off the west coast which belong to our territory. The north Koreans have recently introduced a large number of various new weapons for surprise attack. They have also built new naval and air bases in areas near the armistice line. Thus they have been bent on preparing for another war, aggravating the tension on the Korean peninsula to a serious extent.

In order to prevent a recurrence of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, and to maintain peace and security in Northeast Asia, I proposed to the north Korean side the conclusion of a non-aggression agreement on January 18 this year.

**The north Korean side, however, has again turned its back to this sincere proposal put forth by us, and intensified its slanders against us as well as the infiltration of armed espionage agents into the south.**

**On February 15 this year, north Korean gunboats repeated the inhuman and savage act of sinking and hijacking our fishing vessels peacefully engaged in fishing operations on the high seas off the west coast, killing and kidnapping the innocent fishermen aboard.**

**Furthermore, the north Koreans have overtly attempted to create social unrest in the south, and to overthrow the Republic of Korea, thus revealing their design to communize the whole of the country. Externally, they have put forward a proposal for a peace agreement with a third party in their attempt to disguise the real intention behind their peace propaganda.**

**All these acts of the north Korean Communists reveal that they have no intention to settle the problems pending between the south and the north by peaceful means and through dialogue.**

My dear compatriots in the south and the north:

Judging objectively from the current internal and external situations facing Korea today, I wish to reaffirm that our foreign policy for peace and unification is truly the most reasonable and realistic step toward peaceful and independent unification of our fatherland.

It is unlikely that our efforts for peaceful unification will bear fruit within a short period, as long as the north Korean Communists do not renounce their negative and provocative attitude, derived from their strategy of placing the south under communist rule.

However, we cannot afford interruption or delay in our efforts toward the easing of tension and the consolidation of peace on the Korean peninsula, because we firmly believe that these are the major prerequisites to peaceful unification of our country.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the June 23 Foreign Policy Statement, I wish to reiterate our determination to continue our best efforts, with patience and sincerity, to ease tension and consolidate peace on the Korean peninsula, and to make progress in the south-north dialogue. At the same time, I once again demand that north Korea accept our policy for peace and unification.

**First, I strongly urge the north Korean Communists to renounce immediately their policy of communizing the whole of Korea by force and violence** and, by returning to the spirit of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, to join us in efforts to normalize the South-North Red Cross Conference as well as the South-North Coordinating Committee, and to realize exchanges and cooperation between the south and the north.

**Second, I call upon the north Korean side to discontinue at once all its acts or interference in our internal affairs and all its hostile activities against the Republic of Korea, including military provocations, and to respond without delay to our call for negotiations to conclude a non-aggression agreement between the south and the north.**

Third, I reiterate that the Republic of Korea, with its 33 million population, should be admitted into the United Nations, so as to contribute positively to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace, and to the promotion of international cooperation. At the same time, we shall not oppose north Korea with its 14 million people joining the United Nations if it so desires.

Fourth, we shall continue to pursue our open-door policy with a view to improving relations with countries which may have different ideologies and systems, on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. We earnestly hope that all peace-loving nations will respond positively to this policy, thereby contributing with us to the security of this region, and to the establishment of world peace.

My dear fellow countrymen:

In the firm belief that our policy of consolidating peace on the Korean peninsula and achieving peaceful unification of the fatherland will certainly bear fruit, let us march forward with courage and wisdom.

Source: *Toward Peaceful Unification: Selected Speeches & Interviews* by Park Chung Hee (1976), p. 103-108